Displaying items by tag: Analysis

Well it doesn’t normally happen like this. In late September 2017 Ash Grove Cement announced that it was set to be bought by Ireland’s CRH. The words it used were a ‘definitive merger agreement.’ Then suddenly this week on 5 October 2017 Ash Grove said that it had received a higher offer from an unnamed third party and that it was extending its so-called ‘window shop period.’ So much for definitive! The following day Reuters revealed that the new bid was from Summit Materials.

The on-going board machinations at LafargeHolcim and the PPC-AfriSam merger saga in South Africa show that the cement industry has its moments of boardroom high drama. Indeed, both of these long-rumbling stories have had murmurs this week with the early departure of LafargeHolcim’s finance director Ron Wirahadiraksa after less than two years and Dangote Cement’s decision to exit the ring from the PPC bidding. However, it’s rare that cement companies are publicly announced as sold and then get gazumped instead.

The Ash Grove debacle also carries a personal dimension. Ash Grove chairman Charlie Sunderland initially described CRH as his company’s biggest customer and one with a close relationship to the firm. Yet a US$300m higher bid suggests how much those ‘kind’ words were actually worth. To add insult to injury the chief executive officer (CEO) of Summit Materials, Tom Hill, used to work for CRH. This no doubt gave him an idea of how the management of CRH thinks. CRH’s public response so far has been that it has noted the extended shareholder approval period at Ash Grove.

At first glimpse Summit Materials and CRH have a similar cement production base in the US. Both companies operate two integrated plants in the country. Summit Materials runs plants at Hannibal, Missouri and Davenport, Iowa. CRH runs plants at Sumterville, Florida and Trident, Montana. Summit then has 10 cement terminals along the Mississippi River from Minnesota to Louisiana compared to CRH US’ five cement terminals in Detroit, Michigan, Cleveland, Ohio, Dundee, Michigan, Buffalo, New York and Duluth, Minnesota.

Yet, CRH also has two plants in Canada. Then the sheer scale of CRH’s other operations in North America simply dwarfs Summit’s. CRH Americas reported sales of US$16.7bn in 2016, more than 10 times higher than the US$1.6bn that Summit Materials declared. Both companies cover aggregates, asphalt, readymix concrete and cement but CRH is by far the larger of the two. So much so in fact that Summit Materials might potentially be taking on a serious amount of debt to finance the Ash Grove sale. As such any blip to the US cement market over the next few years could have serious repercussions to an overleveraged Summit Materials.

On face value the possible engagement with Summit Materials might appear to show that there is a lack of trust between CRH and Ash Grove. However, this cannot be inferred. As its shares are traded over the counter, Ash Grove’s shareholders have allowed a two-week shop window to enable other companies to counter-offer. This is to ensure that they get the best possible value. Talking to Summit is part of this process and may, or may not, mean that the last remaining US-owned cement producer stays based in the US after all.

One of the surprises from the recent round of half-year results has been HeidelbergCement’s struggle to grow its sales so far in 2017. Part of this has been down to a variable market in Indonesia where the German cement producer runs the second largest player, Indocement.

Cement consumption for the country as a whole dropped by 1.3% year-on-year to 29Mt in the first half of the year, according to Indonesian Cement Association figures. This appears to be due to a particularly poor month in June 2017 where local consumption fell by 27% to 3.7Mt. Prior to that, consumption was actually showing 4% growth up until the end of May.

Fairly reasonably HeidelbergCement blamed the decline in part on this year’s timing of Ramadan. Unfortunately this could not explain everything, as its total sales volumes including exports fell by 2.4%. Remove the exports and its sales volumes fell by 4.4%, more than the national average. It said this was due to its concentration in weaker markets in Jakarta, Banten, and West Java where competition pressures had forced prices down ‘significantly.’

They weren’t alone in feeling the pain in June 2017 with both Semen Indonesia and LafargeHolcim reporting reduced sales. However, LafargeHolcim also raised the issue of production overcapacity creating increased sales volumes and pushing down prices. This was reflected in lower earnings for its Asia Pacific division. HeidelbergCement too saw its earnings crumble.

