Displaying items by tag: Lafarge

LafargeHolcim’s announcement this week that it is to close its headquarters in Paris is the latest sign of the tension within the world’s largest cement producer. The decision is rational for a company making savings in the aftermath of the merger of two rivals – France’s Lafarge and Switzerland’s Holcim – back in 2015. Yet, it also carries symbolic weight. Lafarge was an iconic French company that had been in operation since 1833. Its hydrated lime was used to build the Suez Canal, one of the great infrastructure projects of the 19th century.

In the lead up to the merger in 2015 the union of Lafarge and Holcim was repeatedly described as one of equals. However, the diverging share price between the two companies killed that idea on the balance sheets in early 2015. Renegotiation on the share-swap ratio between the companies followed with an exchange ratio of nine Holcim shares for 10 Lafarge shares. In the end Holcim’s shareholders ended up owning 55.6% of LafargeHolcim. Lafarge’s Bruno Lafont lost out on the top job as chief executive officer (CEO) in the frenzy but the role did go to another former Lafarge executive. The new company also retained its former corporate offices in both France and Switzerland.

Since the merger LafargeHolcim has underperformed, reporting a loss of Euro1.46bn in 2017. Former senior executives from Lafarge have become embroiled in a legal investigation looking at the company’s conduct in Syria. LafargeHolcim’s first chief executive officer Eric Olsen resigned from the company in mid-2017 following fallout from a review into the Syria affair. Both Olsen and Lafont are currently under investigation by the French police into their actions with respect to a cement plant that the company kept operational during the on-going Syrian conflict. Olsen’s replacement, Jan Jenisch, is a German national who previously ran the Swiss building chemicals manufacturer Sika.

Regrettably the closure of LafargeHolcim’s corporate office in Paris will also see the loss of 97 jobs although some of the workers in Paris will be transferred to Clamart, in the south-western suburbs of the city. Another 107 jobs will also be cut in Zurich and Holderbank in Switzerland.

One more knock at the local nature of cement companies in the very international arena they operate in doesn’t mean that much beyond bruised national pride. British readers may mourn the loss of Blue Circle or Rugby Cement but the country still has a cement industry even if it mostly owned by foreign companies. France’s industry is doing better as it recovers following the lost decade since the financial crisis in 2008.

Jump to 2018 and LafargeHolcim is being run by a German with links to Switzerland, Holcim shareholders had the advantage during the merger, its former Lafarge executives and assets are facing legal scrutiny over its conduct in Syria and Lafarge’s old headquarters in Paris are being closed. LafargeHolcim in France still retains the group’s research and development centre at Lyon and a big chunk of the local industry. Yet Holcim has held an advantage ever since the final terms of the Lafarge-Holcim merger agreement were agreed so this slow slide to Switzerland is not really a surprise. From a distance it feels very much like the Holcim acquisition of Lafarge is finally complete.

Switzerland: Thomas Schmidheiny has decided not to stand for re-election for the board of LafargeHolcim. In recognition of his years of service to LafargeHolcim and its predecessor company Holcim, the board of directors has decided to name Schmidheiny honorary chairman of the group. He will remain one of the group’s main shareholders. Fellow board member Bertrand Collomb has also decided to stand down.

“For almost 50 years Thomas Schmidheiny has made a significant contribution to the success of Holcim and later LafargeHolcim. He was instrumental in successfully expanding into promising growth markets and has made Holcim one of the leading companies in its industry. On behalf of the board and all employees I would like to thank Thomas Schmidheiny for his exceptional contribution to our company,” said Beat Hess, chairman of the board of LafargeHolcim. He also thanked Collomb for his contribution to Lafarge and then LafargeHolcim.

Schmidheiny began his career at Holcim in 1970. He became a member of the executive committee six years later and served as chief executive officer (CEO) between 1978 and 2001. After joining the board of directors in 1978 he was chairman of the board of directors from 1984 until 2003. Later, he was a key part of the merger between Holcim and Lafarge that completed in 2015.

Collomb joined Lafarge in 1975. After serving in different management positions, including Head of North American operations, he served as chairman and CEO of Lafarge from 1989 to 2003, as chairman until 2007 and then subsequently director until 2012. He was named honorary chairman of Lafarge in 2007 and joined LafargeHolcim’s Board in 2015. Collomb has also decided not to stand for re-election at the upcoming annual general meeting, in order to follow a customary age limit of 75 years.

