Analysis

Boral admitted this week that high energy costs in Australia had forced it to reduce production levels. Chief executive officer Zlatko Todorcevski revealed to Reuters that the company was temporarily cutting back some unspecified areas of its operations. He also said that it was going to have to pass on growing energy prices directly on its customers.

This has followed mounting alarm at fuel prices in successive financial reports by the building materials company leading to revised earnings guidance being issued in May 2022. Bad weather was responsible for the larger share of the expected additional adverse impact to underlying earnings in its 2022 financial year but around US$10m was anticipated from rising fuel prices. Growing coal and electricity prices were said to be impacting its production and logistics costs, with price rises in January and February 2022 having proved insufficient to keep up with inflation. In a trading update in March 2022 the company said that its exposure to coal prices was unhedged for the second half of its 2022 financial year, to June 2022.

An energy crisis in Australia may seem hard to understand given that the country is one of the world’s biggest exporters of coal and gas. Yet, the country has faced a number of problems with its electricity generation sector in 2022 with disruptions to coal supplies to power stations, outages, ongoing maintenance and a cold winter that adversely affected the market. This led the Australian Energy Market Operator to suspend the country’s main wholesale market on 15 June 2022 in an attempt to stabilise the supply of electricity. New South Wales has also reportedly forced coal mines to prioritise the local market over exports. Energy minister Chris Bowen even asked the residents of New South Wales to try and reduce electricity use in the evenings in an attempt to prevent blackouts. However, with the consumer electricity market now looking more stable, attention has turned to industrial users such as Boral.

Global Cement Weekly has covered energy costs for cement producers a couple of times in the last year. There has been plenty of angst about growing energy costs on cement company balance sheets since mid-2021 as the logistics problems following the lifting of the coronavirus-lockdowns became clear. The biggest story at this time was an energy crisis in China that caused supplies to be rationed to industrial users. This then intensified with the start of the war in Ukraine in February 2022 and energy prices went up everywhere as economic sanctions were imposed upon Russia. One standout was Turkey where cement producers publicly raised the alarm about jumps in coal prices.

Recently, some North American lime producers such as Lhoist North America and the Mississippi Lime Company have been notably bold in announcing price rises due to energy costs and other factors. This week, for example, Lhoist North America said it had raised the price of its lime products by up to 45%. It cited the ‘challenging circumstance’ for all parties at an ‘unprecedented’ time. One alternative to the direct approach of simply putting up prices has been the use of energy surcharges. Japan-based Taiheiyo Cement announced earlier in June 2022 that it was going to introduce a coal surcharge for its cementitious products in September 2022 due to rising energy prices. Its system is based on the coal price with revisions planned every two months. The scheme will run for one year in the first instance. How customers will react to this remains to be seen.

We have looked above at a few disparate examples of the problems that energy costs have been causing cement and lime producers over the last month. These issues look set to continue in an acute phase while the war in Ukraine rages on, but the longer term trends from the economic recovery from coronavirus will undoubtedly last for longer. As examples in Australia and China have shown, local energy crises can easily spill over into the industrial sector as domestic users are prioritised. So, even if cement companies source their supplies carefully, they may face issues if the wider market struggles. Meanwhile, cement producers face the dilemma of justifying price rises to customers adapting to mounting inflation. Taiheiyo Cement has shown one way of doing this. The problems caused by surging energy prices to other cement companies look set to become more apparent in the next few months as reporting of the first half of the year emerges.

Coolbrook has been in the news recently with collaboration deals struck with Cemex and UltraTech Cement. First the Finland-based company officially launched its Roto Dynamic Heater (RDH) technology with a memorandum of understanding signed with Cemex in May 2022. Then, this week, it signed a similar agreement with UltraTech Cement.

The specifics of either agreement are unknown but the target is clearly to build an industrial pilot of an electric kiln – or something like it - at a cement plant. Coolbrook says it has run a pilot of its RDH technology in Finland. Further tests are now scheduled to continue for two years starting from September 2022 at the Brightlands Chemelot Campus at Geleen in the Netherlands. Commercial scale demonstrations are scheduled from 2022 with the hope of commercial use from 2024. Links with Cemex and UltraTech Cement seem to suggest progress. At the same time Coolbrook will be testing its RotoDynamic Reactor (RDR) technology, which promises to electrify the steam cracking process used in plastic manufacturing.

