It’s been a busy week for slag and cement with the Global Slag Conference taking place in Istanbul and the announcement that SSAB and Heidelberg Materials are working to develop electric arc furnace slag (EAF slag) into an alternative binder in cement.

The Global Slag Conference had many highlights and one can read all about it in the review. Ikram Ahmed Khan’s presentation about doing business in the Middle East with an ongoing war was a standout. There was also plenty of discussion on the valorisation of steel and newer slags. The announcement from SSAB and Heidelberg Materials ties into this. Traditional sources of ground granulated blast furnace slag are expected to decrease as the iron and steel industries decarbonise. The hunt for alternatives is on.

One key question that the conference posed was who exactly should pay the carbon tax related to using slag as a byproduct. During a panel discussion a cement and concrete producer on a panel noted that there is an ongoing debate on the issue. At present in the European Union (EU), iron and steel producers do not pass on any of the emission costs on to slag users. Users of slag, including cement producers, are able to use the byproduct without having to use their own allowances or buy carbon credits. Hence, the EU emissions trading scheme is intended to incentivise the use of low carbon products such as cement or concrete made with less clinker.

Iron and steel producers are primarily interested in making their primary products. Slag can be a lucrative byproduct but is not their main concern. Yet, since the carbon footprint of iron and steel is higher than cement, it is in their interests to attempt to lobby governments to pass on as many of the CO₂ emissions (or ‘allocate’ them to the slag byproduct) as they can. They are, of course, free to put up the price of their slag if they are paying more for carbon credits to make their primary products. How practical this may be in a competitive marketplace remains to be seen though.

One example of an attempt to pass on the emissions allocation by steel producers has been the Germany-based Low Emission Steel Standard (LESS). This is a methodology to define low-carbon steel. It permits that a credit of 0.1t CO₂e/t be given for granulated slag or comparable by-products, when sold as clinker substitutes for cement production. This figure was derived following consultation with the BMWK Scientific Advisory Board as part of the BMWK stakeholder process ‘Lead markets for climate-friendly basic materials.’

This potential battle between iron/steel and cement/concrete is partly down to how these different commodity markets work and how they pass on their carbon costs. Broadly speaking: steel is at higher risk of carbon leakage but it finds it harder to pass on carbon costs; cement is at lower risk of leakage but finds it easier to pass on costs. The phasing out of the free allocation of carbon credits and the commencement of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) in the EU adds to the pressure on both sectors and is potentially driving debates such as whether allocations should be passed on to byproducts. It is worth noting that political pressure against the EU ETS is mounting, making it uncertain to tell how far it will go.

Cement producers are used to similar issues from the alternative fuels sector. Here, for example, biogenic feedstocks are prioritised in the EU and the emission allocations are not passed on but other ‘fossil’ feedstocks are liable. This, in turn, affects which feedstocks are prioritised and where the investment goes. For slag, the phase out of free allocations, the introduction of the CBAM and the threat of mounting ETS carbon cost is increasing the pressure to find ways to decarbonise heavy industry through any means available. This presents a situation of competing narratives between the iron/steel and cement sectors. If slag is a ‘waste’ then the steel producers might be deemed responsible for the emissions. Yet, if it is a valuable by-product, then they might argue that the emissions should be passed on down the chain. If so, then this starts to alter the economics of using slag as a secondary cementitious materials (SCM) either for cement or concrete.

The 19^th Global Slag Conference will take place in April 2027 in Aachen, Germany

There have been several big stories in the cement sector from the Americas this week. Firstly, Cementos Argos revealed its plan to re-enter the US market through a spin-off. Then, the long-running restructuring of Brazil-based InterCement reached a milestone as a new consortium of investors took control. Holcim has also started preparing to delist Cementos Pacasmayo from the New York Stock Exchange. Let’s take a look at the first two stories in more detail.

The Argos story seems similar to Holcim’s spin-off in North America and the creation of Amrize. The US and the Latin American businesses will separate over the next two years.It’s more of a statement of intent so far though. Cementos Argos sold its stake in US-based Summit Materials to Quikrete in early 2025. It has since started importing aggregates into Florida in the US with more destinations in the south of the country planned. It has also appointed US executive Jason Teter, with experience from Vulcan Materials and Lafarge, as the head of Argos Materials, the new US subsidiary.

That divestment in 2025 left Cementos Argos with what it says is a war chest of over US$4bn. The group says it is targeting the aggregates sector in the US because it believes that prices are more stable than cement over the long term. To this end it aims to become a serious supplier of aggregate in the US market, adding up to US$300m of earnings by 2030. This compares to its adjusted earnings of around US$360m in 2025. The group’s competitors may have other ideas. Yet as Cementos Argos said in February 2026 about the sale of its stake in Summit Materials, it was “...consolidating a historic return equivalent to an annual yield of over 20% in US dollars since its entry into the US market - an unprecedented value creation record for Colombian companies in the country.”

