Aria Cybersecurity signed a deal this week just in time for the IEEE-IAS/ACA Cement Conference taking place in Florida, US. This opens up the topic of cybersecurity for the cement sector for us to discuss this week.

The software security company announced that it will be supplying its AZT Protect product to an unnamed but major US-based cement company. It reportedly demonstrated its offering to the customer in a laboratory before piloting it at a cement plant. One of the key points the supplier highlights in its press release is that its product can protect legacy systems that no longer have regularly updated software patches. For example, it suggests that it could save the customer money in this case by letting it continue to run critical machines using Windows 10, thereby saving knock-on software upgrade costs. Aria went on to say that once the current deployment is complete it is considering “expansion opportunities in up to 100s of other sites in the operator’s sister organisation.” Finally, it noted Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) warnings from April 2026 that Iran-based hackers have been targeting certain Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley programmable logic controllers (PLC) in US critical infrastructure sectors.

Cybersecurity isn’t something Global Cement Weekly covers that often, partly due to the lack of publicly available information. Most large companies are reluctant to admit to hacks unless they are forced to disclose them. Some major incidents that we are aware of include Buzzi Unicem’s NotPetya Attack in 2017 that started in Ukraine and then spread to the group’s other European operations. Supplier Schmersal owned up to one in 2020, albeit with the spin that it had successfully managed to fight back. No doubt there are others. Away from cement, gypsum wallboard producer Knauf was targeted by a ransomware attack in 2022. Meanwhile, everyone working in the field is acutely aware of major incidents in industries outside of building materials such as the US-based Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack in 2022 or the one upon UK-based Jaguar Land Rover that halted the car manufacturer’s production lines for over five weeks in mid-2025. That last one reportedly cost the company around US$2.5bn.

Baidyanath Kumar, the Chief Information Security Officer and Data Protection Officer at JK Lakshmi Cement, gave an interview to Express Computer in early 2026 where he outlined the challenges facing heavy industry. In summary: criminals are looking for ransomware targets, supply chains are vulnerable and operational and information technology processes at plants are merging. Kumar goes into detail on strategic security frameworks and the use of security operations centres. Yet one other point to flag is that he says that it is the age of using AI to fight AI-driven attacks. Part of this, startingly, is about protecting AI security models from being corrupted or manipulated by attackers.

Thinking about cybersecurity more widely in organisations brings us to initiatives such as the Helena Protocol from Cementos Argos. This takes its name from Helen of Troy and is intended to prevent the company’s digital systems from ‘trojans’ and other digital threats. It presents cybersecurity as a shared responsibility between both employees and suppliers. In this way it is like a corporate health and safety policy. Other cement companies have similar documents.

Finally, as Baidyanath Kumar points out in his interview, AI is the current frontier of cybersecurity. Readers will likely be aware of the way in which Anthropic released its latest AI model to selected organisations first in April 2026 due to potential security issues. AI companies have a habit of hyping up their products, but AI tools finding vulnerabilities in software seems like a real threat. Hopefully the cybersecurity community will be able to stay ahead of this one.

The 1st Global CementAI Conference 2026 takes place in Brussels on 19 - 20 May 2026

On 13 April 2026, the Paris Criminal Court found Lafarge guilty of financing a terrorist organisation and violating international financial sanctions.¹ The verdict is not final and remains subject to appeal. The former French cement multinational entered into ‘commercial partnership with Islamic State (ISIS),’ the court found, concluding a trial that began in November 2025, a decade after attacks by ISIS killed 130 in the court’s home city.

For four years, in May 2010 – September 2014, France-based Lafarge operated the Jalabiya cement plant in Syria’s Aleppo Governorate. During the final year of the plant’s operation, beginning some time in 2013, it paid ISIS and local Al-Qaeda successor Al-Nusra Front US$6.6m (reconverted from €5.59m, per the French court – Lafarge paid in Dollars). It took 12 years to convict the alleged perpetrators. Now, former Lafarge executives and affiliates are set to spend a combined 32 years and six months behind bars. The sentences were as follows:

Above – Table 1: Convicted Lafarge-terror conspirators in order of severity of their sentences. Source: Mark Handley, Duane Morris LLP.

Additionally, Lafarge received fines of US$1.32m for terrorist financing and US$5.38m for breach of sanctions. How did it come to this for the world’s largest cement multinational?

