Displaying items by tag: Belarus

Belarus/Russia: Exports of cement from Belarus to Russia increased by 61% to 0.43Mt in September and October 2022 compared to the same period in 2021. Eurocement has also warned that Russia’s total imports could rise to 2.2Mt in 2022, comprising 1.5Mt from Belarus, according to RIA. The Russia-based cement producer forecast that total imports could rise to 5Mt in 2023, split mainly between imports from Belarus and Iran. Eurocement noted that it had encountered problems with rising imports already in 2022.

From 2027, the 27 member states of the European Union (EU) will begin to charge third country-based cement exporters for the CO₂ emissions of their products sold inside the bloc. The new Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is a lynchpin in the strategy to reduce EU industries' CO₂ emissions by 55% between 1990 and 2030. Starving foreign cement industries of a source of income may also help to make them change their ways. A regional solution leveraged through an unfair head start, however, might cause progress to falter where it is most needed in the global fight against climate change.

Carbon leakage has hung over the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) since its inception in 2005. Cembureau, the European cement association, reported a 300% five-year increase in third-country cement imports up to 2021, with spikes matching those in ETS credit prices. Companies from Turkey to Australia have produced and transported their cement into the EU, at great CO₂ cost, while benefitting from a competitive edge over domestic producers, it would seem. Lawmakers rectified the situation by maintaining free allocations of ETS credits to EU industries, including cement, which received US$92m-worth in 2021.¹ In the wake of the Paris Agreement, an emissions pricing mechanism on cement imports first came before a vote of the member states in February 2017.

In what would become a recurring theme, opposition from all sides of the issue defeated the proposal. Most interesting was the international response: Brazil, China, India and South Africa voiced ‘grave concern’ over the proposed CBAM. A Russian representative at the Department of European Cooperation lamented the possible necessity of ‘response measures,’ while US Climate Envoy John Kerry coolly urged the EU to wait until after the COP26 climate change conference in November 2021. The outbursts were surprising given that the mechanism clearly conformed to World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules: free allocations were always expected to phase out in a mirror image of the CBAM phase-in. The proposal eventually adopted on 22 June 2022 set the end date for both as 2032.

In 2020, the EU imported US$383m-worth of cement and concrete across its external borders, down by 17% year-on-year from US$463m in 2019.² Imports had previously more than doubled decade-on-decade from US$204min 2009. China accounted for US$167m-worth (43%) of global cement and concrete exports to the EU in 2020, followed by Vietnam with US$34m (9%) and the UK with US$30m (7.9%). Other significant sources include Belarus (US$28m - 7.4%), Russia (US$13.8m - 3.6%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (US$13.5m - 3.5%), Serbia (US$13.1 million - 3.4%), Israel (US$13m - 3.4%), Turkey (US$12.6m - 3.3%) and the US (US$10.3m - 2.7%).

China

China’s first emissions trading scheme will be one year old on 16 July 2021. The scheme, covering more than twice the CO₂ emissions accounted for under the EU ETS, may lend an apparent synergy to EU energy policy and that of the bloc’s main trade partner.³ On the contrary, Chinese carbon credits cost 8.5% the price of EU ETS credits on 29 June 2022, with a growth rate of just 10% year-on-year, compared to 53% in EU ETS credit prices. Unlike their European equivalent, they are also restricted to the energy sector. Chinese cement exporters are unready to meet the CBAM on its own terms. The inclusion of indirect emissions further disadvantages plants operating in China’s 57% coal-powered economy. Premier Li Keqiang has warned countries to be on their guard against a ‘new green trade barrier.’

These concerns ought to be considered in light of the scale and diversified nature of the China-EU trade partnership. The eventual inclusion of polymers, hydrogen and ammonia under the CBAM still does not extend its scope beyond 3% of Chinese imports to the EU by value, enabling China to retain the leverage it has previously proved willing to exercise against those who threaten the perceived interests of global trade.

