With nearly 82 million inhabitants and a GDP of Euro2.5tn in 2010, Germany is both the most populous and richest nation in Europe.1,2 Although its cement production industry has been muted in recent years due to the global economic downturn, the country has a strong industrial background and is a leader in many industrial sectors, including the manufacture of cement production equipment, which has enabled strong exports to developing regions of the world.
Introduction
East and West
Following defeat of Nazi Germany at the end of the Second World War, Germany was split into two sections in 1949, with the western three quarters (Federal Republic of Germany, FRG) under the initial control of France, Britain and the USA. The north-east corner became the German Democratic Republic (GDR) under the Soviet stewardship of the USSR.
While the FRG (West Germany) was allowed to rebuild its market-based economy and become re-established within Western Europe as part of the US's Marshall Plan, the GDR (East Germany), like other Soviet states, was run to a strict planned economy with centralised production targets and wage structures.
Far from being helped by the USSR, East Germany was weakened by it. War reparations owed by the new state to the USSR severely weakened its economy and in 1945–46, the Soviet regime transported around a third of the East German industrial plant to the USSR.3 By the early 1950s it had extracted some Euro7bn in reparations in agricultural and industrial products.
By 1985 the East German economic output was controlled by the government to the tune of 96.7%.4 Despite claims to the contrary by the socialist government, the country became dependent on loans, which led its currency to be weakened to the point where direct bartering without cash and resource-hoarding became increasingly common.
This and innumerable other factors led to a growing discontent with the status-quo in East Germany and the wider Soviet Union. Crucially, in August 1989, socialist Hungary effectively removed border restrictions along its border with Austria. This opened a 'back-door' to West Germany via Hungary and Austria and a significant exodus followed. In the autumn of 1989 following popular protests, the East German government announced that its citizens were free to visit West Germany. On 9 November 1989 this led to the destruction of the Berlin Wall, which had physically separated East and West Berlin since 1961.
Re-unification
In March 1990 the East German Socialist Party suffered a massive defeat in the first honest elections to be held there. The defeat was a clear mandate against socialist rule and it accelerated progress towards re-unification of the two states in early 1990, a process that had already been discussed in 1989.
After intense discussions between the two sides, the two economies were merged on 1 July 1990 and on 3 October 1990, the two nations became one entity again, with East Germany ceasing to exist and the Federal Republic of Germany enlarging to include five new Länder (States) from its former-Soviet neighbour.
Status at re-unification
In 1990, the former East Germany had 25% of the combined German populations, but only 9% of the combined GDP. Conversely the West had 75% of the population and a staggering 91% of the GDP. This meant that the former East Germany had a GDP/capita rate that was just one third that of the West.5
This imbalance was not assisted by a poorly-thought through political move, which saw the Deutschmark and the East German Mark unified at a rate of 1:1.6 The move was meant to symbolise the union of two equal 'partners', rather than have the West perceived as the 'victor', but it is now thought that the exchange should have taken place at the 1990 black-market rate of around 10 East German Marks to 1 Deutschmark.
The result of this discrepency, coupled with significant East-West migration, saw labour in the former Eastern states effectively priced out of the market in the early 1990s. Western companies wanting to exploit Eastern markets often decided to simply increase production at existing sites in the West, which gave rise to a greater imbalance and did little to help the idea that the two former sides were equal.
Other problems affecting the East were vast. As well as unaffordable labour it had a legacy of poor infrastructure, disputes over the ownership of buildings (from the pre-war, Nazi and communist eras) and continued power-shortages, all of which led to a lack of investment. Indeed the former East German economy contracted by 50% in 1991 compared to 1990.
As well as these problems and disputes, the (mainly Western-run) Treuhand (Trust Agency), which was responsible for the privatisation of 14,000 former East German businesses in just five years, allowed significant swathes of property to be assigned to West German companies.5 Less than 5% of takeovers were from companies outside the former West Germany. The Treuhand had the power to decide which factories it kept and which were closed, leading to resentment in the former East. In five years the Treuhand made 2.5 million of its 4 million workers redundant.5
As well as different economic expectations, the former East and West residents had vastly different views regarding the country's political past, which stemmed from the Socialist dogma that capitalism had 'allowed' the formation of the Nazi party. Meanwhile the West felt that it had made efforts to acknowledge the past and felt that the East was in denial.