Lafarge’s entry into Syria at the start 2008 was a quiet sideshow to its acquisition of then 9Mt/yr-capacity Egyptian Cement Company’s parent Orascom Cement in Egypt for US$12.9bn. Orascom Cement’s other assets included a 4.4Mt/yr plant in Algeria and a 0.6Mt/yr cement plant in Türkiye, with a 20% stake in another, 2.2Mt/yr plant there.³ Orascom Cement had on-going new cement plant projects in Iraq, Nigeria and the UAE and had plans for a 2.5Mt/yr plant in Indonesia. It also held a 98.7% stake in a project to build a new cement plant in Syria. The project was situated in eastern Aleppo Governorate, 30km east of the River Euphrates, 30km south of the Turkish border and 80km from the nearest city, Raqqa. This would become the 2.6Mt/yr Jalabiya cement plant, commanding a 23% share of the Syrian market in the course of its doomed existence. The plant was very much Lafarge’s ‘baby,’ with the group investing US$680m in it, the largest foreign investment in Syrian history to date.

Lafarge Syria Cement represented a first foothold in what would become Lafarge’s Mediterranean Basin and Middle Eastern region. This accelerated its strategic growth in emerging markets, from which it expected to derive 65% of earnings in 2010, up from 45% in 2007.⁴ At that time, commentators were still pondering the potential global effects of an emerging ‘US sub-prime mortgage sector crisis.’

In acquiring Orascom Cement, Lafarge took on US$1.65bn of debt. It anticipated annual savings of US$177m. In the last full year of the plant’s operation in 2013, Lafarge noted that its returns ‘Continued to be impacted by the current environment’ surrounding the country’s civil war (2011 – 2024). It reappraised its previous outlook as US$27.2m above recoverable amount. Executives must have been feeling some pressure.

Lafarge was not operating the Jalabiya cement plant alone. From Orascom Cement, it also inherited a minority partner: Min Ajl Suriyya, a conglomerate belonging to local tycoon Firas Tlass. Tlass helped mediate between Lafarge and the Syrian government, and latterly rebel groups, included the designated terrorist PKK, after the plant fell behind their lines in 2011. Tlass apparently continued to manage things as payment structures grew more layered, and Lafarge seemingly thanked him by raising his stake in Lafarge Cement Syria from 1.3% to 10% in 2013. By this time, Lafarge Syria Cement had evacuated its non-Syrian employees to Egypt.

It is unclear how Lafarge could have carried out its actions in Syria without supportive French and European institutions also breaching sanctions and, indirectly, funding terrorist organisations. In March 2013, the French Development Agency and European Investment Bank agreed to refinance Lafarge Cement Syria’s debts in the sanctioned nation.

ISIS declared its caliphate at Raqqa on 29 June 2014. Since late 2013, it had been in what presiding judge Isabelle Prévost-Desprez characterised as a ‘commercial partnership’ with Lafarge Cement Syria, operating as its main raw materials and fuel supplier. Further payments secured safe passage for materials and staff. Amro Taleb served as intermediary in the dealings, along with Firas Tlass.

Investigative journalist Dorothée Myriam Kellou exposed Lafarge’s ISIS entanglement in an article in the Le Monde newspaper in June 2016, and the case was taken up in France by advocacy group Sherpa and the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights. Complaints against Lafarge in France have included crimes against humanity, complicity in war crimes, endangering the lives of others (as well as abusive exploitation of labour and degrading working conditions), financing a terrorist organisation and violating an embargo, but it only faced charges for the last two.⁵ Lafarge has also established a new first: the first French company tried for financing terrorism.

Former deputy managing director Herrault appeared in no mood for repentance: "We could have washed our hands of it and walked away, but what would have happened to the plant's employees?" Those employees are currently without recognition or redress for the effects of Lafarge’s actions, after the French Supreme Court found – in January 2024 – that French labour laws could not be applied to them. Firas Tlass continues to evade justice, having received his seven-year sentence in absentia, along with a ban from entering France. Lafarge itself claimed the findings as a ‘legacy matter.’

On one view, Lafarge’s Syria story is a reckoning for multinationals operating in developing markets – in particular, in places with active conflicts – where codes of conduct can disadvantage them differently to locally-owned or other competitors. If the late 2000s were a drive to become a primarily Global South company for Lafarge, then the early 2020s may have been the great backtrack, through Holcim’s apparent realignment towards mature markets.