China plans to reach net zero CO₂ emissions by 2060 through an energy transition in which it invested US$266m in 2021, more than the next six ranked countries combined.⁴ In the medium-term future, the CBAM may become a green bridge, connecting with Chinese emissions reduction policies in a single carbon border measure to raise money for developing countries’ sustainable transitions, as suggested by former governor of the People’s Bank of China Zhou Xiaochuan. Until then, China seems well positioned to ensure that a fair share of the costs arising from the CBAM pass to importers and the consumer.

Turkey

Turkey provided 3.3% of the EU’s cement and concrete imports in 2020, but the volume corresponded to 13% of Turkey’s total exports of the same. Thus, the country has a high exposure to any adverse effects of the CBAM – quantified at an estimated US$789m/yr by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.⁵ Turkey’s ratification of the Paris Agreement in late 2021 is among the positive outcomes of the CBAM. The country now plans to align with the CBAM. In this, the Turkish cement industry will rely on a share of a US$3.2bn loan from the World Bank, France and Germany.

The UN has yet to receive an updated climate action plan from the Turkish government in line with its pledges. Should Turkey fail to transition within the short timeframe provided by the CBAM, its cement sector might increase its existing focus on the West African market, where it holds 55% and 46% market shares for cement and clinker imports to Ghana and Ivory Coast respectively. The beleaguered industry has one greater refuge still: the US market, which consumed 18% of Turkish cement exports in 2020.

North America

Discussions of the CBAM’s impacts in Canada and the US are tied to those countries’ on-going deliberations over possible adjustment mechanisms of their own. At present, individual provinces and states are responsible for implementing carbon pricing. An international emissions trading scheme, called the Western Climate Initiative, already exists between the US state of California and the Canadian province of Quebec. The Canadian government is conducting a consultation on federal Border Carbon Adjustment (BCA) credits in the context of economy-wide pricing.⁶ Carbon border adjustment was previously an item on the US Trade Policy Agenda in 2021, but disappeared in 2022. President Biden pledged to impose 'carbon adjustment fees or quotas on carbon-intensive goods from countries that are failing to meet their climate and environmental obligations' during his candidateship in the 2020 US presidential election. On 7 June 2022, two weeks before the EU adopted CBAM, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse introduced a carbon border adjustment bill to the US Senate, which it referred to its Committee on Finance.⁷

North American legislators will need to follow the European Parliament in building a broad centrist majority in order to pass their CBAMs. If they succeed, the world will gain a low-carbon axis of cement markets, bringing their trade partners behind them.

Other European countries

The UK cement industry expects to pay an extra US$30.1m/yr on account of the CBAM.⁹

A November 2021 report by the Ukraine Resource & Analysis Centre (Society and Environment) concluded that Ukraine's 'largest and most technological' cement producers will experience no critical influence from the CBAM when exporting to the EU.⁸ At that time, the Ukrainian strategy consisted of an alignment with any future CBAM. On 31 May 2022, The European Business Association calculated Ukrainian cement producers' total CBAM tax bill as US$3.36m/yr.¹⁰

Montenegro introduced its own emissions trading system, modelled on the EU ETS, in February 2021, a move which Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia have both announced their intent to follow.¹¹

Norway has called for international acceptance of the CBAM, but questioned the practicality of including indirect carbon pricing.

An example of the possible adverse effects of the CBAM comes from the EU's ban on Russian cement imports in April 2022. The loss of the EU market was one likely contributor to a rollback of climate regulation there.¹²

Developing countries

Non-governmental organisation (NGO) Oxfam has criticised the CBAM's failure to include an exemption for the least developed countries. The EU's solution is an indirect one: it will put CBAM revenues towards its budget, from which international climate finance funding will be raised to an equivalent level. As Paris Agreement signatories, EU member states already expect to contribute towards a total US$100bn/yr in climate finance funds for poorer countries in 2023.