Progress in the 1990s
By 1995 the economic imbalances between the two sides had been greatly reduced, with average Eastern wages going from 35% of the former Western levels to 74% since 1990.7 Also in 1995 former (mainly younger) East and West Germans with similar levels of education were paid broadly the same as each other for working in the former West. Indeed, by just 1991 there were over 400,000 former East Germans commuting to work in the West. Conversely, older workers in the East were not well suited to market economies.
In addition, there was little drive for anyone in the West to go to the East in the initial years after re-unification, although the presence of the German capital, which was officially moved back to Berlin from Bonn in the West on 10 March 1994 gave the region a boost.
By the formation of the single-currency Eurozone, a process that started in 1999, significant progress had been made in terms of equalising the two former rival economies. By 1999 Germany contributed about 34% of the then 11-member Eurozone's GDP and was easily the largest EU economy. In 1999 its GDP/capita was Euro18,754, with living standards among the world's best.8
The adoption of the Euro currency reduced costs and some of the 'red-tape' of dealing with other nations in the Eurozone, which has further helped Germany to expand its economy. However as an economic powerhouse, Germany has recently borne the brunt of Eurozone economic bail-out plans of Greece,10 Portugal,11 Ireland12 and recently Greece for a second time.13
Economy
Current economic status
At the geographical and economic heart of Continental Europe, the German economy in 2011 is the largest in Europe and the fourth largest in the world after the US, China and Japan.2 Following re-unification, it retains a strong emphasis on wealth creation, with large and strong industrial and manufacturing sectors, especially in terms of vehicle manufacturing, infrastructure and large plant manufacturing, including cement plants. Germany has a very strong export trade. In 2010 its Euro2.5tn economy exported Euro947bn,14 over a third of its total output.
Differences remain
Despite large initial changes in the relative wealth of the two former sides, the former East Germany is still behind the former West in economic terms. Its five states still receive a combined subsidy of a massive Euro57bn/yr from the former Western states, a practice that is expected to continue until 2019, a full 30 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall.18
According to Wolfgang Hummel, deputy director of the State Ministry of Finance for Berlin (2008), such subsidies have already cost tax-payers in the Western states an estimated Euro1.34tn from 1990 to 2009.8 Indeed, it is estimated that former East Germany still consumes 20% more than it produces, which is a pattern that, according to Hummel has the potential to see East Germany, 'slide ever further behind economically.'9
The 2010 GDP listings for Germany's 16 states clearly show the discrepancies that still exist.19 The top 11 positions are taken by the 11 former-Western states, which had an average GDP/capita of Euro27,800. The city-state of Berlin, the only state formed by parts of both former nations, was ranked 12th (Euro20,900) and the five former Eastern states have an average GDP/capita of Euro18,100. The average German GDP/capita was Euro24,900 in 2010.
There are also inequalities in Germany's unemployment data. In 2008, before the onset of the global economic downturn, former Western states had a combined unemployment rate of 6.2%, but in former Eastern states the rate was over twice as high at 12.7%.8
In addition, the country as a whole continues to be saddled with a large social security bill from unemployment payments, an increasingly elderly population and a heavily regulated workforce. It has generous benefits, which arose in part from the West's desire to demonstrate its prosperity to East Germany.
Recent economic performance
Despite the remaining differences, the German economy on the whole improved in 2010, following a poor 2009.24 In 2010, the economy grew by 3.6%, helping to claw back a 4.7% decrease that was recorded in 2009.In terms of exports, 2010 saw a 14.2% increase, almost entirely negating a 14.3% decrease seen in 2009.
Germany is a massive exporter of manufactured goods, an increasing proportion of which are destined for emerging economies. Investment in machinery and equipment was up by 9.4% in 2010, helping to stem a 22.6% decline seen in 2009. The nation's imports for 2010 were up by 13%, following a 9.4% decrease in 2009.24
Cement industry
Overview
In recent decades the German cement industry has developed into a highly sophisticated one.17 Material transfer processes are highly automated, production is overseen by process control systems and product quality is assured by stringent laboratory procedures. Besides the well-known standard cements, the development of standardised and non-standardised specialist cements for customised applications has featured strongly. This has led to the development of rapidly-setting cements, pollution-free spraying cements and micro-fine injection cements. Continued development is ably assisted by well-funded research centres and computer models.17
The German cement industry has also seen significant development in terms of alterations to production processes. These have allowed for gradual lowering of the fixed and variable costs and the implementation of increasingly stringent environmental regulations.