All other current members of the board of directors will be proposed for re-election at the annual general meeting. This will include: Beat Hess; Oscar Fanjul; Paul Desmarais, Jr; Patrick Kron; Gérard Lamarche; Adrian Loader; Jürg Oleas; Nassef Sawiris; Hanne Birgitte Breinbjerg Sørensen; and Dieter Spälti. Following the election of the nominees the board of directors will drop in size to 10 members compared to 12 at present.

India: ACC and Ambuja Cements, the two Indian subsidiaries of LafargeHolcim, have put their merger plans on hold. ACC said that its board was of the opinion that there were ‘certain constraints’ blocking its merger plans, according to the Press Trust of India. However, it added that a merger was its ‘ultimate’ objective. Ambuja Cements made a similar statement. Both companies joined Holcim in 2005, before becoming part of LafargeHolcim in 2015.

One fascinating statistic stands out in a study on how the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) pays its bills: cement represented 4% of its revenue in 2015 or around US$100m. The Centre for the Analysis of Terrorism (CAT) came up with this figure as part of its analysis on how the group finances itself. Its data was based on available information such as local sources, internal ISIS documents and reports from governments and institutions.

What’s more, the previous year in 2014, CAT estimated that ISIS brought in US$300m from cement sales. The difference in revenue between 2015 and 2014 came about from the group losing control of territory. In late 2014 it controlled four cement plants: the Lafarge Al-Jalabiya plant in Ayn al-Arabin, the Al-Raqqah Guris Cement plant and Fallujah, Kubaisa and Al-Qa’im plants in Iraq. Altogether it had a cement production capacity of 7.5Mt/yr, a higher capacity than 62% of the cement producing nations that are recognised formally by the United Nations. Briefly it had production parity with countries like Angola, Uzbekistan and Kuwait.

However the loss of the Al-Jalabiya and Kubaisa plants has stifled this revenue stream. At its peak ISIS couldn’t have been selling cement for more than something like US$40/t (capacity / revenue) if the plants were operating at full capacity. Yet it’s much more likely that the plants were chronically under-utilised and prices significantly higher in the heat, dust and confusion of a militant group attempting to form a state in a warzone.

Global Cement Weekly has covered previously the furore that erupted when French media accused Lafarge of cutting deals with ISIS to keep its Jalabiya cement plant during the early stages of the Syrian Civil War. At the time of the revelations in June 2016 LafargeHolcim said that its first priority was the safety and security of its employees at the plant before it eventually closed it, although it did not deny accusations directly.

Since then the plant’s former security manager Jacob Waerness has popped up in an interview with Bloomberg in connection with a book he wrote about the affair. According to Waerness, Lafarge stayed in the country for too long before the plant was finally seized by ISIS in September 2014.

The problem for Lafarge, as other multinational companies left the warzone, was that the US$680m plant had only been operational since late 2010 before hostilities broke out in 2011. Essentially, it tried to wait out the conflict and then got left behind. Pertinent to the start of this column, Waerness says that as the more extreme groups took control of the surrounding area he was offered and declined a meeting with the IS finance chief in Raqqa in the summer of 2013. However else one might describe IS, it was and clearly is well aware of the revenue to be gained from functioning cement plants.

LafargeHolcim has since started an internal review into the reported allegations under the auspices of its Finance & Audit Committee. In September 2016 the Iranian-backed Fars News Agency was reporting that US special forces were using the Jalabiya plant as a base. If and when peace comes to the region it will be intriguing to find out what condition the plant is in. Until then, LafargeHolcim will have to wait and take the loss on its investment.

Back in 2001 a UK government advisor gained infamy for trying to use the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 to bury bad news. This week’s column is trying hard NOT to be about the UK vote to leave the European Union (for more on that try our editorial director’s column in the latest issue of Global Cement Magazine). They’ll be plenty of time for that later on when the repercussions for the cement and construction industries sink in. However, it has inadvertently buried some bad news coverage for LafargeHolcim.

The French newspaper Le Monde reported on 21 June 2016 that Lafarge’s Syrian subsidiary paid money to Islamic State (IS) militants in order to keep its Jalabiya cement plant in operation in 2013 and 2014. The paper said that the plant was kept in operation until September 2014 as the result of ‘agreements with local armed groups, including the Islamic State.’ It added, that Lafarge ‘indirectly financed the jihadist organisation.’