Graph 1: Cement production capacity and consumption. Source: Semen Indonesia investor presentation, March 2017.

Graph 1 shows quite nicely the fix the Indonesian cement market is in at present. Consumption surpassed production capacity in the early 2010 before incoming capacity jumped ahead again around 2013. You can also view Global Cement’s version of this graph here. Even at an optimistic annual growth rate of 8%, consumption won’t get close to capacity until 2020. Yet before the market collapsed in June, consumption was growing at 4%, which is the weakest of Semen Indonesia’s growth scenarios.

Admittedly the graph is in an investor document so we can forgive ebullience but they are going to need a magic bullet to dodge this one. Lucky then that the graph also has infrastructure highlighted. The cement producer says that the Indonesian government earmarked US$26bn for infrastructure spending in 2017 and that this spending campaign can be seen in the changing ratio of bulk to bagged cement it has been selling. Independent of Semen Indonesia, the Fitch credit rating agency was also predicting rising consumption off the back of infrastructure plans in a report it put out in June.

However, as more cement plants are being built, cement plant utilisation rates seem destined to stay subdued for the foreseeable future unless the government seriously ups its infrastructure investment or unless the economy goes into overdrive. Unsurprisingly exports have shot up so far in 2016, by 74% to 1.14Mt. Cement producers in neighbouring countries beware!

Last week we looked at the prospect of two new Angolan cement plants, a situation that will reportedly lead the country to being ‘self sufficient in cement.’ When we hear this phrase, very often from relatively small markets in Africa or Asia, the obvious next step invariably follows: The country in question will become a regional powerhouse for cement exports.

But try telling that to the desperate Vietnamese cement producers, swamped by chronic overcapacity and very low prices, both at home and abroad. In an effort to shift more of Vietnam’s cement mountain, this week the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) proposed big changes to its handling of cement exports. At the moment cement is subject to a 5% export tax and does not receive VAT refunds. This means that Vietnamese cement has become less competitive than Chinese, Thai, Indonesian and Japanese cement on the regional market, compounding the oversupply situation at home.

The MPI now proposes to scrap the tax and allow for VAT refunds to avoid a colossal 36-47Mt oversupply of cement by 2020. It is quite staggering that this response hasn’t been considered before. This is especially the case, given that the VICEM’s General Director Tran Viet Thang asked for the government to look at the rules back in February 2017. Indeed the Vietnam Cement Association predicted an oversupply of nearly 50Mt/yr by 2020 in January 2017.

Vietnam exported 14.7Mt of cement and clinker in 2016 according to its domestic statistics service. The country was the seventh largest exporter of cement and clinker in 2016 in value terms, with a total value of US$431.7m. China, as one might suspect, topped the list, but only at US$683.6m, around 58% more than Vietnam. Given that China’s cement capacity is around 20 times that of Vietnam, this highlights the extent to which Vietnam is trying to rely on imports.

A market-led response to this would be to close some of the cement plants down and stop commissioning any new ones. China has made some inroads into this approach and Vietnam is following suit… to some extent. That said, however, Trinh Dinh Dung, the Deputy Prime Minster, inaugurated the second production line at the Thanh Thang Cement plant on 4 July 2017 and Long Son Cement will open its second production line at Long Son in late August 2017. That new line will add nearly another 3Mt/yr of capacity to the national total just by itself. On top of this, Thai-owned Siam City Cement Vietnam opened a new ‘terminal’ in Vietnam in late June. Thailand ranked above Vietnam in the cement and clinker export list for 2016 at US$612.2m, suggesting that, contrary to the obvious implication, the port could even be used to ship out Thai exports into Vietnam!

This is not the first time we have heard about Vietnam’s massive cement surplus but it is the first time that the government appears to have registered it as needing attention. A market-led economy would simply shut the plants down but Vietnam plays by different rules. Will changing the rules on tax help it sell out its surplus? Call us in 2020…

The small cement industry of Mozambique, in south west Africa must be an interesting place to make cement. On one side the country's producers, like their more vocal South African counterparts, have been fighting off cheap imports from Iran, Pakistan, China et al. On the other side of the coin though, Mozambique has growing domestic demand and is within striking distance of growing markets further into Africa, like Malawi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

With the announcement this week that there will be not one but two new integrated cement plants in the country, bringing over 2Mt/yr of new capacity, everything should be set fair for the coming years then, shouldn't it? Domestic production will rise, the price of local cement will fall as a result, competition from imports will drop off and money will be made from new exports.

