Displaying items by tag: Ukraine

Nigerian billionaire Aliko Dangote was spotted attending the inauguration ceremony of Kenyan President William Ruto earlier in September 2022. This is relevant because Dangote’s cement company previously announced plans in 2016 to build two 1.5Mt/yr plants in Kenya, near Nairobi and Mombasa respectively. They were intended to become operational by 2021. Unfortunately, Dangote himself allegedly described Kenya as being more corrupt than Nigeria to Kenyan broadcast journalist Jeff Koinange a few years later and nothing more happened. Back in 2014 Ruto visited Dangote Cement’s Obajana plant in Kogi state in Nigeria when the politician was the Deputy President of Kenya. Dangote’s attendance at the presidential inauguration this month suggests at the very least that his relationship with Ruto remains active. Maybe more news on those planned plants will follow.

Graph 1: Cement in Kenya, 2018 – June 2022. Source: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS).

The reason why the owner of Africa’s largest cement company might be interested in the Kenyan market can be seen in its latest cement production figures. Data from the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) shows that production for the first half of 2022 grew by 20% year-on-year to 4.95Mt in the first half of 2022, from 4.12Mt in the same period in 2021. Cement production was broadly similar in 2018 and 2019 at around 6Mt. It then increased by 25% to 9.25Mt in 2021 from 7.41Mt in 2020. On a rolling annual basis, production picked up at the start of 2020 and has risen consistently since then each month, peaking at over 10Mt in May 2022.

However, the elections in August 2022 probably slowed this growth trend, despite being much more peaceful than those in 2007, although the KNBS is yet to release the data. Bamburi Cement said in its outlook for the second half of 2022 that it expected markets to recover after the ballot. The subsidiary of Holcim reported increasing turnover in the first half of 2022, due to mounting sales volumes and price rises, but its profit fell sharply. It blamed this on fuel and logistics inflation, growing clinker import costs as well as negative currency exchange effects.

That last point about imported clinker is worth noting given that a government report in late 2021 found that the country had a clinker shortage of up to 3.3Mt/yr. Yet, the KNBS data in recent years shows that cement production and consumption are broadly similar, suggesting that the shortfall in clinker is being imported. The report added that 59% of the imported clinker originated from Egypt, tariff free, due to a free trade agreement. Local producers were reported to have been operating at a 65% capacity utilisation rate. Egypt and the UAE accounted for most of the imported clinker followed by Saudi Arabia. An interview in the Standard newspaper at this time with Bamburi Cement’s managing director Seddiq Hassani revealed that, despite locally produced clinker being cheaper than imported clinker, some producers were reluctant to hand control of a key input material over to their local competitors. Other producers, predictably, were trying to persuade the government to raise the duty on imports of clinker from 10% to 25%. Tariff discussions have continued in 2022.

So far in 2022 the other big stories in the sector have included Bamburi Cement’s plans to build two solar power plants and a major repair to the kiln shell at East Africa Portland Cement’s (EAPCC) Athi River cement plant. The solar plants will be built next to Bamburi Cement’s integrated Mombasa plant and its Nairobi grinding plant. Once operational in 2023 they are anticipated to supply up to 40% of the cement producer’s total power supply. Devki Group, the owner of National Cement, also announced plans in August 2022 to set up a wind farm near Mombasa. However, this seems more like an attempt to diversify the group into electricity production rather than to supply its own plant near Nairobi. EAPCC’s upgrade project has completed this week after about a month and half of work. It is intended to increase the plant’s cement production by 50%.

Cement production started in rise in 2020 but the Covid-19 pandemic may have constrained this. Production (and consumption) then jumped up in 2021 and looks set to do similar in 2022 bar a possible blip from the elections in August 2022. This is despite the global market issues arising from the end of Covid-19 and the war in Ukraine. These may be uncertain times but the fundamentals for the Kenyan cement market look positive despite rising end prices. Unsurprisingly, it looks likely that Dangote Cement remains keen to extend its business to Kenya.