LafargeHolcim issued a statement on the story on same day. However, it didn’t deny the accusations. It stated that the company, as Lafarge, was under control of the plant in Jalabiya between 2010 and September 2014 and that the safety of its employees had always been its first priority. Part of the statement read, “Once the conflict reached the area of the plant, the first priority for Lafarge was the safety and security of the employees, while planning for the eventual closure of the plant. In September 2014, Lafarge stopped operating the Jalabiya plant. After that, all employees were evacuated, put on paid leave and were no longer allowed to access the plant. In December 2015, given the evolution of the situation in Syria, the decision was taken to terminate all employee contracts and, where possible, transfer employees to other parts of the group.”

The company may yet face prosecution for the dealings if it is found to have financed any terrorist organisation. Emmanuel Daoud, a specialist in international law quoted by various media sources, speculated that the outcome of any potential investigation might depend on whether the company was protecting its staff or protecting its profits. Additional complications also arise from the subsequent merger of France’s Lafarge and Switzerland Holcim to form LafargeHolcim.

It should be remembered though that cement plants and their staff are often very real targets in regional conflicts. They can also be held under switching jurisdictions. We reported that a Lafarge Syria plant near Aleppo was attacked and set on fire in 2014. Before the site was abandoned to protect the staff the site was first under the auspices of the Syrian army and then the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party. Paying ‘taxes’ to the loosing side in a civil war might well be interpreted as funding terrorists in the aftermath.

A similar story resolved itself this week with the news that seven quarry workers kidnapped in Nigeria were released. Unfortunately there was one death and injuries sustained in the ambush that trapped them. Sy van Dyk, the chief executive of Macmahon, the company involved, refused to comment to local press on whether his company had paid a ransom to release the workers.

This all links to the wider issue of how multinational companies should deal with armed groups and de-facto governments in unstable areas. For example, the UK and US governments discourage paying ransoms to kidnappers because they say it encourages it as a business. Yet, other European nations notably paid to release their nationals during the earlier stages of the Syrian conflict and elsewhere. This in turn offers insight towards why Lafarge, a French multinational company, might have been more likely to negotiate with armed groups in Syria than say a British or American one. If an official investigation into Lafarge’s dealings follows then more details may emerge but there are no easy answers to these kinds of issues.

San Miguel Corporation has upped the pace of its capacity expansion this week to a US$1bn investment towards five new 2Mt/yr cement plants in the Philippines. The announcement builds on its previous plans to build two plants for US$800m. At that time construction had already begun at subsidiary Northern Cement's plant in Pangasinan and Quezon. Plants in Bulacan, Cebu and Davao have now joined the list for completion in 2017.

The scale of this expansion is vast considering that the Philippines has 17 active cement plants with a total integrated production capacity of 24.6Mt/yr. San Miguel president and COO Ramon Ang's comments to media that if there were an oversupply of cement the market would correct itself in a couple of years may sound flippant to anyone who isn't the head of a multi-billion dollar corporation. However, if achieved it will propel the San Miguel subsidiaries from the country's fourth largest cement producer to its largest.

However each of the other major producers also have their own expansion plan in various stages of completion. Holcim Philippines announced US$40m plans in May 2015 to expand its production capacity to 10Mt/yr by the end of 2016, mainly through reviving existing projects. Cemex announced plans in May 2015 to spend US$300m towards building a new 1.5Mt/yr integrated line at its Solid Plant. Lafarge Republic had plans in April 2015 to raise its cement output through the opening of grinding plants at its Rizal and Bulacan cement plants. The former was opened in April 2015 but this is the one plant that hasn't been acquired by CRH following the sale of Lafarge Republic in the run-up to the LafargeHolcim merger. The latter was last reported due for opening in December 2015.

The big change in the Philippine cement industry in 2015 has been the merger of Lafarge and Holcim to form LafargeHolcim. Given that Lafarge Republic and Holcim Philippines held over 55% of the country's production capacity before the merger, it was inevitable that they would be forced to sell off assets. In the end CRH picked up most of Lafarge Republic's cement assets bar the Teresa Plant in Rizal, which stayed with Holcim. The merger has skewed the market towards one clear leader, LafargeHolcim (9.5Mt/yr), followed by Cemex (4.73Mt/yr) and CRH (4.19Mt/yr) with similarly sized cement production bases. These producers are then chased by San Miguel (2.15Mt/yr) and the other smaller firms. If San Miguel succeeds in its expansion strategy then the market will change once again.