Meanwhile, Brazil-based InterCement said that it had completed the second stage of its debt recovery plan on 4 April 2026. The summary of this process is that InterCement entered bankruptcy protection in late 2024, a consortium of investors led by LATCEM, Redwood Capital Management and Moneda Patria Investments took on the company’s debts, injected US$100m into InterCement and has taken control of it in the process. They now intend to restructure the company and have more breathing room than the previous owners, Mover, with less debt now owed (US$450m) and no debt maturities owed until 2031, according to Bloomberg.

Much of the attention about the new owners of InterCement has been focused on the fact that LATCEM is controlled by Argentina-based businessman Marcelo Mindlin. He has also been appointed as the president of Loma Negra, InterCement’s subsidiary in Argentina. InterCement Brazil reported revenue of US$640m in 2025. Loma Negra, by comparison, reported revenue of US$607m at the same time. It is a significant subsidiary in other words.

The Cementos Argos and InterCement stories are pretty different. Cementos Argos is looking to head back into the US market and reinvest some of the proceeds from its sale of Summit Materials. It is aiming at aggregates not cement this time. It is planning on using a similar approach to Holcim by spinning off its US subsidiary, although it intends to do this as it builds the business. InterCement, meanwhile, may have bought itself some time with the new investors. Its debts appear much reduced but are still large, suggesting there is considerable impetus for restructuring the business. Potential entrants to the cement market in Brazil take note. The link by Mindlin to Argentina suggests that Loma Negra may be more likely to stay together but we’ll just have to wait and see.

On 13 April 2026, the Paris Criminal Court found Lafarge guilty of financing a terrorist organisation and violating international financial sanctions.¹ The verdict is not final and remains subject to appeal. The former French cement multinational entered into ‘commercial partnership with Islamic State (ISIS),’ the court found, concluding a trial that began in November 2025, a decade after attacks by ISIS killed 130 in the court’s home city.

For four years, in May 2010 – September 2014, France-based Lafarge operated the Jalabiya cement plant in Syria’s Aleppo Governorate. During the final year of the plant’s operation, beginning some time in 2013, it paid ISIS and local Al-Qaeda successor Al-Nusra Front US$6.6m (reconverted from €5.59m, per the French court – Lafarge paid in Dollars). It took 12 years to convict the alleged perpetrators. Now, former Lafarge executives and affiliates are set to spend a combined 32 years and six months behind bars. The sentences were as follows:

Above – Table 1: Convicted Lafarge-terror conspirators in order of severity of their sentences. Source: Mark Handley, Duane Morris LLP.

Additionally, Lafarge received fines of US$1.32m for terrorist financing and US$5.38m for breach of sanctions. How did it come to this for the world’s largest cement multinational?

Lafarge’s entry into Syria at the start 2008 was a quiet sideshow to its acquisition of then 9Mt/yr-capacity Egyptian Cement Company’s parent Orascom Cement in Egypt for US$12.9bn. Orascom Cement’s other assets included a 4.4Mt/yr plant in Algeria and a 0.6Mt/yr cement plant in Türkiye, with a 20% stake in another, 2.2Mt/yr plant there.³ Orascom Cement had on-going new cement plant projects in Iraq, Nigeria and the UAE and had plans for a 2.5Mt/yr plant in Indonesia. It also held a 98.7% stake in a project to build a new cement plant in Syria. The project was situated in eastern Aleppo Governorate, 30km east of the River Euphrates, 30km south of the Turkish border and 80km from the nearest city, Raqqa. This would become the 2.6Mt/yr Jalabiya cement plant, commanding a 23% share of the Syrian market in the course of its doomed existence. The plant was very much Lafarge’s ‘baby,’ with the group investing US$680m in it, the largest foreign investment in Syrian history to date.

Lafarge Syria Cement represented a first foothold in what would become Lafarge’s Mediterranean Basin and Middle Eastern region. This accelerated its strategic growth in emerging markets, from which it expected to derive 65% of earnings in 2010, up from 45% in 2007.⁴ At that time, commentators were still pondering the potential global effects of an emerging ‘US sub-prime mortgage sector crisis.’

In acquiring Orascom Cement, Lafarge took on US$1.65bn of debt. It anticipated annual savings of US$177m. In the last full year of the plant’s operation in 2013, Lafarge noted that its returns ‘Continued to be impacted by the current environment’ surrounding the country’s civil war (2011 – 2024). It reappraised its previous outlook as US$27.2m above recoverable amount. Executives must have been feeling some pressure.

Lafarge was not operating the Jalabiya cement plant alone. From Orascom Cement, it also inherited a minority partner: Min Ajl Suriyya, a conglomerate belonging to local tycoon Firas Tlass. Tlass helped mediate between Lafarge and the Syrian government, and latterly rebel groups, included the designated terrorist PKK, after the plant fell behind their lines in 2011. Tlass apparently continued to manage things as payment structures grew more layered, and Lafarge seemingly thanked him by raising his stake in Lafarge Cement Syria from 1.3% to 10% in 2013. By this time, Lafarge Syria Cement had evacuated its non-Syrian employees to Egypt.

It is unclear how Lafarge could have carried out its actions in Syria without supportive French and European institutions also breaching sanctions and, indirectly, funding terrorist organisations. In March 2013, the French Development Agency and European Investment Bank agreed to refinance Lafarge Cement Syria’s debts in the sanctioned nation.