This applies in particular to the reduction of the specific fuel requirement. In this area the conversion from wet to dry production and the optimisation of waste-heat utilisation has led to a substantial improvement in the energy efficiency. The overall alternative fuel substitution rate is over 60% for the industry.17
Like in other nations, the cement industry has also seen a dramatic change in terms of kiln capacity over the years. In the 1960s and 1970s the average West German cement capacity went from 350t/day to 2400t/day and in 1977 a kiln with 4000t/day capacity was commisioned in the south of the country.25 Today, the largest cement plant is the three-kiln, 2.Mt/yr Rüdersdorf Plant in the state of Brandenburg (former East Germany), which is operated by Cemex OstZement GmbH.16
Integrated plants (2011) | 33 |
Capacity (2011 est.) | 60.5Mt/yr |
Consumption (2010) | 24.6Mt |
Global production rank | 17th |
Total employees | ~7400 |
Turnover (2010) | Euro1.2bn |
Growth forecast for 2011 | 0.06 |
Table 1: Summary statistics for the German cement industry.16,17
1: Deuna Zement GmbH (Dyckerhoff / Buzzi Unicem), 1.3Mt/yr |
15: HeidelbergCement AG, Südbayrisches Portland |
26: Cemex OstZement GmbH, |
Figure 3: Map of Germany showing major cities, neighbouring countries and integrated cement manufacturing plants.16
Cement associations
The German cement industry has long been supported by two associations, the Verein Deutscher Zementindustrie (VDZ) and the Bundesverband der Deutschen Zementindustrie (BDZ).
VDZ: The VDZ was formed in 1877 and ever-since has contributed to the development and continued progress of the German cement industry. It published its first cement standard a year later in 1878 and has continuously pushed for improvements.25
As early as the 1930s, the VDZ set up a dust committee to tackle the issue of high dust emissions from cement plants. By the 1950s it had helped to reduce the average dust from 3-5% of total output to standards in the region of 10-30mg/m3 in West Germany. By 2011 the VDZ was testing over 500 cements and cementitious binders from 67 German factories in accordance with the European standard EN197-1.25
The VDZ has also led developments in terms of health and safety and in 1968 it set up the Accident Prevention Commision to provide free advice to cement and lime facilities. In line with improving performance, the VDZ was among the first in the world to recognise the performance of the safest plants and in the 30 years to 1998 both the accident rate and total lost-time had dropped by two thirds.25
BDZ: The BDZ is the political and economic union of German cement manufacturers and became the successor to the former Verein Deutscher Cement-Fabrikanten in 1911. Based in Düsseldorf, it has close links with the VDZ with several common departments.17
The BDZ's task is to further the interests of its members in relation to political, economic and public policy. It is a member of Cembureau and participates in the Federal association of building materials, stones and aggregates and the Federal Association of German Industry.
Key figures
The German cement industry has 33 integrated cement plants, with a combined production capacity of 60.5Mt/yr.16 It is the largest in Europe ahead of Italy (53Mt/yr), Spain (48.9Mt/yr), Ukraine (24.9Mt/yr) and France (22.6Mt/yr). The plants are owned by 13 different industrial groups, more than any other EU country. Germany takes 17th place in the global table of cement producers.16
Despite having the largest capacity in western Europe, Germany consumed just under 24.6Mt/yr in 2010, 2.5% down on the cement consumed in 2009. In the first half of 2011 the country consumed 12.11Mt of cement, 19% ahead of the 10.21Mt that it consumed in first half of 2010. Summary consumption statistics for 2003-2011 are given in Figures 4-6.17
The BDZ report states that, although strong, the recovery was not as profound as in other economic areas. This has its roots at least in part on the dependency of the construction business (and hence the cement industry) on weather conditions. After a weak first quarter of 2010, demand was again down to 2009 levels by November 2010. The early start of winter in December 2010 negatively impacted on the demand in the fourth quarter of the year.
