Displaying items by tag: Import

FLSmidth revealed this week that Cooperativa Boliviana de Cemento, Industrias y Servicios (COBOCE) has ordered a cement mill for its Irpa Irpa plant near Cochabamba. The Danish engineering firm was pleased to note that with the sale it has now delivered mills to three of the country’s five producers. Other recent orders include supplying an OK 36-4 mill to Sociedad Boliviana de Cemento’s (SOBOCE) Viacha cement plant, announced in early 2016, and a sale of a complete integrated production line at Sucre to Fábrica Nacional de Cemento (FANCESA) in late 2016.

These order reveal slow but steady growth in the local industry in recent years. However, a slowdown so far in 2017 suggests that the market is changing. National Institute of Statistics of Bolivia (INE) data shows that sales in the local market broke down in 2016 into a 42% sales share for SOBOCE, 25% for FANCESA, 19% for COBOCE, 8% for Yura and 6% for Itacamba. This changed somewhat in the first quarter of 2017 with a reduction in the sales of SOBOCE and Yura. Sales in the country are concentrated in the departments of Chuquisca, La Paz and Cochabamba, which held 70% of cement sales in 2016.

Graph 1: Cement production and sales in Bolivia, 2012 – 2017. Source: National Institute of Statistics of Bolivia.

Annual cement sales in Bolivia have been growing consistently since 2001. Financial services company Pacific Credit Rating placed average annual sales growth at 7.72% from 1998 to 2016. In 2016 sales reached 3.7Mt. Graph 1 shows a continuation of this trend although the first half of 2017 has been weaker than 2016. COBOCE blamed the reverse in 2017 on reduced local government spending on infrastructure projects and poor weather. The producer was expecting sales to grow by 6 – 8% as a whole for 2017. However, on the basis of the figures for July and August 2017 this is not looking likely. Sales for the two months dropped by 2.5% year-on-year to 0.64Mt. A representative of FANCESA later blamed the market change on a reduction in sales supporting the construction of tall buildings in the country’s key markets as customers switched to buying ‘random’ volumes.

Sure enough local producers have started to complain about foreign exporters damaging their trade. A union head in Chuquisaca called for cement and clinker imports by Yura from Peru to be banned and concerns have been raised about concessions offered to Itacamba, a joint venture between Spain’s Cementos Molins, Brazil’s Votorantim Cement and Camba Cement. President Evo Morales inaugurated this company’s new plant in Yacuses, Santa Cruz in early 2017. The niggles about foreign exports to Bolivia seem counter-intuitive given that the country is landlocked and it has the world’s highest capital city above sea level. Usually, markets with nearby ports are most at risk from clinker and cement imports. Yet, Itacamba was planning exports to Argentina in November so the import and export markets via road and river links can’t be discounted.

Cement sales may be down so far in 2017 but overall the wider economy appears to be in rude health. After a strong decade of growth the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate has fallen each year since 2014, but it was still 4.3% in 2016, one of the highest in South America. If that kind of growth persists it seems unlikely that the cement industry will have trouble for long.

After a couple of weeks looking at the capacity-rich cement markets of Angola and Vietnam, we turn our attention this week to some of those countries on the receiving end of overcapacity.

Costa Rica is an unlikely place to start but it came to our attention this week due to a short but significant news item. In summary, the amount of cement imported into Costa Rica increased by a factor of 10 between 2014 and 2016, from around 10,000t to over 100,000t. This is around 5% of its 2Mt/yr domesitic capacity, so the change is already fairly big news. The fact that an incredible 97% of this came from just one country, China, makes the story far more interesting as it shows the effects that Chinese overcapacity can have on smaller markets.

But when we look at how the value of the cement imports has changed over time, we see an even more dynamic shift. While the amount of cement imported into the country increased by nearly 10-fold, the value of the same imports only increased by around half as much between 2014 and 2016. If these figures can be taken at face value, the implication is stark. Taking the very low base as effectively ‘zero,’ each tonne of cement imported must cost around half as much as it used to.