Cembureau called for urgent action on electricity prices from European governments this week to protect cement plants. Its maths was crushingly simple. One tonne of cement takes around 110kWh of electricity to produce. Electricity prices started to top Euro700mWh in some European Union (EU) countries at the end of August 2022. The association says that this represents added costs of Euro70/t of cement and a tripling of the total cost of production. This kind of sudden extra cost to cement production could lead to the widespread closure of cement plants and lead to chaos in the construction supply chain.

Previously, Cembureau reported in 2020 that electricity accounts for about 12% of a cement plant’s energy mix. In a dry production process plant 43% of this is used for cement grinding, 25% goes into raw material preparation, another 25% on clinker production and the final portion is typically used for raw material extraction, fuel grinding and for packing and loading. However, the cost of the electricity can make a big difference to the overall energy bill for a cement plant. When a report by the European Commission’s (EC) Joint Research Centre (JRC) modelled a reference northern European cement plant with a production capacity of 1.0Mt/yr back in 2016, it concluded that the EU cement industry was spending around half of its energy costs on electricity compared to smaller ratios at plants in China, Egypt, Algeria and... Ukraine. That last country in the list is poignant given its unwitting participation in the current energy crisis. One other thing to note is that cement producers, as large scale users, may well be paying less than the wholesale prices Cembureau appears to be quoting.

The timing of Cembureau’s proclamation is pertinent because the EU and individual states have mostly been waiting until the autumn before revealing their energy support plans. However, the dilemma for Cembureau, and other industry lobbying groups, is how to protect their sectors whilst domestic consumers are threatened. The aftermath of the coronavirus lockdowns has shown what can happen when production of key commodities stops: supply chain disruption, shortages and price rises. One ironic shortage in the UK during the lockdown periods was that of CO₂, as high gas prices forced the main producer to shut down, leading to unexpected knock-on problems along the supply chain in areas such as food production. The same situation is reportedly at risk of happening again now too.

Cembureau’s wider solution is to link domestic and industrial consumers of electricity. So, some of its suggestions to policymakers are to use all available means of power generation, implement emergency measures such as price caps immediately, change the rules of the electricity market more generally to prevent future price shocks and to promote large scale renewable power source development. These are all things that could help both individual and industrial users of electricity.

Compare and contrast, then, with the MPA’s (Mineral Products Association) approach to the same problem in the UK. Its strategy instead has been to ask the UK government for tax cuts and freezes and to hurry along the forthcoming policy on support for Energy Intensive Industries. That’s not to say that Cembureau’s suggestions don’t also include some sector specific requests. It has asked that the EU temporary state aid framework adopted in late March 2022 should allow all energy intensive industries to have access to state aid covering 70 - 80% of eligible costs. It has also encouraged the wider use of alternative fuels, although it doesn’t link the reason why beyond reducing imports of fossil fuels. Lastly, it bangs the drum for its recent preoccupation, the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, this time adding electro-intensity as a main criterion for eligibility for compensation under EU emission trading scheme (ETS) indirect state aid guidelines.

Government support packages for the energy crisis are starting to be announced in European countries but the question for everyone is whether they and other actions will be enough. One problem for the cement industry will be simply staying on the radar of policy makers facing a crisis looming over their citizens. Yet if there is not enough energy to go around then rationing of some kind will be inevitable and heavy industrial users will be the first obvious targets to be told to cut back. Some months later building material supply shortages will hit. One national cement sector to watch in the coming months may be the Spanish one as it has long warned of the risks of high electricity prices.

Senegal: Data from the National Agency for Statistics and Demography (ANSD) indicates that cement exports fell by 34% month-on-month in June 2022, although local sales rose by 4%. Overall cement production fell by 2% as manufacturers battle the economic impacts of the war in Ukraine.