Oxfam has recommended that the EU do more to take account of its disproportionate contribution to cumulative global CO₂ emissions. This would include directly paying CBAM revenues into international climate finance and accelerating the phase-out of free ETS allocations.

Conclusion

On 22 June 2022, the most sustainable cement market in the world successfully harnessed market forces to its emissions reduction ambitions. The European cement industry will be able to celebrate the end of carbon leakage. Cement companies outside of the EU, however, now face increased costs and lower prices for their product. The legislation addresses some of the harm that it causes to less developed countries; those – like China, Turkey and Vietnam – in the middle must meet it head-on.

So far, we have cited governments and lobby groups, but the real question of readiness for the CBAM lies with producers. Global cement companies, including those based in the EU, have implemented their sustainable cement technologies across all continents, and are beginning to reap the rewards of a new world where paying for pollution is unavoidable.

Sources

1. Sandbag, E3G and Energy Foundation, A Storm in a Teacup, Impacts and Geopolitical Risks of the European Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, August 2021, https://9tj4025ol53byww26jdkao0x-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/E3G-Sandbag-CBAM-Paper-Eng.pdf

2. Trend Economy, ‘Imports: European Union: 6810,’ 14 November 2021, https://trendeconomy.com/data/h2/EuropeanUnion/6810

3. Energy Monitor, ‘Carbon trading the Chinese way,’ 5 January 2022, https://www.energymonitor.ai/policy/carbon-markets/carbon-trading-the-chinese-way

4. China Power, ‘How Is China’s Energy Footprint Changing?’ https://chinapower.csis.org/energy-footprint/

5. Politico, ‘EU’s looming carbon tax nudged Turkey toward Paris climate accord, envoy says,’ 6 November 2021, https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism-turkey-paris-accord-climate-change/

6. Canadian Climate Institute/L'Instut Climatique du Canada, 'Border Carbon Adjustments,' 27 January 2022, https://climateinstitute.ca/publications/border-carbon-adjustments/

7. Congress, 'S.4355 - Clean Competition Act,' 7 June 2022, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/4355?s=1&r=6

8.Ukraine Resource & Analysis Centre (Society and Environment), ' The Impact of Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) on the EU - Ukraine trade,' November 2021, https://www.rac.org.ua/uploads/content/624/files/impactcarbonmechanismcbamukrainesummaryen.pdf

9. Burke et al, 'What does an EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism mean for the UK?' April 2021, https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/What-does-an-EU-Carbon-Border-Adjustment-Mechanism-mean-for-the-UK_FULL-REPORT.pdf

10. European Business Association, 'Ukrainian exporters to pay more than € 1 billion in carbon tax to the EU under the CBAM,' 31 May 2022, https://eba.com.ua/en/ponad-1-mlrd-yevro-podatku-na-vuglets-shhoroku-splachuvatymut-ukrayinski-eksportery-v-yes-v-ramkah-svam/

11. Balkan Green Energy News, 'Which Western Balkan countries intend to introduce carbon tax?' 18 May 2022, https://balkangreenenergynews.com/which-western-balkan-countries-intend-to-introduce-carbon-tax/

12. Climate Home News, 'Russian climate action and research is collateral damage in Putin’s war on Ukraine,' 26 May 2022, https://www.climatechangenews.com/2022/05/26/russian-climate-action-and-research-is-collateral-damage-in-putins-war-on-ukraine/

Europe: The Council of Europe has banned imports of cement from Russia as part of a fifth set of economic and individual sanctions. The import ban, in response to the war in Ukraine, also includes wood, fertilisers, seafood and alcoholic spirits. It has been valued at Euro5.5bn/yr. Other measures within the European Union (EU) include blocking coal and other solid fossil fuel imports from August 2022, stopping access of Russian flagged ships at ports, banning Russian or Belorussian road transport within the region and additional restrictions on the export on materials such as jet fuel, computer parts and certain types of machinery. Imports of coal into the EU are currently valued at Euro8bn/yr.