At the beginning of 2011 contract awards in the construction industry increased significantly compared to 2010. When adjusted for inflation, January and February 2011 contracts were 4.6% higher than those awarded in January and February 2010. As a result, the cement sector is now on the right path to making up for the hiatus in demand at the end of 2010.
Highlights for 2010 from the BDZ
Turnover: According to the figures of the German Federal Statistics Office turnover in the German cement industry dropped by around 5% to Euro2.1bn in 2010 compared to 2009.17
Employees: Cement sector companies have largely maintained staffing levels despite the economic crisis and drops in production. The number of employees in the cement industry (in companies with 50 or more employees) remained at 7363, roughly the level of 2009, when it had 7374 on average over the course of the year.17
Consumption: In the past 10 years German cement consumption has dropped by around 30% from 35.78Mt in 2000 to 24.6Mt in 2010. The main reasons for the drop in consumption are a lower backlog of demand from the former East Germany, unfavourable demographic and tax frameworks for residential construction work, significantly reduced investments in the economy and a holding back on public/state construction investments by the government (with the exception of economic programmes devised during the 2009 fiscal crisis).
Exports: Cement and clinker exports by German producers in 2010 were somewhat below those of 2009, with the economic recovery in important buyer markets not sufficient to compensate for the negative effects of the crisis. According to preliminary figures, at 6.9Mt exports remained almost 7% below the level of 2009. This corresponds to a current export ratio of 22.7%. From a long-term perspective however, exports by German producers have almost doubled in the past decade from 3.7Mt in 2000 to 6.9Mt in 2010.17
As in 2009 around 1.2Mt of cement was imported into Germany. Again, as in 2009, this cement came mainly from EU member countries. The most important prominent suppliers were France, Luxemburg and the Czech Republic.
Cement uses: Concrete production took up 55.8% of all cement used in the German market in 2010, with 12.4Mt being used for ready-mix concrete and 1.3Mt used to make concrete on building sites. Just under one third (30.9%, 7.6Mt) was used for the production of precast concrete parts and 5.3% (1.3Mt) was used for the production of mortars and screeds. The remaining 2Mt (8%) was used for various other applications such as spraying concrete, soil-stabilisation, mining industry products and individual home-owner/DIY projects.17
Residential construction: Residential construction recovered particularly well in 2010. The increased construction volumes that have been seen since mid-2010 are expected to continue to bring with them an increased cement demand of around 8-12% in 2011, both in private residential and high-rise construction. It would be easy to get carried away with these seemingly impressive figures, but it must be remembered that 2009 levels were particularly weak.17
Residential construction currently amounts to over half of the building investments in Germany with more than 55%. In this segment, which is important for cement, the proportion of existing building measures makes up almost 80%. For comparison it stood at just 60% in 2000. In 2010 completed newbuilds rose for the first time since 1997, specifically by 6%. In high-rise residential construction the number rose by 8%, which represents approximately 169,400 residential units. For further perspective, the 1990 figure was almost double this value at 330,000 residential units.17
For 2011 further growth is forecast based on a background of relatively low mortgage interest rates, a positive overall economic climate, reduced anxiousness about job and income loss, a shortage in rented residential supply in population-intensive areas resulting in stronger demand for high-rise residences and potential for rehabilitation through replacement newbuilds. How sustainable this trend is remains to be seen. Possible factors against it are a reduction in population and a decrease in the number of residents aged 30 to 40 engaging in private building activities. Forecasts anticipate 180,000 new-build residential units for 2011 as a whole.17
Non-residential construction: Starting at a low base level in 2010, industrial construction is recovering. As it represents more than a quarter of German cement use, it is an important area for cement sales. In the non-residential construction sector, growth of around 9% is expected for 2011. In 2010 the sector grew by 1.4% compared to 2009. Buildings that are similar to residential buildings, especially offices and administration buildings represent a saturated market and did not have a similar trend. In 2010 this sector lay at 17% below the 2009 level. In 2011 further reductions of around 8% are expected.17
Underground construction: Developments in underground construction still need to be viewed critically. Risks prevail particularly in the financing of public underground works in the period after 2010, especially in the former East. Positive signs were witnessed in the five new states again in commercial construction and order books already indicate this upward trend continuing in 2011. However overall a 2% fall in cement demand for underground construction is expected for the whole of Germany in 2011.17
Public works: Public building investments have been reduced due to a reduction in access to funds and an increasingly tight debt brake, which has acted as a further financial bottleneck. A change in direction for investment repayments has been observed at town hall and community levels following the expiry of economic stimulus programmes. Additionally, the awkward framework parameters such as long approval periods, protests and other acceptance problems regarding large-scale projects still continue. The situation in road construction is particularly difficult.17
Energy policy and related costs
The German cement industry is actively engaged in achieving a balanced energy mix so that it can guarantee secure and competitive energy and electricity prices. The energy concept of the Federal Government from autumn 2010 had offered some initiatives but in part also introduced new burdens for the cement industry as well as for other energy-intensive industries.