Philippines: Eagle Cement’s sales rose by 24% year-on-year to US$246m in the first half of its 2023 financial year from US$199m a year earlier. Its income was US$53.4m, down by 20% year-on-year from US$66.6m. Eagle Cement attributed the decline to cost impacts resulting from the Russian invasion of Ukraine and bottlenecks in global supply chains. Its operating expenses were US$26.1m, up by 35% year-on-year.

Italy: Buzzi Unicem recorded a net profit of Euro88.7m in the first half of 2022, down by 58% year-on-year from Euro210m in the first half of 2021. The group said that its recurring profitability worsened across its markets, with the exception of Russia. It also noted ‘substantial stability’ in the Czech Republic. Its consolidated sales, including those of its Brazilian and Mexican businesses, were US$2.41bn, up by 18% from US$2.05bn.

The group recorded cement sales volumes of 14.2Mt, down by 4.1% from 14.8Mt. Volumes fell by 27% in Eastern Europe and by 28% in Italy, but rose by 27% in Central Europe and by 8% in the US. Excluding Russia, the producer’s fuel costs per tonne of cement rose by 8.8% year-on-year to approximately Euro8.80, and its total energy costs rose by 20% year-on-year to Euro234m.

It implemented continued price rises across all markets except Mexico during the half, with the sharpest rises recorded in Italy and Ukraine.

A disturbing story has emerged this week concerning attempts by an unknown party to seize control of Holcim Russia. The situation marks a dangerous new phase for multinational companies operating in Russia. This includes a number of building materials producers and their suppliers.

The public side of events started on 26 July 2022 when Holcim Russia announced on its website that a legal case concerning an unpaid loan against it had been initiated at a court in Chechnya and that someone was also trying to change ownership documents with the Federal Tax Service. This was then followed by an interview by Forbes Russia with the new alleged owner of the construction materials company explaining how he had made the so-called acquisition. Holcim Russia immediately hit back hard with multiple and well researched reasons why this couldn’t be so. These included the supposed private investor’s apparent lack of a business past, a long criminal history, psychiatric records, social media accounts of an individual of seemingly modest means and so on. Kommersant FM has since reported that the court in Chechnya took the side of the asset raider but that both the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Ministry of Industry and Trade are now investigating the case.

Taking loans from a mystery businessman with no apparent past does not look credible for a multinational like Holcim and its subsidiaries. This particular method was also flagged up by one of the legal sources quoted by Kommersant FM as a recognisable corporate scam in Russia dating back to the 2000s. What is more certain is that Holcim reported that it had a 100% interest in Holcim Russia in its annual report for 2021. It then said it was going to leave the Russian market in late March 2022 following the start of the war in Ukraine a month earlier. By May 2022 it said that it had attracted the interest of 30 possible buyers. Only this week Holcim’s chief executive officer Jan Jenisch confirmed in the company’s second quarter conference call that divestment discussions were 'active' and ongoing with a 'solution' expected in the coming months. The timing of Holcim Russia’s sudden difficulties is therefore noteworthy given that a potential buyer has not yet been publicly announced.

Whoever has tried their luck at taking over Holcim Russia has done so at a time when anti-Western sentiment is high in Russia. For example, the government attempted to pass a new law seizing the assets of Western companies trying to leave the country in July 2022. Any intervention by the authorities is likely to take some of this into account and they may be wary of helping an organisation with perceived European links. Naturally, the nationalist card was played up in the interview with Forbes Russia. For its part, Holcim Russia has commented that the ongoing 'illegal action' might lead to production delays for building materials supporting key housing and infrastructure projects. Whatever is going on it must be a tense time for Holcim Russia and its 1500 employees. We’ll leave the last word to Holcim Russia’s general manager Maxim Goncharov who has described the situation as the “theatre of the absurd.” He is not wrong.