Josep Borrell, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy at the European Council said, “These latest sanctions were adopted following the atrocities committed by Russian armed forces in Bucha and other places under Russian occupation. The aim of our sanctions is to stop the reckless, inhuman and aggressive behaviour of the Russian troops and make clear to the decision makers in the Kremlin that their illegal aggression comes at a heavy cost.”

Belarus: The Belarusian Universal Commodity Exchange says that it expects to auction 1.5Mt of cement in 2022. BELTA News has reported that the figure corresponds to 50% of the annual production of Belarusian Cement Company.

Belarus: State-owned utilities provider Beltopgaz is targeting national peat production of 11Mt in the five-year period ending on 31 December 2025. BelTA News has reported that the new target is an outcome of an on-going comprehensive modernisation of peat production in the country. The 2021 peat season ended on 1 September 2021. During the year, Belarus produced 1.5Mt of peat, 14% of the five-year target.

The cement industry currently consumes 300,000 peat briquettes per year, 43% of the total produced nationally.

Belarus: The Belarus Architecture and Construction Ministry recorded a 25% year-on-year increase in Belarus’ first-half cement exports in 2021. Business World Magazine News has reported that the value of cement exports in the period rose by 38%. The ministry said that challenges included the on-going coronavirus pandemic and restrictions, bad winter weather and anti-dumping measures in neighbouring Ukraine.

The state is working to enhance Belarusian cement producers’ presence across Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) markets. This includes the establishment of a trading house with Kazakhstan to double the export of building materials to that country.

Poland: The Polish Cement Association (SPC) has forecast a 2% year-on-year drop in cement sales to 18.5Mt in 2021. President Krzysztof Kieres attributed the fall to growing imports and reduced construction due to a cold start to the year. He predicts that sales will rise again, by 4% to 19.3Mt, in 2022.

The SPC has warned that the industry faces large costs in meeting the European Green Deal’s required 40% CO₂ emissions reduction by 2030 and achieving carbon neutrality by 2050. In particular, the local industry noted that the rising European Union (EU) CO₂ price has caused a direct increase in electricity prices. It has called on the government and the EU to compensate it for this rise.

Imports of cement also present a key challenge. In 2020, imports of Belarusian cement increased by 80% to 440,000t and imports of Ukrainian cement increased by 50% to 32,000t. The association expressed strong support for the European Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) as a means of protecting the industry against imports both from neighbouring countries outside the EU and via polluting shipping from cement exporters further afield such as Turkey.

Belarus: The Belarus Energy Minister Viktor Karankevich has met with energy research institute Belgiprotopgaz to discuss the latter’s plans for the transition to the use of peat as fuel for cement production. Business World Magazine has reported that the country launched a major modernisation of peat production for 2021 – 2025 in late 2020. If successful, the domestically produced resource will replace imported natural gas in cement kiln lines.

Belarus: Belarusian Cement Company subsidiary Krasnoselskstroimaterialy has reported total costs savings across its operations of Euro1.34m in 2020. Belarus: Daily News has reported that the company undertook several and diverse measures to achieve the reduction.

The company said, "We have replaced imported bottom ash mix with high-aluminium clay from our own deposit.” It added, “The coal content of the fuel mix rose to 85%. We have also optimised the use of raw materials in the production of cinder blocks. This has helped to reduce the cost of their production by means of decreasing the usage rates for cement, lime and thermal energy."

Cement imports were one of the themes in this week’s news, with stories on the topic from South Africa and Ukraine. The former concerned the latest chapter in that industry’s saga on slowing down imports. The International Trade Administration Commission (ITAC) has started a review on tariffs imposed on cement from Pakistan that were introduced in 2015.