Except that might not happen. Before the announcement of these two plants, (one of which does not state a capacity), there was around 5.5Mt/yr of grinding and integrated capacity either currently active in Mozambique or due to come onstream in 2015. With the new projects this rises to over 7.5Mt/yr.

The desirable chain of events described above starts to break down due to the fact that domestic demand in Mozambique, while rising, is not currently anywhere near as high as domestic supply. The United States Geological Survey estimated that the country produced just 1.2Mt/yr in 2012. Data for 2013 and 2014, though unavailable, is highly unlikely to show a three-fold increase. Indeed Insitec, a minority shareholder in Cimentos de Moçambique, predicted in 2014 that demand for that year would rise to just 1.5Mt, before hitting the dizzying heights of 1.8Mt in 2018 – And that's still three years away!

So what are the options? Option 1: Some or all of the planned and mooted cement plants will fail to come to fruition. Option 2: Some or all of the plants will be built but will operate at reduced capacity and/or on a campaign basis. Option 3: The Mozambican cement industry becomes a regional powerhouse and starts to export to its neighbours.

Option 1 is certainly possible. Limak Group, one of the parties linked to the new projects, is a Turkish cement producer that is inexperienced outside of Turkey. There has also been a lack of information on the progress of projects by Austral Cimentos ('coming on stream in 2015'), Star Cement and Consolidated Building Materials, although a lack of progress reports does not necessarily imply 'no progress.'

Option 2 is more likely, as some producers already operate on a campaign basis. InterCement's plant at Nacala, formerly an integrated plant, currently operates only as a grinding station. Option 3 is also possible, with Malawi particularly lacking in cement production facilities.
In reality a combination of all three 'Options' is the most likely outcome. However, this will lead to Mozambique becoming yet another player in an increasingly busy African cement market. The desire for self-sufficiency in cement production, a common goal for the region's governments, can easily lead to over-estimates of local demand growth, with resultant over-capacity. Of course the expectation that all African countries can get rid of this extra cement capacity via exports will ultimately backfire.

In southern Africa we already have South Africa exporting. Angola declared 'cement self-sufficiency' in October 2014 and banned imports at the start of 2015. Zambia, Botswana, Zimbabwe and DRC all have large-scale Dangote and/or PCC projects near completion or in production that will greatly reduce their need for imports. Meanwhile, further north, Nigeria is already a gigantic producer and significant cement exporter. Cameroon has recently banned imports and Ghana is thinking of doing the same. Over in the east of Africa, Ethiopia's (and the rest of that region's) rapidly-developing situation was covered in this column just two weeks ago.

Finally, in the north of Africa, Algeria has declared its intention to be self-sufficient in cement by 2016. This news must have 'gone down like a lead balloon' in Italy, Spain and Greece, which have been reliant on north African markets after the bottoms fell out of their own economies. In the north east, Egypt has different problems at present, also described previously. It needs fuel not cement!

So where does this all lead for regional cement dynamics in Africa? Well perhaps the situation in India points the way. There, as in Africa, local and regional producers with the desire to expand grew from their local bases and eventually overlapped. Against a backdrop of lower-than-expected demand, the country now has overcapacity. This has resulted in smaller producers being acquired and leaving the market.

Could this eventually happen in Africa? Only time will tell. However one thing is certain: It's just not possible for every country to export to every other country!

Just one week after Dangote started trial production at its new Mugher cement plant in Ethiopia it announced that it would be doubling capacity at the site. Upgrade work is slated to begin before the end of 2015, according to Nigerian media.