Vietnam: High costs have resulted in the cancellation of four planned new integrated cement lines by a local cement producer. Viet Nam News has reported that the producer in question presently faces costs of US$59.9 - 64.1/t cement, with a net loss of US$8.55 - 10.30/t. Coal prices are US$237/t, more than triple those at the start of 2022 of US$85.5/t. Gypsum and diesel prices rose by 50% over the first half of 2022. The producer reportedly attributed the coal price rise to the effects of the Covid-19 conflict and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

India: UltraTech Cement has imported a 157,000t shipment of coal from Russia for US$25.8m, which it paid in Chinese Yuan. ET NOW News has reported that this is the first instance of an Indian entity using the currency in international trade. The deal has a value of US$164/t, 50% below average South African coal prices and 20% below average Australian cement prices in India. The deal reportedly signals the possible end of Indian coal prince inflation in the medium – long term.

From 2027, the 27 member states of the European Union (EU) will begin to charge third country-based cement exporters for the CO₂ emissions of their products sold inside the bloc. The new Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is a lynchpin in the strategy to realise a 55% reduction in EU industries' CO₂ emissions between 1990 and 2030. Starving foreign cement industries of a source of income may also help to make them change their ways. A regional solution leveraged through an unfair head start, however, might cause progress to falter where it is most needed in the global fight against climate change.

Carbon leakage has hung over the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) since its inception in 2005. Cembureau, the European cement association, has reported a 300% five-year increase in third-country cement imports up to 2021, with spikes matching those in ETS credit prices. Companies from Turkey to Australia have produced and transported their cement into the EU, at great CO₂ cost, while benefitting from a competitive edge over domestic producers, it would seem. Lawmakers rectified the situation by maintaining free allocations of ETS credits to EU industries, including cement, which received US$92m-worth in 2021.¹ In the wake of the Paris Agreement, an emissions pricing mechanism on cement imports first came before a vote of the member states in February 2017.

In what would become a recurring theme, opposition from all sides of the issue defeated the proposal. Most interesting was the international response: Brazil, China, India and South Africa voiced ‘grave concern’ over the proposed CBAM. A Russian representative at the Department of European Cooperation lamented the possible necessity of ‘response measures,’ while US Climate Envoy John Kerry coolly urged the EU to wait until after the COP26 climate change conference in November 2021. The outbursts were surprising given that the mechanism clearly conformed to World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules: free allocations were always expected to phase out in a mirror image of the CBAM phase-in. The proposal eventually adopted on 22 June 2022 set the end date for both as 2032.

In 2020, the EU imported US$383m-worth of cement and concrete across its external borders, down by 17% year-on-year from US$463m in 2019.² Imports had previously more than doubled decade-on-decade from US$204min 2009. China accounted for US$167m-worth (43%) of cement and concrete exports to the EU in 2020, followed by Vietnam with US$34m (9%) and the UK with US$30m (7.9%). Other significant sources include Belarus (US$28m - 7.4%), Russia (US$13.8m - 3.6%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (US$13.5m - 3.5%), Serbia (US$13.1 million - 3.4%), Israel (US$13m - 3.4%), Turkey (US$12.6m - 3.3%) and the US (US$10.3m - 2.7%).

China

China’s first emissions trading scheme will be one year old on 16 July 2021. The scheme, covering more than twice the CO₂ emissions accounted for under the EU ETS, may lend an apparent synergy to EU energy policy and that of the bloc’s main trade partner.³ On the contrary, Chinese carbon credits cost 8.5% the price of EU ETS credits on 29 June 2022, with a growth rate of just 10% year-on-year compared to 53% in EU ETS credit prices. Unlike their European equivalent, they are also restricted to the energy sector. Chinese cement exporters are unready to meet the CBAM on its own terms. The inclusion of indirect emissions further disadvantages plants operating in China’s 57% coal-powered economy. Premier Li Keqiang has warned countries to be on their guard against a ‘new green trade barrier.’