Local producers in South Africa have experienced mixed fortunes since 2015, such as PPC and AfriSam’s failed merger attempt or the introduction of a local carbon tax, and were starting to complain again about imports even before the effects of coronavirus in 2020. This led the Concrete Institute to lobby ITAC in 2019 about rising imports from other nations, principally Vietnam and China.

Back in 2013 cement imports from Pakistan to South Africa were 1.1Mt. This represented the vast majority of all imports to the country. Tariffs of 14 – 77% were imposed on Pakistan-based exporters in mid-2015, initially for six months, but this was then extended. Roughly a year later in mid-to-late 2016, Sephaku Holdings said that imports of cement had ‘significantly’ declined on a year-on-year basis, particularly from Pakistan. By the end of June 2016 approximately 0.16Mt had been imported compared to 0.5Mt in the previous period. However, it noted that 75% of the volume was from China. Since then imports started to creep up. Cement imports reportedly rose by 84% year-on-year in 2018 and then by 11% in 2019. Data from construction industry data company Industry Insight suggests that Vietnam accounted for 70% or 0.47Mt of the 0.68Mt of cement imported into South Africa in the first nine months of 2020. The remaining 30% or 0.20Mt came from Pakistan. In this kind of environment it seems unlikely that ITAC will do anything other than extend tariffs.

Meanwhile in the northern hemisphere, in Ukraine this week a court in Kiev dismissed a challenge by the Belarusian Cement Company to remove cement import tariffs from Russia, Belarus and Moldova that were introduced in mid-2019 for five years. Notably, a law firm representing Dyckerhoff Cement Ukraine, HeidelbergCement Ukraine, Ivano-Frankivsk Ukraine and CRH subsidiary Podilsky Cement commented favourably upon the court’s decision to uphold tariffs. These producers form UKRCEMENT, the association of cement producers of Ukraine. However, the association doesn’t include Russia-based Eurocement, which operates Ukraine’s largest cement plant at Balakleya. Relations have been poor between Russia and Ukraine since a war between the countries that started in 2014. So any trade tariffs implemented upon Russia and/or Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) members will inevitably carry the whiff of geopolitics. Yet, in Ukraine’s defence, it also started an anti-dumping investigation into cement imports from Turkey in September 2020. Nationalism may be relevant but let’s not discount hard-nosed economics just yet.

Turkey’s involvement in Ukraine leads to last week’s presentation at Global Cement Live by Sylvie Doutres, DSG Consultants on cement and clinker trade in and out of the Mediterranean region. Readers can watch the presentation here but the headline story here was the trend of reducing exports away from southern European countries such as Spain, Italy and Greece, to greater exports from North African countries and Turkey over the last decade. Turkey particularly has pushed its share of exports even more in 2020 despite (or perhaps because of) a tough domestic market. The general trend here away from southern Europe has been blamed on European Union-based (EU) producers becoming less competitive often against newer plants in nearby countries.

Battles between producers and government tariff policies are a perennial feature of any market in commodities such as cement. The ebb and flow of import and export markets cover many factors including production costs, distribution networks, tariff structures and more. Distinctive features of cement trading, for example, are the high cost of transporting heavy building materials over land and the world’s chronic cement production overcapacity. In the EU’s case one reason that often gets blamed is the emissions trading system (EU ETS) and the mounting cost it is imposing upon cement production. For example, today’s story that Holcim España wants to convert its integrated Jerez plant into a grinding unit has been blamed on falling exports and a reduction in ETS credits. It is noteworthy then that the EU ETS rate breached the Euro30/t level in December 2020. This may be good news for the sustainability lobby but the exodus of exports away from Southern Europe tells its own story. What form the EU ETS carbon border adjustment mechanism takes as part of the EU Green Deal will be watched closely by producers both inside and outside the EU.

Global Cement Live continues on 21 January 2021 with Kevin Rudd, Independent Cement Consultants, presenting 'Independent or third party factory acceptance testing of major cement plant equipment and critical spare parts and the challenges of Covid’