Digging a little deeper and the picture gets more complicated. While they have fallen, Costa Rican cement prices have not fallen by 50% and why the sudden deluge of imports anyway? In 2015 the country changed its rules on cement imports to facilitate more flexible imports and lower prices for consumers. It did this by changing a regulation relating to how long cement can be stored, previously set at just 45 days, with the aim of allowing cement to come from further afield and, crucially, in bulk rather than bags.

The effects on price were immediate. Previously as high as US$13/bag (50kg) in December 2014, fairly high by global standards, Sinocem, the first Chinese importer, immediately sold its first shipment at US$10/bag. This effect of lower prices has now forced the average sales prices down to around US$10/bag across the country by 2017. This is good for consumers but not necessarily the local plants.

Back in 2015, the two local integrated plants operated by Cemex and Holcim warned that cement quality would suffer if cement bags were not used within 45 days. This apparently self-serving ‘warning’ went unheeded by the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Trade (MEIC), which pointed out that other countries in South America, as well as the European Union and United States, had no analogous short use-by dates for cement bags.

The rule remains in place, although discontent rumbles on. Indeed LafargeHolcim noted in its third quarter results for 2016 that ‘Costa Rica was adversely affected by increased foreign imports.’  This may well be a little bit of posturing and it doesn’t square with the fact that Costa Rica exported three times more cement that it imported in 2016. Of total exports of 0.34Mt, over 95% went to neighbouring Nicaragua, which has a single 0.6Mt/yr wet process plant owned by Cemex. It seems that the two Costa Rican plants have found a way to keep a little bit of the Chinese producers’ margin for themselves.

Of course, Chinese cement overcapacity doesn’t only affect the Central American market. It has been rippling all around the Pacific Rim. In July 2017, this column looked at the decision by Cementos Bío Bío to stop making clinker at its Talcahuano plant in Chile. It now favours grinding imported clinker from Asia. Before that, Holcim New Zealand closed its Westport cement plant in 2016, finally admitting that domestic clinker was not viable.

In the grand scheme of things, this all makes sense. The market has forced those operating on thin margins to adjust. Ultimately, the end consumer is likely to benefit from lower prices, at least for as long as reliable low-cost imports can be secured. What happens, however, if China actually gets round to curtailing its rampant cement capacity, or simply decides to charge more for its cement? Flexible imports, the main aim of the Costa Rican rule change, may then prove vital, as long as there is more than one international supplier of cement.

The old joke about buses only coming along in pairs might just apply to Angolan cement plants this week with the inauguration of Nova Cimangola’s new 2.4Mt/yr cement plant in Luanda. It follows the announcement of the start of an upgrade project to build a clinker kiln at Cimenfort’s grinding plant in Benguela. In cement industry terms for a country with a production capacity below 10Mt/yr these projects are right on top of each other!

Nova Cimangola’s new plant has been a well-publicised project internationally. Sinoma International Engineering coordinated the line for US$400m in 21 months using components from well-known suppliers. Loesche provided a number of raw material, cement and coal mills for the project, including the country’s first vertical roller mill, as well as other components and parts. Loesche’s Austrian subsidiary A Tec also got involved as an EPCM (Engineering, Procurement & Construction Management) partner.

Cimenfort’s clinker kiln project is the third phase of a process to turn its grinding plant at Catumbela in Benguela into a fully integrated unit since it opened in 2012. Earlier phases saw the grinding plant’s capacity increase to 1.4Mt/yr from 0.7Mt/yr by using a new roller press. Work on the kiln is now scheduled to start in January 2018 with completion scheduled for 2020.