Publically available details on the RDH technology are light. In its promotional material Coolbrook says that it can achieve process temperatures of up to around 1700°C. This is crucial to achieve full clinker formation in a cement kiln. Reaching this temperature with non-combustion style kilns, such as solar reactors, has previously been a problem. Notably, Synhelion and Cemex said in February 2022 that they had managed to produce clinker using concentrated solar radiation. Retrofit possibilities and compact equipment size are also mentioned in the promotional material for the RDH. The former is an obvious attraction but size of equipment footprint is increasingly emerging as a potential issue for cement plants looking to reduce their CO₂ emissions. Rick Bohan from the Portland Cement Association (PCA) presented a summary of the potential and problems of emerging carbon capture and utilisation/storage (CCUS) technologies for cement plants in the US at the Virtual Global CemCCUS Seminar that took place on 14 June 2022. He noted that installing CCUS equipment makes cement plants start to look different (more like petrochemical plants in the view of Global Cement Weekly) and that they may require more space to install it all.

Coolbrook hasn’t been the only organisation looking at kiln electrification. The installation with the most available information on kiln electrification has been the Decarbonate project, led by the VTT, formerly known as the Technical Research Centre of Finland. The project has built a pilot rotary kiln with a length of 8m inside a shipping container. It has a production capacity of around 25kg/hr. The system reportedly uses fixed radiant heating coils around the kiln, surrounded by insulation materials. Early results presented to the 1st Virtual Global CemPower Seminar in late 2021 were that the kiln started up, sufficient calcination was occurring and the system was operated continuously for three days at a temperature of 1000°C with no problems reported. Further research was scheduled to carry on into 2022 with longer trials planned for three different materials.

HeidelbergCement’s subsidiary in Sweden, Cementa, completed a feasibility study on implementing electrified cement production at its Slite plant in 2019. It then said that it was conducting further study with electricity producer Vattenfall as part of CemZero project. This consists of three projects running to 2025. Namely: heat transfer with plasma in rotary kilns; direct separation of carbon dioxide from calcination of carbonate-based raw materials in the production of cement clinker and burnt lime; and carbon dioxide-free products with electrified production - reactivity of cement clinker with secondary additives. HeidelbergCement has since announced plans to build a full scale 1.8Mt/yr carbon capture and storage (CCS) plant at the Slite cement plant by 2030.

How this would fit with any kiln electrification plans is unknown. However, one attraction of moving to an electrical kiln, for all of the projects above, is to cut out the 40 – 50% of a cement plant’s CO₂ emissions that arise from the fuel that is burnt. Taking a kiln electric also makes CO₂ capture easier. Much of the remainder of the CO₂ released comes from the decomposition of limestone during calcination when clinker is created. Substitute out fossil or alternative fuels and the flue gas becomes much purer CO₂.

It is early days for cement kiln electrification but progress is happening both commercially and scientifically. The next step to watch out for will be the first pilot installation at a cement plant. One point to finish with is a comment that Rick Bohan made at the IEEE-IAS/PCA Cement Industry Technical Conference that took place in May 2022: carbon capture is expected to double a cement plant’s energy consumption. Kiln electrification is one potential route for cement production to reach net zero. CCUS is another. If one or both occur then a low carbon future could be a high energy one also.

Watch out for Global Cement’s forthcoming interview with Coolbrook in the September 2022 issue of Global Cement Magazine

For more on CCUS, download the proceedings pack for the Virtual Global CemCCUS Seminar 2022

For more on Synhelion and Cemex read the interview in the December 2020 issue of Global Cement Magazine interview

We return to India to discuss a potential fight that may be brewing in the cement sector. Competition between UltraTech Cement and Adani Group started when the latter won the race to buy Holcim’s cement assets in the country in May 2022. However, the rivalry stepped up a notch this week when UltraTech Cement responded by approving a US$1.7bn investment for expansion.

The leading Indian producer announced that it was committing the funds towards increasing its cement production capacity by 22.6Mt/yr. This will include a mixture of expansions to existing sites and building new plants such as new integrated units, new grinding units and new terminals. UltraTech Cement currently has a previous round of expansion that is set to be completed by the end of the 2023 financial year. Commercial production at the newly announced projects is forecast to start by the end of the 2025 financial year. The company finished off by saying that the upgrade projects would maintain its position as the third largest cement producer outside of China, with its total production capacity rising to 159Mt/yr.