The move shows how much potential Ethiopia is seen to have for the cement industry. With a population of around 90m, it had a cement production capacity of 9.7Mt/yr before the new 2.5Mt/yr Dangote plant comes on line, according to Global Cement Directory 2015 figures. Including the new Dangote plant and even at 100% capacity utilisation this would place cement consumption in the country at 135kg/capita. This is a low figure internationally and hence the continued interest in new capacity. Subsequently, a large number of projects have been rumoured and mooted in Ethiopia over the years. However, many of these publicised projects then fail to make it to construction.

Mebrahtu Meles, the Minister of Industry, said that there were 18 companies engaged in cement production at the 7th Africa Cement Trade Summit that took place in Addis Ababa in April 2015. Meles placed the installed production capacity at 11.2Mt/yr (including the Dangote plant) with the expectation that this will increase to 17.15Mt. However, these cement plants are only producing 5.47Mt/yr, giving the country a capacity utilisation rate of below 50%. This too is low by international standards (60% or more). Cement consumption was placed at just 62kg/capita in 2014.

At the same event, the Ministry of Industry revealed that it was working on a national Cement Industry Development Strategy from 2015 to 2025. The strategy will tackle local industry issues such as unavailability of locally-produced packaging materials, poor transport links, high costs of production and a limited market. Key targets include stimulating cement demand to 12.22Mt/yr by 2020 by moving to concrete road construction and raising capacity utilisation rate to 75% by 2017 and to 80% to 2025.

Despite the publicity Dangote isn't the only player creating new capacity in Ethiopia. Habesha Cement is set to open its 1.4Mt/yr cement plant near to Addis Ababa in 2016. Habesha also has an international angle, given that South African cement producer PPC purchased the majority stake in Habesha Cement in the autumn of 2014 following the project's difficult financial history.

The new Dangote plant predates the country's new cement industry strategy but the upgrade plans demonstrate confidence in both the market and the government's plans. To meet its targets though the country is going to need to increase both its capacity utilisation and build more production capacity. Although muted from previous pronouncements the current target relies on Habesha Cement building its plant and the capacity utilisation rate rising from 50% to at least 75%.

South African weekly newspaper, M&G Africa, has described how Africa faces an infrastructure 'apartheid' whereby 44 of the continent's 58 countries share just 25% of the continent's infrastructure. Building things in Africa costs more because of this infrastructure deficit and it hits cement capacity utilisation rates as well. Ethiopia is one of the region's richer countries in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) but the same issues apply. Hitting its targets for the cement industry may be hard.

In the UK there is an expression, coined by former Prime Minister Harold Wilson, that a 'week is a long time in politics.' While the week he was referring to has long since been forgotten, this refrain has since been repeated to the point of cliché by the mainstream media and is often used in the context of rapidly-changing political news stories. Regardless of its origin, this expression could well be used to accurately describe the current situation in France and Switzerland, where the past week has seen a number of serious and unpredictable developments in the preparation of the anticipated LafargeHolcim mega-merger.

Disgruntlement from 'those close to the deal' first surfaced as a 'wild rumour' a few weeks back but, in the past seven days, several of Holcim's shareholders, including the influential Thomas Schmidheiny, have questioned the contribution that can now be made by Lafarge. Holcim shareholders claim that the group has out-performed Lafarge in the 12 months since the deal was announced and they feel that this should be recognised financially. The abandonment of the Euro1.20 cap on the Swiss Franc by the Swiss National Bank (SNB) on 15 January 2015 has loaded the dice even further in Holcim's favour.

This is how the situation has deteriorated in the past seven days. Late last week, we had confirmation that Holcim was seeking to renegotiate the terms of the merger. On Monday we heard what at least part of those terms were, including an assertion that each Lafarge share was now worth just 0.875 of a Holcim share. Lafarge's main shareholders, accepting that their position was compromised to an extent, suggested that each Lafarge share was worth 0.93 of a Holcim share. Since then, it has become apparent that Bruno Lafont, the proposed leader of LafargeHolcim, has also put Holcim in a spin, as he is perceived to have presided over Lafarge's poorer performance.