If Cimenfort makes it to clinker production they will join the country’s three main producers: Nova Cimangola, Fabrica de Cimento do Kwanza Sul (FCKS) and the China International Fund. Getting that far is by no means certain as the Palanca Cement plant project demonstrates. That scheme was backed by Brazil’s Camargo Corrêa, the owners of InterCement, and local business group Gema. However, the regulators bailed out Portugal’s Banco Espírito Santo, the financial backer of the project, in 2014 effectively killing it. Another project that has gone on the back burner is Portugal’s Secil’s plan to build a second plant next to its grinding plant in Lobito. Originally approved by the Angolan government in 2007 the project has been kicked around since then through various revisions to the local investment body. It was last reported as being under consideration by the president’s office of Angola in 2016.

Ministry of Industry figures place cement production capacity at 8.3Mt/yr compared to a consumption of 6Mt/yr. In contrast to this Secil’s parent company Semapa reported that the Angolan cement market contracted in 2016 by 25% to 3.9Mt in line with the poor state of the general economy, pushed down by poor oil prices. It blamed the decrease in cement consumption on a halt in public infrastructure spending and the negative effect that local currency devaluations had on clinker imports and other incoming raw materials. With the International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasting economic growth to pick up for Angola in 2017, improvements in the construction and cement sector are expected by Semapa but they hadn’t been seen so far during the first quarter of the year.

The government’s keenness to describe its cement industry as ‘self-sufficient in cement’ mimics calls from other African countries like Nigeria. The Angolan government banned cement imports in 2015, with the exception of certain border provinces, and this has continued into 2017. However, the ban hasn’t stopped the country exporting cement to its neighbours. Earlier this year the head of Cimenterie de Lukala in the Democratic Republic of Congo blamed the closure of his company’s integrated plant on imports from Angola.

All of this leaves an enlarged local cement industry waiting for the good times to come again. In the meantime, exporting cement and clinker no doubt seems like a promising proposition. In the middle of this are projects like those from Cimenfort and Secil that are looking decidedly dicey in the current economic environment. These companies may have just missed the bus to make their upgrades happen. Still, if they wait around long enough, their chance may come again when the market revives.

Sad news this week from the Talcahuano cement plant in Chile that is to stop producing clinker. Local media reports that the Cementos Bío Bío unit has decided to import clinker from Asia instead, which will reduce its production costs. At the same time it has laid off a third of its workforce. The plant has been producing cement since 1961.

The decision carries echoes of Holcim New Zealand’s closure of its Westport cement plant in 2016, another unit in a country on the Pacific Rim. However, in that country LafargeHolcim has purposely moved towards becoming a distribution company by opening import terminals and depots. Plus the local subsidiary benefits from the cement-trading arm of a multinational company. By contrast, local producer Cementos Bío Bío still retains two integrated plants and a grinding plant in Chile. Following the closure its production share from integrated plants will drop to 2.4Mt/yr (39%) from 3.2Mt/yr (45%). The country will retain a total production capacity of 6.2Mt/yr from its clinker producing plants.

The timing of Cementos Bío Bío’s decision is also interesting given that the Chilean competition authority (TDLC) approved Hurtado Vicuña Group to buy a controlling stake in Cemento Polpaico from LafargeHolcim in early July 2017. The deal was originally announced in October 2016 to sell LafargeHolcim’s 54.3% stake in Cemento Polpaico for US$225m. The sale includes one integrated plant with a cement production capacity of 2.3Mt/yr and two grinding plants. Hurtado Vicuña has not been required by the regulator to sell any of its cement units but it has been asked to sell parts of its concrete business and to abide to a ban on repurchasing the assets within 10 years. Hurtado Vicuña owns Cementos BSA, a subsidiary that runs the El Bosque cement grinding plant in Santiago and it has just started-up production at a new 0.95Mt/yr grinding plant at Quilicura, also near the capital.