Holcim had no part in Lafarge’s Syrian affair. It rebranded from LafargeHolcim in May 2021, signalling Swiss ascendancy within the merged entity. More than that, the board may have wanted a clean break, and seemingly shareholders agreed. Increasingly, losing the ‘Lafarge’ looks like commercial good sense. The trade in its shares appears unaffected by Lafarge’s guilty verdict: they opened trading up 0.7% on 14 April 2026.

Lafarge left a legacy of industrious cement supply across five continents; its name may still be synonymous with cement in your home market. Now, it has a shadow global legacy of financing terror, including in its own home city of Paris, as well as in Syria where it committed its conspiracy. Many groups have been awaiting justice for what Lafarge did. Monday’s convictions might lay a groundwork for future civil lawsuits.

References

1. ACTU17, ‘Financement du terrorisme en Syrie : le cimentier Lafarge et huit ex-dirigeants reconnus coupables,’ 13 April 2026, https://actu17.fr/justice/financement-du-terrorisme-en-syrie-le-cimentier-lafarge-et-huit-ex-dirigeants-reconnus-coupables.html

2. TRT World News, 'French cement maker Lafarge found guilty of financing Daesh in Syria,' 13 April 2026, https://www.trtworld.com/article/a0e11edfd7d7

3. Encyclopaedia.com, 'Orascom Construction Industries S.A.E.,’ www.encyclopedia.com/books/politics-and-business-magazines/orascom-construction-industries-sae

4. BBC News, ‘Cement giant Lafarge buys Orascom,’ 10 December 2007, https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Z72QydAHZNZeJIywfQTRJmByIKhkRRrPdgszTe9emfE/edit?tab=t.0

5. Public International Law and Policy Group, ‘Lafarge: A New Era of Accountability,’ 24 June 2022, www.publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/expert-roundtable-lafarge#:~:text=Lafarge%20was%20charged%20with%20complicity,terrorist%20enterprise%2C%20and%20forced%20labor

Source

Duane Morris LLP, ‘France – cement maker Lafarge and eight executives convicted of sanctions and terrorist financing breaches,’ 13 April 2026, https://blogs.duanemorris.com/europeansanctionsenforcement/2026/04/13/france-cement-maker-lafarge-and-eight-executives-convicted-of-sanctions-and-terrorist-financing-breaches/

It’s been a busy week for slag and cement with the Global Slag Conference taking place in Istanbul and the announcement that SSAB and Heidelberg Materials are working to develop electric arc furnace slag (EAF slag) into an alternative binder in cement.

The Global Slag Conference had many highlights and one can read all about it in the review. Ikram Ahmed Khan’s presentation about doing business in the Middle East with an ongoing war was a standout. There was also plenty of discussion on the valorisation of steel and newer slags. The announcement from SSAB and Heidelberg Materials ties into this. Traditional sources of ground granulated blast furnace slag are expected to decrease as the iron and steel industries decarbonise. The hunt for alternatives is on.

One key question that the conference posed was who exactly should pay the carbon tax related to using slag as a byproduct. During a panel discussion a cement and concrete producer on a panel noted that there is an ongoing debate on the issue. At present in the European Union (EU), iron and steel producers do not pass on any of the emission costs on to slag users. Users of slag, including cement producers, are able to use the byproduct without having to use their own allowances or buy carbon credits. Hence, the EU emissions trading scheme is intended to incentivise the use of low carbon products such as cement or concrete made with less clinker.

Iron and steel producers are primarily interested in making their primary products. Slag can be a lucrative byproduct but is not their main concern. Yet, since the carbon footprint of iron and steel is higher than cement, it is in their interests to attempt to lobby governments to pass on as many of the CO₂ emissions (or ‘allocate’ them to the slag byproduct) as they can. They are, of course, free to put up the price of their slag if they are paying more for carbon credits to make their primary products. How practical this may be in a competitive marketplace remains to be seen though.

One example of an attempt to pass on the emissions allocation by steel producers has been the Germany-based Low Emission Steel Standard (LESS). This is a methodology to define low-carbon steel. It permits that a credit of 0.1t CO₂e/t be given for granulated slag or comparable by-products, when sold as clinker substitutes for cement production. This figure was derived following consultation with the BMWK Scientific Advisory Board as part of the BMWK stakeholder process ‘Lead markets for climate-friendly basic materials.’