Cement sales rose by 11.1% to 11.9Mt in the first half of 2015 according to the Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippines (CeMAP). They attributed this growth to strong construction activity helped by increases in government infrastructure spending. Alongside this, gross domestic product (GDP) is predicted to rise by 6% in 2015 and 6.3% in 2016 by the Asian Development Bank. Another promising sign for development came from a study by Antoinette Rosete of the University of Santo Tomas which forecast that cement demand would meet 27Mt/yr. Capacity utilisation rates rose to 85% from 68% in 2014 according to Department of Trade and Industry data.

With this kind of encouragement, no wonder San Miguel is betting on such a large expansion project. If Rosete's forecast and capacity utilisation rates hold then the Philippines might need a capacity base of around 36Mt/yr. San Miguel's growth will fill that gap.

Of course other players might have their own ideas about giving away market share. LafargeHolcim and Cemex are likely to be saddled with debt or existing projects. CRH meanwhile is the wildcard as its expansion strategy is opaque. In recent years it has seemed to focus on acquisitions over building its own projects. The Euro5.2bn the company has spent on buying Lafarge and Holcim assets this year seems likely to slow down investment on any internal development plans. However CRH is bringing in local partner Aboitiz in the Philipines to help with a US$400m loan.

The Philippines is clearly an exciting market for the cement industry at the moment. One consequence of the current situation is that it may signal what CRH's global intentions are following the LafargeHolcim merger. If it decides or is able to start building new capacity then it may reveal the start of a new phase for the Ireland-based multinational.

UK: Investment boutique Perella Weinberg Partners has hired LafargeHolcim co-chairman Wolfgang Reitzle as an advisory partner.

Reitzle, also a former chief executive of the German gas maker Linde and chairman of the supervisory board of German car supplier Continental, will provide counsel in a senior role to the investment firm and its clients, especially in Europe, according to Perella Weinberg. He will continue in his role at LafargeHolcim.

Reitzle has had previous dealings with Perella Weinberg Partners; Holcim appointed Perella Weinberg banker Dietrich Becker to renegotiate the terms of its merger with Lafarge. "Reitzle has an exceptional track record of successfully managing growth across a variety of industries," said Joseph Perella, co-founder and chairman of Perella Weinberg Partners.

UK: Aggregate Industries' new cement division will be led by Joe Hudson as managing director of cement and concrete products. He joins Aggregate Industries from Lafarge, where he has worked in a number of key functional and operational roles since 2001. Hudson was heavily involved in preparations for the LafargeHolcim merger as group senior vice president for organisation and development at Lafarge and has experience of running a cement business, having previously worked as managing director / CEO for Lafarge Wapco Plc in Nigeria.

Kenyan cement producers kicked off this week about Chinese cement imports for the Standard Gauge Railway Project in Kenya. Local producers, including ARM Cement and Lafarge, have asked the Kenya Railways Corporation to explain why the Chinese-backed project is importing cement. Project builders the China Rail & Bridge Corporation (CRBC) has imported 7000t of cement so far in 2015 according to Kenya Ports Authority data.

Project completion is planned for 2017 with a requirement of 1Mt of cement. If CRBC carried on this rate then, roughly, the project might only use 42,000t of imported cement if the import rate holds. This is less than 5% of the estimated requirement. However, cement imports increases into Kenya have stayed steady since 2012. Imports rose by 2000t from 2013 to 2014. CRBC's imports will stick out significantly in 2015.

Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) data places Kenyan cement production at 5.8Mt in 2014, an increase of 16.3% from 5.1Mt in 2013. Production growth has been steadily building since the late 1990s with, more recently, a dip in the rate of growth in 2011 that has been 'corrected' as the growth has returned. Consumption has risen by 21.8% year-on-year to 5.2Mt in 2014 with imports also rising and exports dropping.

Imports for the railway project are duty free as ARM Cement Chief Executive Officer Pradeep Paunrana helpfully explained to Bloomberg. Producers have also recently upgraded their plants to specifically supply 52.5 grade cement to the project. Given this, it is unsurprising that local Kenyan producers, including ARM Cement and Lafarge, are complaining about this situation, especially given the increasingly pugnacious African response to foreign imports led by Dangote and companies in South Africa. Both ARM and Lafarge hold integrated plants and grinding plants in Nairobi and Mombasa. This is the route of the new railway line.