In its 2016 annual report LafargeHolcim reported that cement sales volumes of cement fell in Chile due to a fall in the residential construction market in the second half of the year. However it did manage to raise its operating earnings before interest, taxation, depreciation and amortisation (EBTIDA) off the back of higher prices and lower production costs compared to the previous year. Cementos Bío Bío concurred with this assessment of the market in its 2016 report, lamenting the country’s poor economic growth since 2015 and declines in the mining and construction sectors. Despite this its cement despatches rose very slightly to 1.56Mt in 2016. The big drop in its sales occurred in 2014 when its sales fell by 10% year-on-year to 1.51Mt. More recently, Bío Bío noted a 37% decrease in its operating profit for its cement, concrete and lime division for the first quarter of 2017 due to falling sales volumes and margins in cement and lime. However, it did benefit from falling costs for energy and petcoke inputs. The group also announced plans to sell a minority stake in itself in February 2017.

These stories show another country that is realigning its cement industry to a clinker-rich world market. Chile appears to retain a ‘big three’ group of local clinker producers that has shifted with the rise of Cementos BSA and the departure of LafargeHolcim. However, the market share in the cement grinding business has changed significantly as Cementos BSA has gained both an integrated plant and a more national profile, away from the capital, with its grinding plants. Once the local market picks up it will be interesting to see whether this trend towards clinker import and local grinding continues.

Tensions have boiled over regarding imports of cement to Kenya in recent weeks as different importers have received opprobrium in the local press. Last week Dangote Cement was attacked for importing cheap cement into the country from Ethiopia, allegedly off the back of a cheap electricity deal. This week, Chinese imports have been in the firing line, following data reportedly seen by the Business Daily newspaper that showed that the value of Chinese cement imports rose tenfold year-on-year in the first half of 2016.

At the heart of these rows lies a strong demand for cement: Kenya had a cement production utilisation rate of 90% in 2015 according to Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) data. It produced 6.35Mt in that year and used 5.71Mt for consumption and stocks. Its utilisation rate has been rising steadily since 2012. It was 93% for the first six months of 2016.

Unfortunately for the local producers this kind of demand attracts competition from within and without. Nigeria’s Dangote Cement is planning to build a 3Mt/yr plant at Kitui and Cemtech Kenya, a subsidiary of India’s Sanghi Group, is planning to build a 1.2Mt/yr plant at Pakot.

Local producer ARM Cement reported both falling turnover and a loss for the first half of 2016. It blamed this on increased competition in Tanzania. However, in 2015 it increased its turnover in Kenya by importing clinker over the border from its new Tanga plant in Tanzania. It also noted a ‘competitive landscape’ in Kenya and lamented the effects of currency devaluation on its financies as a whole. East African Portland Cement had a tougher time of it for its half-year that ended on 31 December 2015, issuing a profit warning of a loss and expected reduced profits despite a rise of 12% in sales revenue. By contrast, Bamburi Cement, LafargeHolcim’s subsidiary, reported both increases in revenue and operating profit in 2015. Although it too noted problems with interest rates and currency depreciation in the country during this period.

The focus on Chinese imports follows Chinese contractors winning some of the biggest infrastructure projects in the country. The China Rail & Bridge Corporation (CRBC), for example, is building a railway between Mombasa and Nairobi. The Business Daily newspaper has found data showing that Chinese cement imports worth US$19.8m to Kenya in the first half of 2016 compared to US$1.99m in the same period of 2015. The background to this is that China has more than doubled the value of all of its imports to Kenya since 2011 according to the KNBS. Total import volumes of clinker from all foreign countries increased by 51% in 2015 from 1.31Mt in 2014, the largest increase in at least five years.

If local cement producers are being locked out of supplying these kind of deals no wonder they are getting angry. However, another angle on what’s happening here might be that local producers who are suffering from increased competition, falling prices and a precarious national financial situation are lashing out at the easiest target. The local press doesn’t appear to have criticised ARM Cement for moving its Tanzanian clinker north of the border for example. Likewise, a Bamburi Cement spokesperson previously said that the producer had supplied 300,000t of cement to the rail project since September 2014, earning it nearly US$10m. Kenya needs cement as it builds its infrastructure. Fortunes will be made and tempers will be lost as it does so.

South African authorities have started a new investigation into imports of cement from Pakistan. This time the inquiry will examine trade dumping allegations made by local producers including Afrisam, Lafarge, NPC Cimpor and PPC.