Unusually for these kinds of press releases though, UltraTech Cement made of point of doing the calculation for any readers who might want to know how much this new capacity might cost. It is US$76/t. Adani Group didn’t do this when it said it had agreed to buy Ambuja Cements and ACC from Holcim but, unsurprisingly, it cost more, at least US$94/t based on the cash figure Holcim released for the deal. Note that Adani Group has valued the acquisition at US$10.5bn, which would put the capacity cost up to US$150/t. Other zingers in the press release included Kumar Mangalam Birla’s quote that his company held, “... a deep and nuanced understanding of the market dynamics of the cement industry.” Both of these additions to the statement suggest that UltraTech Cement is making a point about its new competitor.

Bloomberg has framed the actions of UltraTech Cement and Adani Group in the cement sector as a brewing corporate battle between old and new money. Both Kumar Mangalam Birla, chair of Aditya Birla Group - the owner of UltraTech Cement, and Gautam Adani were in the top 10 of the Forbes list of the richest people in India in 2021. Birla comes from inherited wealth, although he has undeniably expanded UltraTech Cement greatly during his tenure as chair. Adani is self-made. Cement is just part of the empires of both men but one risk to UltraTech Cement is just how fast an expansion-driven competitor with concerns in power generation and logistics might decide to try to shake up the cement sector.

It is interesting at this early stage to glimpse part of the potential strategies both cement companies may be employing. Adani Group is in the process of buying its way into the cement sector at a relatively high price for capacity. UltraTech Cement is responding by building new capacity at a lower price. Research by Kotak Institutional Equities cited in the Bloomberg article suggests that Adani Group could increase its 70Mt/yr capacity up to 100Mt/yr at US$80 – 90/t. This would cost up to around US$2.5bn but it’s not impossible. Kotak also reckons UltraTech Cement can eke out around US$3 – 4/t more in earnings before interest, taxation, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) compared to the existing Ambuja Cements and ACC assets. Adani Group might be able to cut this gap down through creating synergies by further merging the two companies.

This adds to the feeling that UltraTech Cement is in a stronger position as the incumbent market leader. Yet risks abound in the current inflationary conditions and even less is certain if Adani Group is prepared to invest heavily enough. After all, UltraTech Cement had a production capacity of only 23Mt/yr in 2010. Less than a decade later it became India’s largest cement producer. It is now Adani Group’s next move in the battle of the cement billionaires.

One big story in India in recent weeks has been the start of action by the central government to tackle rising cement prices. First it reduced tax duties on petrol and diesel in late May 2022. Finance minister Nirmala Sitharaman also said that they were looking at ways of improving the availability of cement in the country, including better logistics, to help lower its cost. A delay to a change in the Goods and Services Tax (GST) rate structure is also being considered to slow inflation generally. Local press then reported a few days later that the government had set up a panel to explore ways of reducing the price of cement by distributing supplies better around the country. Specifically, it was talking to the South India Cement Manufacturers’ Association to work out ways for their members to meet the rising demand in other parts of the country. Reported options included looking at better use of rail and sea connections.

Chart 1: Map of Indian regions showing integrated/clinker production capacity per capita. Note: the chart does not include standalone grinding plant capacity. Source: Global Cement Directory, Indian census data. Map image adapted from Filpro CC BY-SA 4.0.

The map above (Chart 1) summarises the general problem the country faces from a clinker production point of view. More clinker can be produced in the south of the country than elsewhere. This map is partly a reflection where the limestone reserves are. However, it does not show that the East region of India has a higher concentration of cement grinding plants than elsewhere. Additionally, a number of new integrated/clinker plants have been built in the East and more have been proposed. The data in Chart 1 suggests that India has an integrated production capacity of 312kg/capita nationally. This compares to a cement consumption of 200 – 250kg/capita as reported by the ratings agency Crisil.

Data from Crisil indicates that cement prices grew by 9% from the start of 2021 to March 2022. A similar rise of 8.1% month-on-month was reported in April 2022. It is not a direct comparison but retail inflation in India was reported as being 7.8% in April 2022. The cause of this has been blamed on a general tightening in energy supplies in the autumn of 2021 followed by the effects of the war in Ukraine that started in early 2022. Rising international coal and petcoke prices have made manufacturing cement more expensive. Growing petrol and diesel prices have made moving it around costlier still. Looking at the cement market generally, Crisil noted that demand for cement grew sharply in the first half of the 2022 financial year but then slowed in the second half due to poor weather, issues with sand supply and a labour shortage. The ratings agency has forecast stable growth in the 2023 financial year but with the caveat that the mounting costs of construction, including building materials, could dent this.

