One fascinating statistic stands out in a study on how the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) pays its bills: cement represented 4% of its revenue in 2015 or around US$100m. The Centre for the Analysis of Terrorism (CAT) came up with this figure as part of its analysis on how the group finances itself. Its data was based on available information such as local sources, internal ISIS documents and reports from governments and institutions.

What’s more, the previous year in 2014, CAT estimated that ISIS brought in US$300m from cement sales. The difference in revenue between 2015 and 2014 came about from the group losing control of territory. In late 2014 it controlled four cement plants: the Lafarge Al-Jalabiya plant in Ayn al-Arabin, the Al-Raqqah Guris Cement plant and Fallujah, Kubaisa and Al-Qa’im plants in Iraq. Altogether it had a cement production capacity of 7.5Mt/yr, a higher capacity than 62% of the cement producing nations that are recognised formally by the United Nations. Briefly it had production parity with countries like Angola, Uzbekistan and Kuwait.

However the loss of the Al-Jalabiya and Kubaisa plants has stifled this revenue stream. At its peak ISIS couldn’t have been selling cement for more than something like US$40/t (capacity / revenue) if the plants were operating at full capacity. Yet it’s much more likely that the plants were chronically under-utilised and prices significantly higher in the heat, dust and confusion of a militant group attempting to form a state in a warzone.

Global Cement Weekly has covered previously the furore that erupted when French media accused Lafarge of cutting deals with ISIS to keep its Jalabiya cement plant during the early stages of the Syrian Civil War. At the time of the revelations in June 2016 LafargeHolcim said that its first priority was the safety and security of its employees at the plant before it eventually closed it, although it did not deny accusations directly.

Since then the plant’s former security manager Jacob Waerness has popped up in an interview with Bloomberg in connection with a book he wrote about the affair. According to Waerness, Lafarge stayed in the country for too long before the plant was finally seized by ISIS in September 2014.

The problem for Lafarge, as other multinational companies left the warzone, was that the US$680m plant had only been operational since late 2010 before hostilities broke out in 2011. Essentially, it tried to wait out the conflict and then got left behind. Pertinent to the start of this column, Waerness says that as the more extreme groups took control of the surrounding area he was offered and declined a meeting with the IS finance chief in Raqqa in the summer of 2013. However else one might describe IS, it was and clearly is well aware of the revenue to be gained from functioning cement plants.

LafargeHolcim has since started an internal review into the reported allegations under the auspices of its Finance & Audit Committee. In September 2016 the Iranian-backed Fars News Agency was reporting that US special forces were using the Jalabiya plant as a base. If and when peace comes to the region it will be intriguing to find out what condition the plant is in. Until then, LafargeHolcim will have to wait and take the loss on its investment.