The application made by the cement producers provided evidence that the difference between the price of cement (the dumping margin) in Pakistan and for imports from Pakistan in 2013 was 48%. Or, in other words, the price of Pakistan cement imported to South Africa was nearly half that of what is was being sold for in the country that it was actually produced in.

The data submitted to the International Trade Administration Commission of South Africa comes from a report by Genesis Analytics on Pakistan cement prices in 2013 and tax information from the South African Revenue Service. Neither source is readily available for more detailed analysis here but data released by XA International Trade Advisors suggests that cement imports from Pakistan rose to 1.1Mt/yr in 2013 and at a value of US$59m. Roughly, this gives a price of US$55/t. This compares to an average price of US$90/t, from the All Pakistan Manufacturers' Association for the first nine months of the 2012 – 2013 Pakistani fiscal year, giving a dumping margin similar to the allegation by the South African cement producers.

Separate industry sources quoted by the Pakistan media on the story reported that the country supplies 1.5 - 1.6Mt/yr of cement to South Africa, its biggest export market, receiving a revenue of US$125m. Although this suggests a dumping margin lower than the one presented to the authorities it is still high.

Other information of note in the investigation notification is that the Pakistan cement imports are only competing heavily with the local bagged cement market in the Southern African Customs Union, which also includes neighbouring Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. The notification discounts bulk cement imports from Pakistan as being 'prohibitively' expensive suggesting that the Pakistan cement producers have no import infrastructure in southern Africa or that something else is stopping them. For example, the country's market leader for production, Lucky Cement, has export facilities in Karachi with silos and automatic ship loaders. Yet it's only 'brick-and-mortar' presence overseas are projects building an integrated plant in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and a grinding plant in Iraq.

It may also be worth considering that South African industry newcomer Sephaku Cement hasn't joined the dumping allegation. The Dangote subsidiary was set to start producing clinker in late August 2014. This is out of character considering how prominent the Nigerian-based cement producer has been in campaigning against imports to its home nation. However, the Aganang plant in Lichtenburg, North West Province is over 700km from the coast and presumably safe from foreign imports at present.

One final question occurs. How are Pakistan cement producers able to dump bagged cement on the South African market at prices lower than what they are selling it for at home? If individual producers sold their excess at home at a lower price they could potentially undercut their competitors and make a profit. There are many barriers, from input costs to industry structural issues and other reasons that may be preventing this. However, if the South African cement producers succeed in their latest attempt to block imports from Pakistan it may add more impetus to remove such barriers.

Eurocement recently trumpeted the production of two new types of cement at its Podgorensky plant in Voronezh Region. A focus on standards follows a self-declared offensive being taken by the leading Russian cement producer against foreign imports since August 2013.

When the 3Mt/yr Podgorensky plant reached its full production capacity in July 2013, Eurocement president Mikhail Skorokhod gave a press conference to promote his products over the imports from Iran and Turkey. Some of the more humorous comments Skorokhod made to the press included suggesting that Iranian cement might be radioactive and the revelation that the title of Eurocement's in-house magazine, 'All Shades of Grey', might be inspired by an erotic novel with a similar name ('50 Shades of Grey').

More seriously, Russia's southern regions between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea are vulnerable to foreign imports. Both Turkey and Iran have high cement production capacities and they have access to the country via these two seas. In addition to rising housing construction in Russia since 2010, cement demand is expected to further take a boost from building associated with the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics and the 2018 FIFA World Cup.

As stated by Skorokhod, the Podgorensky cement plant was created to fight foreign imports. Hence the focus on standards and government approval. The cement types in question - TSEM I 52.5N and TSEM II/ A-Sh 42.5N - were certified by NIIMosstroy (the Moscow Construction Research Institute) with additional testing conducted by the Voronezh Regional Center for Hygiene and Epidemiology. The move was similar to attempts made in recent years by local producers in southern and eastern Africa to focus consumers' minds on quality versus the potential risks of low-cost imports.