In a recent report, the BDZ has highlighted issues surrounding the government's May 2011 announcement that it would abandon nuclear power generation preferably by 2017 and by 2022 at the latest. Considering that nuclear power contributed 22.6% of German electrical power in 2010, this policy represents a massive challenge, but government's stance is very firm. It is proposing a concerted switch to renewable energies.
The BDZ has questioned this policy from two stand-points. Firstly, according to its recent report, only 10% of the renewable energy sources installed in Germany are capable of providing baseload energy. This, it argues, will necessitate the construction of a new generation of either flexible power up/down power stations (for storage of renewable energy at significant cost) or highly-efficient oil and gas-powered production units. The CO2 emissions caused by such fossil-fuel units would partially negate the positive benefits of a wider switch to renewable energy sources.
The other objection from the BDZ is based on the prospects of increased electricity costs for the cement sector, which, coupled to increased CO2 emissions, it forecasts has the potential to severely damage the German cement industry in the medium term. The BDZ says that the cost burden from electricity generation is 'already enormous' with prices almost doubling since 2003 to a rate of Euro55-60/MWh. State-determined burdens are among the highest in the world and the association says that the industry has little room for manoeuvre without passing on costs to its customers.
In the event of abandonment of nuclear-derived power by 2017, the Federation of German Businesses (known by its German acronym BDI) has asserted that the power purchase price could rise to around Euro70/MWh.17 This additional burden will mean additional outgoings of Euro50m for the industry as a whole.
The BDI asserts that the potential switch to a mixture of renewable sources and efficient fossil-fuel plants may have negative effects in terms of CO2 quotas for the cement industry and hence future profitability. It says that CO2 costs for the German cement industry would rise considerably and forecasts that CO2 certificate prices would double from Euro19/t in 2012 to Euro38/t in 2020. Such a price explosion would lead to accumulated increased costs of around Euro57m between 2013 and 2020 for the German cement companies compared to a reference scenario based on natural growth. The BDI adds that higher CO2 certificate prices would also significantly increase the overall electricity costs as a result of emissions' pricing on the stock-exchange. This, it feels, adds a 'one-sided burden' onto the German cement industry, which would serve to further damage its future competitivity.
The BDZ argues that it is important not to give up the positive elements from the Federal Government's previous energy concepts in the light of its new policies. Such elements include;
1. Taking into account the indirect effects of emissions trading on energy-intensive industries and compensation for electricity price effects in the third trading period of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS),
2. Recognition of the key role of efficiency increases offered by the home-rebuilding programme,
3. Replenishment of funds for the CO2 home-rebuilding programme, tax breaks and changes in rental legislation,
4. Doubling of home-rebuilding rate to 2%,
5. Subsidy qualification for replacement newbuilds in the home-rebuilding programme.
Going forward - CCS to the rescue?
With an alternative fuel utilisation rate of around 60%, around two thirds of CO2-emissions from the German cement industry are unrelated to fuels.17 In light of this statistic, the industry believes that it is approaching a point where it regards further incremental progress in CO2-intensity reduction (by such means as alternative fuels, efficiency savings and clinker-substitution) as unlikely.