The backdrop to this is that the Chinese cement industry is struggling at home as it adjusts to lower construction rates and reduced cement production growth. Profits made by the Chinese cement industry fell by 67.6% year-on-year to US$521m for the first quarter of 2015, according to National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) statistics. At the same time the Shanghai Composite, China's principal stock market, has seen the value of its shares fall by 30% since June.

Although it is unclear where the cement imports in this particular row are coming from, informal or formal business links between large state controlled corporations such as a China's major cement producers will always be questioned by competitors outside of China for both genuine issues of competitiveness and simple attempts to claw more profit. If the Chinese cement producers are sufficiently spooked or they really start to lose money then what is to stop it asking a sister company building a large infrastructure project abroad to offer it some help? Or it might consider asking the Chinese bank providing 90% of the financing towards the US$3.8bn infrastructure project to force the Kenyan government to offer more concessions to foreign firms. Meanwhile one counter argument goes that Kenya has a growing construction market with a giant infrastructure project that may unlock the region's long-simmering low cement consumption per capita boom. The Kenyan government may face some difficult decisions ahead.

The Greek debt crisis directly hit the local cement industry on Tuesday 30 June 2015 when Titan Cement reported that it was unable to pay a dividend to its shareholders. The leading local cement producer blamed the capital controls introduced by the government.

It is worth looking at the effects on the domestic cement industry as the Eurozone bureaucracy and the Greek government play 'chicken' with each other while Greece starts the default process, having failed to pay the latest International Monetary Fund (IMF) payment on 30 June 2015. Greece will now join a group, possibly even more select than the European Union, of countries that have failed to pay back the IMF, including current defaulters like Sudan and Zimbabwe.

A better comparison might be made with Argentina which defaulted upon its foreign debts in 2001. Its construction industry fell by 12% year-on-year in 2001 and by a further 30% in 2002. Cement consumption and cement production utilisation rates hit 23% in 2002. One key difference with Greece is that the country has had major financial difficulties for far longer than Argentina. Argentina ran into financial depression in 1998 and defaulted in 2001. Greece ran into financial trouble following the 2008 financial crisis and then received its first bailout in 2010.

As the capital controls show, even initial responses to the financial situations are impacting upon the standard transactions a limited company conducts. The Financial Times ran an article in May 2015 examining the potential effects on businesses of a debt default and Greek exit from the Eurozone (Grexit). In short, business and commerce will continue where possible reacting to whatever comes their way. For example, an olive oil producer reported switching to exports to make profits. Crucially though, another company interviewed, a construction contractor, worried about potential cuts to government or EU-led infrastructure projects.

As Titan reported in its first quarter results for 2015, its Greek market has been dependent on road building. In February 2014 Titan Cement reported its first improved operating results in seven years followed by profit in 2014 as a whole. The other major cement producers, Lafarge subsidiary Heracles General Cement and Italcementi subsidiary Halyps Cement, reported an improved construction market in 2014 with rising cement volumes. However, it was noted by Lafarge that it was developing exports to 'optimise kiln utilisation.' Titan also noted the benefits of exports in its first quarter report for 2015, focusing on a strengthening US Dollar versus the Euro. Given on-going events, one suspects there is going to be a lot more 'development' of this kind.

To set some sense of scale of the crisis Jim O'Neill, former head of economics at Goldman Sachs, famously calculated that, at the height of its growth, China created an economy the size of Greece's every three months. What happens next is down to the crystal balls of economists, although the path of least resistance now seems to be pointing at further default, departure from the Eurozone and Euro and further significant financial pain for Greece.

It looks likely that the local construction market will stay subdued and exports will offer a lifeline. How much the EU is prepared to let Greece default on its bills and then try and undercut its own over-capacity cement industries remains to be seen. However, since the main cement producers in Greece are all multinational outfits, it will afford them some flexibility in their strategy in coping with the fallout. Meanwhile a cement production capacity of around 14Mt/yr for a population of 11m suggests over capacity by European standards. If exports can't help then the situation looks grim.

UPDATE: Here is Global Cement's previous take on Greece from June 2012