Eurocement clearly wants to fight imports head on given that, according to CMPRO data, total cement imports to Russia nearly doubled from 2.8Mt in 2011 to 5.1Mt in 2012. Turkey, Belarus and Iran were the main importers in 2012. In 2012 cement imports as a percentage of consumption hit their highest level since 2008. At the same time Russian consumption of cement rose by 13% to 65Mt in 2012 from 58Mt in 2012.

Back in August 2013, Skorokhod said that the Podgorensky plant had cut imports to the southern ports. With no figures available yet for imports in 2013 we can only wait and see.

Weston is off. The 'will-they, won't they' of the New Zealand cement industry took a more decisive turn this week with the announcement that Holcim New Zealand intends to import cement instead.

Once Holcim's existing cement plant at Westport winds down there will be no more indigenous cement production on New Zealand's South Island. Golden Bay Cement on North Island will be left as the nation's sole cement producer. Instead Holcim now plans to build US$80m on an import terminal and related infrastructure.

Given a previous price tag of US$400m for the Weston project, switching to an import strategy makes sense for Holcim which has had a hard time of late with a poor first quarter following a tough year in 2012. Despite the benefits that the construction sector in New Zealand has seen with the rebuilding following the 2011 Christchurch earthquake, Holcim is thinking of its wider strategy. Although, as one of the largest multinational cement producers, Holcim has a wide supply chain for clinker, Australia reported poor sales in 2012 and it would be an obvious hub to keep New Zealand topped up with sufficient product.

Last week's doubts about the Indian cement market – when Holcim announced major business restructuring in India – may also have an effect as Vicat too has reported problems in the country this week. The question to ask when Holcim releases its half-year results in mid-August 2013 is how much excess capacity does the company have?

Coincidentally, importing cement is one issue that has come up in the UK Competition Commission's on-going investigation into the UK cement industry. An Irish cement importer has alleged that unnamed European cement producers have blocked his attempts to import cement to Ireland. The UK Competition Commission will continue its investigation until late 2013. Whilst we are not suggesting that the New Zealand cement industry has any problems of this kind, as the market adjusts to a higher level of imports it will encounter new challenges.

Nigeria: This week has seen a major development in the Nigerian cement industry, with a call from domestic manufacturers to ban cement imports, three months ahead of the government's schedule for the ban. The call has been presented in some quarters as proof that the country, long blighted by high cement imports, has achieved President Goodluck Jonathan's bold target of making Nigeria a net exporter of cement before 2013. In the face of steadily diminishing oil revenues the government would like Nigeria to be known as the regional cement exporter, but what else might happen?

According to the Cement Manufacturers' Association of Nigeria (CMAN), the country's total cement capacity now stands at 22.5Mt/yr. Domestic consumption is estimated at 18.5Mt/yr, translating into a required capacity utilisation rate of 82%. It is bizarre, therefore, that cement producers feel the need to call for an import ban. Perhaps:

a) The producers know that they can't compete with the low cost of imports from outside Nigeria,

b) The producers want to recoup their plant investment costs as quickly as possible,

c) The producers know that they can't export if the country continues to import.

With notoriously poor transport links within Nigeria, option c may be a small factor. If road and rail links are poor, transport costs increase and exports become less desirable for both the supplier and the end-user. What is more likely however, is a combination of a and b. Producers need to recoup their investments but can't if China and India can undercut them from thousands of miles away. If the desire to recoup investments goes unchecked when the import ban comes in, there is a high potential for cartel-like behaviour to surface again in the country.

One does not have to look back far to the last major incident of apparent cement market cartelisation in Nigeria. In mid-2011 President Jonathan had to step in and personally call for a 25% price reduction. His target was hit within three months, but since then prices have slowly started to rise again, even with Dangote's Ibese 6Mt/yr plant coming online just three months ago! With four producers committed to setting up a 3Mt/yr plant each by 2015 in exchange for 2011 import licences, the supply of cement in Nigeria will continue to rise, making the temptation to collaborate even stronger.