Instead, it believes that a step-change is necessary, bearing in mind long-term investment cycles. Limited potential for further incremental improvement, coupled to Germany and the EU's bold target to cut 80% of greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, have led the cement industry to demand a factual discourse regarding the technical and political implementation of carbon-capture and storage (CCS) technology in Germany.
BDZ - Cement forecast for full-year 2011
The weather conditions at the end of 2010 and the start of 2011 with their consequences for building activities led to cement dispatches in 2011 being able to profit additionally from the backlog effects from 2010. A dynamic export demand and its improving domestic economy have allowed Germany to be a growth leader in the Eurozone. The current overall prognoses are optimistic for 2011. The construction business in the meantime has swung in the direction of general growth. For 2011 economists expect an increase in construction investments of 2.2% compared to 2010.17
Domestic cement dispatches in the first four months of 2011 increased by 28% compared to the same period in the previous year and lies at around 1.5Mt above the level of 2010. With this background the BDZ estimates an increase in cement consumption in 2011 of just short of 6% compared to 2010. In absolute consumption, this corresponds to around 26Mt in 2011, 2Mt more than 2010. Cement demand will continue to be supported by positive trends in the overall economy and higher demand for construction work.17
Cement plant manufacturing
Introduction - VDMA and AGAB
Germany has a very strong engineering sector with notable companies in automotive production, aerospace, rolling stock, shipping, electronics and others.
The country also has a very a strong worldwide presence in the supply of turnkey cement plant projects (KHD, Polysius, Siemens) and milling equipment for raw-meal, fuel and clinker, slag and other materials (Loesche, Gebr. Pfeiffer, Christian Pfeiffer). Large plant manufacturers such as these (and many others) are represented by the Large Industrial Plant
Manufacturing Group (known by its German acronym AGAB) of the Verband Deutscher Maschinen- und Anlagenbau (VDMA). Its members represent a major sector of the German economy. Figure 8 highlights the global role played by these companies.
AGAB has reported that following a 17% year-on-year decline in bookings during the first half of 2010, order intake was up by 22% in the second half of the year, with companies that target the cement sector registering double-digit growth (along with those targeting the metallurgical and paper industries).
While European-based companies are still the main competitors in the domestic large industrial plant manufacturing market, AGAB saw the significance of North American and Japanese large industrial plant manufacturers as broadly unchanged in 2010. It views competitors from China and South Korea as increasingly significant, with them gaining additional ground in 2010. Such companies are playing an increasingly important role, particularly in the cement, chemical and power sectors. AGAB and the VDMA are worried that Germany's dominant role in the supply of the world's large plants may be at risk as suppliers in developing markets take up a significant proportion of the addition orders.
Despite the overall upward trend in the world economy, the international order intake of Euro17.6bn in 2010 reported by AGAB members was 3% below the 2009 level at Euro18.1bn. However, there has been a noticeable improvement in bookings during the reporting period. Compared to 2009, exports fell by a quarter between January and June 2010 but then increased by 23% in the period July to December 2010.
Fundamental market realignments in the world economy are clearly reflected in the figures from AGAB. For example, China was the most important export market for the German large industrial plant manufacturing industry during 2010. The order intake of Euro2.2bn (Euro1.2bn in 2009) consisted of a large number of mid to large size orders from a variety of industries, notably the cement and chemical industries, reflecting a sustained need for extensive modernisation in the Chinese economy.
India is also increasingly important for German cement plant manufacturers. In 2010, bookings from the subcontinent amounted to Euro1.5bn, up from the Euro820m booked in 2009. Russia accounted for Euro736m-worth of AGAB member orders in 2010 and Brazil was the source of a further Euro472m in bookings. Indeed the BRIC countries now account for 30% of international demand for German large plant manufacturers. In 2000 the figure was 18% and in 1990 it was only 9%.