These concerns ought to be considered in light of the scale and diversified nature of the China-EU trade partnership. The eventual inclusion of polymers, hydrogen and ammonia under the CBAM still does not extend its scope beyond 3% of Chinese imports to the EU by value, enabling China to retain the leverage it has previously proved willing to exercise against those who threaten the perceived interests of global trade.

China plans to reach net zero CO₂ emissions by 2060 through an energy transition in which it invested US$266m in 2021, more than the next six ranked countries combined.⁴ In the medium-term future, the CBAM may become a green bridge, connecting with Chinese emissions reduction policies in a single carbon border measure to raise money for developing countries’ sustainable transitions, as suggested by former governor of the People’s Bank of China Zhou Xiaochuan. Until then, China seems well positioned to ensure that a fair share of the costs arising from the CBAM pass to importers and the consumer.

Turkey

Turkey provided 3.3% of the EU’s cement and concrete imports in 2020, but the volume corresponded to 13% of Turkey’s total exports of the same. Thus, the country has a high exposure to any adverse effects of the CBAM – quantified at an estimated US$789m/yr by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.⁵ Turkey’s ratification of the Paris Agreement in late 2021 is among the positive outcomes of the CBAM. The country now plans to align with the CBAM. In this, the Turkish cement industry will rely on a share of a US$3.2bn loan from the World Bank, France and Germany.

The UN has yet to receive an updated climate action plan from the Turkish government in line with its pledges. Should Turkey fail to transition within the short timeframe provided by the CBAM, its cement sector might increase its existing focus on the West African market, where it holds 55% and 46% market shares for cement and clinker imports to Ghana and Ivory Coast respectively. The beleaguered industry has one greater refuge still: the US market, which consumed 18% of Turkish cement exports in 2020.

North America

Discussions of the CBAM’s impacts in Canada and the US are tied to those countries’ on-going deliberations over possible adjustment mechanisms of their own. At present, individual provinces and states are responsible for implementing carbon pricing. An international emissions trading scheme, called the Western Climate Initiative, already exists between the US state of California and the Canadian province of Quebec. The Canadian government is conducting a consultation on federal Border Carbon Adjustment (BCA) credits in the context of economy-wide pricing.⁶ Carbon border adjustment was previously an item on the US Trade Policy Agenda in 2021, but disappeared in 2022. President Biden pledged to impose 'carbon adjustment fees or quotas on carbon-intensive goods from countries that are failing to meet their climate and environmental obligations' during his candidateship in the 2020 US presidential election. On 7 June 2022, two weeks before the EU adopted CBAM, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse introduced a carbon border adjustment bill to the US Senate, which it referred to its Committee on Finance.⁷

North American legislators will need to follow the European Parliament in building a broad centrist majority in order to pass their CBAMs. If they succeed, the world will gain a low-carbon axis of cement markets, bringing their trade partners behind them.

Other European countries

The UK cement industry expects to pay an extra US$30.1m/yr on account of the CBAM.⁹

A November 2021 report by the Ukraine Resource & Analysis Centre (Society and Environment) concluded that Ukraine's 'largest and most technological' cement producers will experience no critical influence from the CBAM when exporting to the EU.⁸ At that time, the Ukrainian strategy consisted of an alignment with any future CBAM. On 31 May 2022, The European Business Association calculated Ukrainian cement producers' total CBAM tax bill as US$3.36m/yr.¹⁰

Montenegro introduced its own emissions trading system, modelled on the EU ETS, in February 2021, a move which Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia have both announced their intent to follow.¹¹

Norway has called for international acceptance of the CBAM, but questioned the practicality of including indirect carbon pricing.

An example of the possible adverse effects of the CBAM comes from the EU's ban on Russian cement imports in April 2022. The loss of the EU market was one likely contributor to a rollback of climate regulation there.¹²

Developing countries

Non-governmental organisation (NGO) Oxfam has criticised the CBAM's failure to include an exemption for the least developed countries. The EU's solution is an indirect one: it will put CBAM revenues towards its budget, from which international climate finance funding will be raised to an equivalent level. As Paris Agreement signatories, EU member states already expect to contribute to the achievement of US$100bn/yr in climate finance funds for poorer countries in 2023.