The fundamentals for the world’s second largest cement market look good as Adani Group’s recent deal to buy Holcim’s Indian assets for US$6.34bn attests. This won’t be much comfort for end-users though who are watching the price of cement rocket upwards. Yet how far the central government will be able to help the southern cement producers move their wares around more easily remain to be seen. If it succeeds, it may slow the rise in prices but it seems unlikely to halt it. The reaction of the more northerly producers is also key, since one option they have is to slacken their own price increases by just enough to fight off the new competition. Already they are facing the dilemma of raising their prices to cover input costs versus the effect this may have on overall demand. All of this looks set to put pressure on the producers’ margins. Indian cement prices look set to go up whatever happens next, making everyone unhappy. Some may be more unhappy than others.

More mergers and acquisition news emerged this week in the shape of potential buyers for Sika’s US admixtures business. Reporting from Bloomberg revealed that Holcim, HeidelbergCement and Turkey-based Sabancı Holding had all made it, amongst other unnamed companies, to a second round of bidding for the assets. Sika then confirmed this to the Finanz und Wirtschaft newspaper and added that the sale would also relate to Canadian assets as well. The intention here is to bypass the risk of a lengthy competition investigation in the US.

Switzerland-based Sika announced in November 2021 that it had signed a deal to buy MBCC Group from Lone Star Funds, a global private equity firm, for Euro5.2bn. At the time of the announcement Sika said that the transaction was subject to regulatory approval but it added that it was ‘confident’ that all required clearances would be obtained with closure planned for the second half of 2022. Known competition probes are now pending in the UK, Australia and New Zealand. A previous piece from Bloomberg suggested that internal analysis by Sika found that the company might need to divest operations with annual sales of around US$160m with a value of US$400m. However, the latest update suggests a value of up to US$1bn. The US represented US$1.71bn or 18% of Sika’s total group sales in 2021. Sika’s information to shareholders to let them know about the MBCC acquisition in November 2021, showed that MBCC had sales of around US$966m in the Americas in 2021 with 36 production plants. Overall, not just in the US, the deal is expected to change Sika’s technology mix from 40% concrete and cement systems to 49%, with most of the additions coming from concrete applications.

Divestments were always likely in an acquisition this large between competitors with shared geographies. What is interesting here to the cement sector is that the three named interested parties are all cement producers. Holcim is perhaps the least surprising given its size, pivot towards light building materials and the fact that its current head, Jan Jenisch, used to run Sika. If anyone knows how much an admixture company is worth, it’s the guy who ran one five years ago! HeidelbergCement does not have such a large light building materials business footprint but it is demonstrably interested in making heavy building material production more sustainable. Also, as the world’s second largest western multinational cement producer it is likely to be interested in an input market for some of its end products. Sabancı Holding is the outlier in this grouping with a more regional grey cement business based in Turkey, an international white cement business and a diverse set of business interests including finance and energy. Although, even as the smallest of the bunch, it still reported sales revenue of over US$9bn in 2021. One notable absence from the potential contenders list for Sika USA is Cemex. Its Urbanisation Solutions division, which produces admixtures among other products, reported sales of US$1.9bn in 2021 or 13% of the group’s total revenue. US$558m of this was made in the US.

The wider context in the North American admixture market is that the announcement of Sika’s deal with MBCC in November 2021 was followed about a month later when Saint-Gobain said it had entered into a deal to buy GCP Applied Technologies. This followed Saint-Gobain’s acquisition of Chryso in October 2021. However, Saint-Gobain said that the GCP deal would strengthen its position more in North America. Readers can find out more about Saint-Gobain’s ambitions here.

The final word at this stage should go on Lone Star Funds, the current owner of MBCC. Lone Star Funds bought the construction chemicals business from BASF for Euro3.17bn in September 2020. At the time the acquisition closed Saori Dubourg, a member of the board of executive directors of BASF, said “Lone Star has been a professional partner in this transaction and is committed to the future success of the business.” If the reporting is correct, Lone Star Funds is now selling the same business for over Euro5bn. There are two takeaways to consider at this point. One is that the perceived value of products that make cement and concrete more sustainable are growing. The other is that Lone Star Funds timed its acquisition of MBCC from BASF very well.