Cement industry support
Germany also sustains a large cement support infrastructure. It has well-established companies engaged in prodution and service in every major area of the cement industry, including ventilation and filtration (Venti Oelde, Intensiv-Filter), equipment testing, optimisation and quality assurance (Testing Bluhm & Feuerherdt, Teutrine, Transresch Antriebssysteme Berlin, Powitec, Toni Technik, Aixergee, ATD Abbaussysteme), wear protection and parts (Hardtop Gießereitechnologie, Wear Protection
Engineering, Durum Verschleiß-Schutz), alternative fuels preparation and implementation (Aumund, Vecoplan, Di Matteo, WTW, Schenck, Pfister, Thorwesten Vent, Yara, Robecco, MVW Lechtenberg & Partner), gears and motors (EMZ Elektromaschinenzentrale, Menzel Elektromotoren, Helmke), lubrication (Fuchs Lubritech, Klüber) and conveying and bagging/dispatch (Möllers, Beumer, Russig, Haver & Boecker, Siloadmaxx). The industry also has consultancies that support these areas of cement development and a large proportion of the German suppliers have subsidiaries and representatives abroad. Many of these suppliers, which in many cases developed to support the domestic cement industry, are involved in projects in a wide range of countries all over the world. Table 2 clearly demonstrates the explosion in demand from developing cement markets in recent years, notably from India, Russia, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.
Cement plant equipment references
Table 2 (below) is a non-exhaustive sample list of cement and lime industry references conducted by major German cement plant producers in 2009-2011, which demonstrates the world-wide service that German plant suppliers provide.
Supplier | Client | Plant | Country | Equipment |
Christian Pfeiffer | Southern Province Cement | Jazan Plant | Saudi Arabia | 150t/day cement mill |
Christian Pfeiffer | Kyzylkumcement | Navoi City Plant | Uzbekistan | 2 x 2Mt/yr cement mills |
Christian Pfeiffer | Krasnoselskstroimaterialui | Krasnoselsk Plant | Belarus | Ball mill for cement |
Christian Pfeiffer | Portlandzementwerk Wotan | Anhütte Plant | Germany | Ball mill for cement |
Gebr. Pfeiffer | Manikgarh Cement | Manikgarh Unit II | India | MPS 6000B raw mill |
Gebr. Pfeiffer | Jaypee Cement | Balaji Plant | India | MVR 5600 C-4 cement mill |
Gebr. Pfeiffer (via CITIC) | Kraznoselsk Cement | Krasnoslesk Plant | Russia | MPS 5300 B raw mill |
Gebr. Pfeiffer | Dong Lam Cement | Hue | Vietnam | MPS 5000 B raw mill |
Gebr. Pfeiffer | Jaiprakash Associates | Jaypee Super | India | MPS 4000 B raw mill |
Gebr. Pfeiffer | Kiasar Cement | Kiasar | Iran | MPS 3550 B raw mill |
Gebr. Pfeiffer | Vietnam Construction Materials | Quang Binh | Vietnam | MPS 5000 B raw mill, MPS 3350 BK coal mill |
Gebr. Pfeiffer (via KHD) | Dungsam Cement | Dungsam | Bhutan | MPS 3550 B raw mill |
Gebr. Pfeiffer | Cali Cement | San Marcos Plant | Colombia | MPS 2500 BC limestone mill |
Gebr. Pfeiffer | UltraTech Cement | Rawan & Rajashree Plants | India | 2 x 90t/hr MPS 3550 BK coal mills |
Gebr. Pfeiffer | Wonder Cement | Tehsil Nimbahera Plant | India | 550t/hr MPS 5600 B raw mill, MPS 3070 BK coal mill |
KHD | Askale Cimento | Gümüshane Plant | Turkey | 4000t/day cement pyro-processing system |
KHD | Saudi Cement Company | Hofuf Plant | Saudi Arabia | 3500t/day clinker production plant |
KHD | Adana Çimento Sanayii T.A.S | Iskenderun Plant | Turkey | Upgrade 1700t/day line to 4500t/day line |
Loesche (via Sinoma International) | Dangote Group | Objana 3 Plant | Nigeria | LM69.4 raw mill |
Loesche | Jaiprakash Associates | Shahabad Plant | India | LM60.6 raw mill, LM46.2+2 and LM56.3+3 PPC mills |
Loesche | Holcim Hungaria | Pillango Plant | Hungary | LM 56.4 raw mill |
Loesche | Aşkale Çimento | Van Plant | Turkey | LM 48.4 raw mill, LM 38.2 D coal mill |
Loesche | Dangote Group | Pout Plant | Senegal | LM 48.4 raw mill |
Loesche (via Asia Cement China) | Hubei Yadong Cement Corp. | Xin Zhou 2 Plant | China | LM 56.4 raw mill |
Loesche (via Nanjin Cement Design) | Yanbu Cement Co. | Yanbu Plant | Saudi Arabia | LM 56.4 raw mill |
Loesche | Kilwaughter Chemical Co. | Larne Plant | UK | LM 5.200 limestone mill |
Polysius | Various | Various Plants | India | 11 x 200-330t/hr Polycom grinding plants |