Oxfam has recommended that the EU do more to take account of its disproportionate contribution to cumulative global CO₂ emissions. This would include directly paying CBAM revenues into international climate finance and accelerating the phase-out of free ETS allocations.

Conclusion

On 22 June 2022, the most sustainable cement market in the world successfully harnessed market forces to its emissions reduction ambitions. The European cement industry will be able to celebrate the end of carbon leakage. Cement companies outside of the EU, however, now face increased costs and lower prices for their product. The legislation addresses some of the harm that it causes to less developed countries; those – like China, Turkey and Vietnam – in the middle will have to face it head-on.

So far, we have cited governments and lobby groups, but the real question of readiness for the CBAM lies with producers. Global cement companies, including those based in the EU, have implemented their sustainable cement technologies across all continents, and are beginning to reap the rewards of a new world where paying for pollution is unavoidable.

Sources

1. Sandbag, E3G and Energy Foundation, A Storm in a Teacup, Impacts and Geopolitical Risks of the European Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, August 2021, https://9tj4025ol53byww26jdkao0x-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/E3G-Sandbag-CBAM-Paper-Eng.pdf

2. Trend Economy, ‘Imports: European Union: 6810,’ 14 November 2021, https://trendeconomy.com/data/h2/EuropeanUnion/6810

3. Energy Monitor, ‘Carbon trading the Chinese way,’ 5 January 2022, https://www.energymonitor.ai/policy/carbon-markets/carbon-trading-the-chinese-way

4. China Power, ‘How Is China’s Energy Footprint Changing?’ https://chinapower.csis.org/energy-footprint/

5. Politico, ‘EU’s looming carbon tax nudged Turkey toward Paris climate accord, envoy says,’ 6 November 2021, https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism-turkey-paris-accord-climate-change/

6. Canadian Climate Institute/L'Instut Climatique du Canada, 'Border Carbon Adjustments,' 27 January 2022, https://climateinstitute.ca/publications/border-carbon-adjustments/

7. Congress, 'S.4355 - Clean Competition Act,' 7 June 2022, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/4355?s=1&r=6

8.Ukraine Resource & Analysis Centre (Society and Environment), ' The Impact of Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) on the EU - Ukraine trade,' November 2021, https://www.rac.org.ua/uploads/content/624/files/impactcarbonmechanismcbamukrainesummaryen.pdf

9. Burke et al, 'What does an EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism mean for the UK?' April 2021, https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/What-does-an-EU-Carbon-Border-Adjustment-Mechanism-mean-for-the-UK_FULL-REPORT.pdf

10. European Business Association, 'Ukrainian exporters to pay more than € 1 billion in carbon tax to the EU under the CBAM,' 31 May 2022, https://eba.com.ua/en/ponad-1-mlrd-yevro-podatku-na-vuglets-shhoroku-splachuvatymut-ukrayinski-eksportery-v-yes-v-ramkah-svam/

11. Balkan Green Energy News, 'Which Western Balkan countries intend to introduce carbon tax?' 18 May 2022, https://balkangreenenergynews.com/which-western-balkan-countries-intend-to-introduce-carbon-tax/

12. Climate Home News, 'Russian climate action and research is collateral damage in Putin’s war on Ukraine,' 26 May 2022, https://www.climatechangenews.com/2022/05/26/russian-climate-action-and-research-is-collateral-damage-in-putins-war-on-ukraine/

Ghana: Alan Kyerematen, the Minister for Trade and Industry, has blamed the increasing price of cement on negative currency exchange effects and growing fuel prices. He informed the Parliament of Ghana that the cost to import clinker has risen significantly, according to the Ghana News Agency. Kyerematen also noted that the cost of freight has surged due to the coronavirus pandemic and then the war in Ukraine.