Then, just yesterday, it was announced that the two current group boards had met separately in an attempt to arrive at new conditions with which to re-start negotiations. Commentators think that Holcim is holding all of the Aces but Lafarge has made it clear that it cannot accept a lower valuation and a CEO from Holcim. Discussions that take place 'in the dark' like this will do little to build confidence between the merging parties and infers that communication has become strained. There are twinges of antagonism in the releases that are not going to be solved by the boards sitting in separate rooms and whipping themselves into a frenzy.

Also caught up in this, like the child of a divorcing couple, is CRH. It only announced its purchase of Holcim and Lafarge divestments in February 2015. It stands to gain a joint Euro158m from Lafarge and Holcim if they fail to merge, but this will not make up for the loss of the many high-quality cement assets it otherwise stands to gain.

What will happen in the coming weeks? You have to be brave to predict how this will turn out, but our LinkedIn Group is a great place to discuss this rapidly-changing story. One thing we can be sure of is that there will be a lot to write about in another seven days. After all, a week is a long time in the cement industry!

On 15 January 2015, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) abandoned the Euro1.20 cap on the Swiss Franc. The effects of the decision were immediate, with the value of a Franc dropping from Euro1.20 to just Euro0.99. The decision caused turmoil for currency brokers and big business in Switzerland's normally bullet-proof finance sector, with some brokers out of business by the end of the same day.

It is not hard to see why these brokers were caught out by the sudden change in the SNB's position. On 18 December 2014 Thomas Jordan, Chairman of the SNB's Governing Board, stated in no uncertain terms that, "The SNB remains committed to purchasing unlimited quantities of foreign currency to enforce the minimum exchange rate with the utmost determination." In research conducted by Bloomberg News on 9 - 14 January 2015, not one of 22 economists questioned expected the SNB to abandon the cap in 2015. That's quite an about-turn by the SNB in less than a month.

The decision to 'scrap-the-cap' shows the potential of outside influences to suddenly unseat even the most secure of businesses. Such companies include Holcim, the share-price of which went on a rollercoaster on the SIX Swiss Exchange in the immediate aftermath of the announcement. At one point on 15 January 2015 Holcim had lost 20% of its value before closing 11% down on the day. It has since recovered somewhat, although a whopping Euro3bn of its capital has been swallowed up due to the plummeting Franc.

Following the sudden changes to its circumstances, Holcim immediately reinforced its commitment to its merger with Lafarge. "Regarding a possible impact on the combination with Lafarge, what we can say is that we remain committed to the merger," said spokesman Eike-Christian Meuter. There was an almost simultaneous reciprocal statement from the French producer, also stating its commitment. No change there then.

The calmness of Holcim's statements was broadly in line with commentary from bankers, which stated that large deals were unlikely to be affected by the change. This is because Swiss firms can insure themselves against the effects of such moves. Another 'get-out of jail free card' could have been a material adverse change (MAC) clause. If in place a MAC would allow the merging parties to terminate a transaction if an external event significantly changes the outlines of the deal. It is not possible to know whether Lafarge and Holcim have such a clause due to confidentiality issues.

Despite the fundamentals of the LafargeHolcim merger appearing to be unaffected, the scrapping of the Franc cap is an excellent example of how external policy makers can have a direct and unexpected impact on the underlying conditions of the global cement industry. Another major external influence at present is the low oil price, mainly affected by the oil producing cartel OPEC. HeidelbergCement said this week that it expects the oil price fall to have a positive impact on its profit in 2015. It makes 80% of its revenue in oil-importing countries, which should see reduced transport and production costs. This will result in improved economic conditions, higher levels of construction and hence cement production. For HeidelbergCement 2015 could be a case of costs down, sales up.

That surely sounds like good news, for some stagnant 'old' developed economies at least. However, in the world of 'new normals' it is the IMF that has sounded the biggest warning this week. It dropped its 2015 global economic growth forecast from 3.8% to 3.5%. As fuel prices slump, so too has inflation. In the EU this has resulted in deflationary pressures that could yet stump the recovery. Consumers (and construction firms alike) may go from a position of not being able to afford things, to not wanting to buy them. In the longer term, this may be yet more bad news for the cement sector in established markets.