Polysius | Ciplan-Cimento Planalto | Planalto Plant | Brazil | 160t/hr ball mill |
Polysius | Shah Cement Industries | Shah Plant | Bangladesh | Cement grinding plant |
Polysius | Spasskzement | Spassk-Dalny Plant | Russia | Polab laboratory automation system |
Polysius | La Cruz Azul | Lagunas Plant | Mexico | 175t/hr Quadropol turnkey grinding plant |
Polysius | S & S Cimentos | Maputo & Nacala Plants | Mozambique | 2 x 700t/day cement grinding plants |
Polysius | Angang Group Slag Development | Yingkou & Anshan Plants | China | 4 x 100t/hr blast furnace slag grinding plants |
Polysius | Wonder Cement | Nibahera Plant | India | 6500t/day cement production line |
Polysius | CIA de Cimento Itambè | Balsa Nova Plant | Brazil | 3000t/day cement kiln line |
Polysius | Penna Industries | Panvel Plant | India | 320t/hr cement grinding plant |
Siemens | Eurocement Group | Voronezh Plant | Russia | Line upgrade to 6000t/day |
Case-study - Portlandzementwerk Wotan
Christian Pfeiffer: The Portlandzementwerk Wotan in Ahütte, Germany was recently fitted with a new ball mill by Christian Pfeiffer Maschinenfabrik GmbH. The new highly-efficient plant is capable of producing cement types with fineness of more than 5000cm2/g (Blaine) and can be flexibly fed with clinker, gypsum, granulated blast furnace slag and two further grinding additives.
The heart of the new grinding plant is, on one hand, a two-compartment ball mill with a diameter of 4.4m and a grinding path length of 14m. An advanced, high-efficiency QDK-NZ series separator guarantees the requested cement quality. The mill is supported on slide shoe bearings and is driven by means of a lateral drive with a DMG 2 gearbox with an installed mill motor capacity of 4400kW.
Conclusions
Despite the challenges of re-unification, stagnation in the early 2000s and the ongoing economic downturn, Germany, its cement industry and its extensive cement manufacturing support industry have remained surprisingly strong. In recent years the cement industry, the largest in western Europe, has become increasingly efficient, especially in terms of the switch to alternative fuels. Meanwhile, the large German cement support industry is growing following its nadir in 2009. It is buoyed especially by continued development in emerging markets, especially those in Asia and the Middle East, with significant interests in South America.
However, both areas of the German industry face stark challenges in the coming years. The cement industry itself is likely to experience significant increases in outgoings with reference to fuel and electricity costs and the cost implications of ever-increasing environmental regulations, both nationally and from the EU. The BDZ has reported that such changes pose a substantial threat to the ongoing profitability of the German cement industry as it stands.
At the same time, the industrial plant sector (and therefore cement plant manufacturing) is threatened by increased competition in the coming years from competitors in the Far East, which are growing in strength in terms of capacity and technical expertise. Germany is hindered in terms of staffing costs and overheads, which are significantly lower in Asia. Germany also places strong emphasis on workers' rights, which limits the use of ad-hoc labour and places firm restrictions on working hours. One area where the German companies are certainly ahead is in their strong international reputation for high-quality, long-lasting equipment, which the Asian producers are still in the process of acquiring. Besides these threats to its industries, the country itself continues to suffer from high unemployment and still supports the former East Germany to a disproportionate extent.
But the country has not stayed ahead by standing still and continues to demonstrate the political will to undertake bold policies. It looks likely that by embracing bold policies regarding developments like alternative fuels and CCS proposals, the cement industry will remain strong. Continued development in developing economies coupled with superior technical ability and its existing reputation are likely to mean that German companies will continue to play an important global role in the cement support sector.
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