This potential battle between iron/steel and cement/concrete is partly down to how these different commodity markets work and how they pass on their carbon costs. Broadly speaking: steel is at higher risk of carbon leakage but it finds it harder to pass on carbon costs; cement is at lower risk of leakage but finds it easier to pass on costs. The phasing out of the free allocation of carbon credits and the commencement of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) in the EU adds to the pressure on both sectors and is potentially driving debates such as whether allocations should be passed on to byproducts. It is worth noting that political pressure against the EU ETS is mounting, making it uncertain to tell how far it will go.

Cement producers are used to similar issues from the alternative fuels sector. Here, for example, biogenic feedstocks are prioritised in the EU and the emission allocations are not passed on but other ‘fossil’ feedstocks are liable. This, in turn, affects which feedstocks are prioritised and where the investment goes. For slag, the phase out of free allocations, the introduction of the CBAM and the threat of mounting ETS carbon cost is increasing the pressure to find ways to decarbonise heavy industry through any means available. This presents a situation of competing narratives between the iron/steel and cement sectors. If slag is a ‘waste’ then the steel producers might be deemed responsible for the emissions. Yet, if it is a valuable by-product, then they might argue that the emissions should be passed on down the chain. If so, then this starts to alter the economics of using slag as a secondary cementitious materials (SCM) either for cement or concrete.

The 19^th Global Slag Conference will take place in April 2027 in Aachen, Germany

There have been several big stories in the cement sector from the Americas this week. Firstly, Cementos Argos revealed its plan to re-enter the US market through a spin-off. Then, the long-running restructuring of Brazil-based InterCement reached a milestone as a new consortium of investors took control. Holcim has also started preparing to delist Cementos Pacasmayo from the New York Stock Exchange. Let’s take a look at the first two stories in more detail.

The Argos story seems similar to Holcim’s spin-off in North America and the creation of Amrize. The US and the Latin American businesses will separate over the next two years.It’s more of a statement of intent so far though. Cementos Argos sold its stake in US-based Summit Materials to Quikrete in early 2025. It has since started importing aggregates into Florida in the US with more destinations in the south of the country planned. It has also appointed US executive Jason Teter, with experience from Vulcan Materials and Lafarge, as the head of Argos Materials, the new US subsidiary.

That divestment in 2025 left Cementos Argos with what it says is a war chest of over US$4bn. The group says it is targeting the aggregates sector in the US because it believes that prices are more stable than cement over the long term. To this end it aims to become a serious supplier of aggregate in the US market, adding up to US$300m of earnings by 2030. This compares to its adjusted earnings of around US$360m in 2025. The group’s competitors may have other ideas. Yet as Cementos Argos said in February 2026 about the sale of its stake in Summit Materials, it was “...consolidating a historic return equivalent to an annual yield of over 20% in US dollars since its entry into the US market - an unprecedented value creation record for Colombian companies in the country.”

Meanwhile, Brazil-based InterCement said that it had completed the second stage of its debt recovery plan on 4 April 2026. The summary of this process is that InterCement entered bankruptcy protection in late 2024, a consortium of investors led by LATCEM, Redwood Capital Management and Moneda Patria Investments took on the company’s debts, injected US$100m into InterCement and has taken control of it in the process. They now intend to restructure the company and have more breathing room than the previous owners, Mover, with less debt now owed (US$450m) and no debt maturities owed until 2031, according to Bloomberg.

Much of the attention about the new owners of InterCement has been focused on the fact that LATCEM is controlled by Argentina-based businessman Marcelo Mindlin. He has also been appointed as the president of Loma Negra, InterCement’s subsidiary in Argentina. InterCement Brazil reported revenue of US$640m in 2025. Loma Negra, by comparison, reported revenue of US$607m at the same time. It is a significant subsidiary in other words.

The Cementos Argos and InterCement stories are pretty different. Cementos Argos is looking to head back into the US market and reinvest some of the proceeds from its sale of Summit Materials. It is aiming at aggregates not cement this time. It is planning on using a similar approach to Holcim by spinning off its US subsidiary, although it intends to do this as it builds the business. InterCement, meanwhile, may have bought itself some time with the new investors. Its debts appear much reduced but are still large, suggesting there is considerable impetus for restructuring the business. Potential entrants to the cement market in Brazil take note. The link by Mindlin to Argentina suggests that Loma Negra may be more likely to stay together but we’ll just have to wait and see.