ISIS declared its caliphate at Raqqa on 29 June 2014. Since late 2013, it had been in what presiding judge Isabelle Prévost-Desprez characterised as a ‘commercial partnership’ with Lafarge Cement Syria, operating as its main raw materials and fuel supplier. Further payments secured safe passage for materials and staff. Amro Taleb served as intermediary in the dealings, along with Firas Tlass.

Investigative journalist Dorothée Myriam Kellou exposed Lafarge’s ISIS entanglement in an article in the Le Monde newspaper in June 2016, and the case was taken up in France by advocacy group Sherpa and the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights. Complaints against Lafarge in France have included crimes against humanity, complicity in war crimes, endangering the lives of others (as well as abusive exploitation of labour and degrading working conditions), financing a terrorist organisation and violating an embargo, but it only faced charges for the last two.⁵ Lafarge has also established a new first: the first French company tried for financing terrorism.

Former deputy managing director Herrault appeared in no mood for repentance: "We could have washed our hands of it and walked away, but what would have happened to the plant's employees?" Those employees are currently without recognition or redress for the effects of Lafarge’s actions, after the French Supreme Court found – in January 2024 – that French labour laws could not be applied to them. Firas Tlass continues to evade justice, having received his seven-year sentence in absentia, along with a ban from entering France. Lafarge itself claimed the findings as a ‘legacy matter.’

On one view, Lafarge’s Syria story is a reckoning for multinationals operating in developing markets – in particular, in places with active conflicts – where codes of conduct can disadvantage them differently to locally-owned or other competitors. If the late 2000s were a drive to become a primarily Global South company for Lafarge, then the early 2020s may have been the great backtrack, through Holcim’s apparent realignment towards mature markets.

Holcim had no part in Lafarge’s Syrian affair. It rebranded from LafargeHolcim in May 2021, signalling Swiss ascendancy within the merged entity. More than that, the board may have wanted a clean break, and seemingly shareholders agreed. Increasingly, losing the ‘Lafarge’ looks like commercial good sense. The trade in its shares appears unaffected by Lafarge’s guilty verdict: they opened trading up 0.7% on 14 April 2026.

Lafarge left a legacy of industrious cement supply across five continents; its name may still be synonymous with cement in your home market. Now, it has a shadow global legacy of financing terror, including in its own home city of Paris, as well as in Syria where it committed its conspiracy. Many groups have been awaiting justice for what Lafarge did. Monday’s convictions might lay a groundwork for future civil lawsuits.

References

1. ACTU17, ‘Financement du terrorisme en Syrie : le cimentier Lafarge et huit ex-dirigeants reconnus coupables,’ 13 April 2026, https://actu17.fr/justice/financement-du-terrorisme-en-syrie-le-cimentier-lafarge-et-huit-ex-dirigeants-reconnus-coupables.html

2. TRT World News, 'French cement maker Lafarge found guilty of financing Daesh in Syria,' 13 April 2026, https://www.trtworld.com/article/a0e11edfd7d7

3. Encyclopaedia.com, 'Orascom Construction Industries S.A.E.,’ www.encyclopedia.com/books/politics-and-business-magazines/orascom-construction-industries-sae

4. BBC News, ‘Cement giant Lafarge buys Orascom,’ 10 December 2007, https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Z72QydAHZNZeJIywfQTRJmByIKhkRRrPdgszTe9emfE/edit?tab=t.0

5. Public International Law and Policy Group, ‘Lafarge: A New Era of Accountability,’ 24 June 2022, www.publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/expert-roundtable-lafarge#:~:text=Lafarge%20was%20charged%20with%20complicity,terrorist%20enterprise%2C%20and%20forced%20labor

Source

Duane Morris LLP, ‘France – cement maker Lafarge and eight executives convicted of sanctions and terrorist financing breaches,’ 13 April 2026, https://blogs.duanemorris.com/europeansanctionsenforcement/2026/04/13/france-cement-maker-lafarge-and-eight-executives-convicted-of-sanctions-and-terrorist-financing-breaches/

The cement sector in China may have turned a corner in 2025. Cement output and revenue from some of the largest producers continued to fall. However, profits at some of them rose in 2025. The signs from the start of 2026 suggest that national production may have recovered from the levels seen early in 2025.

Graph 1: Cement output in China, 2020 to 2025. Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China.

Data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China continues to show the declining trend in production since 2020. Output fell by just under 8.5% year-on-year to 1.67Bnt in 2025 from 1.83Bnt in 2024. The China Cement Association (CCA) noted that real estate investment fell by 17% to US$120bn in 2025. Yet, as mentioned above, the picture has started to look more positive in 2026. Cement production grew by 7% year-on-year to 178Mt in January and February. Whether this trend will continue in 2026 remains to be seen.

Graph 2: Sales revenue from selected Chinese cement producers. Source: Company financial reports.

Graph 3: Sales volumes of cement and clinker from selected Chinese cement producers. Source: Company financial reports.

Looking at the major cement producers in China, CNBM’s sales revenue and profit fell in 2025. This was mainly due to the declining price of heavy building materials, including cement, and a decrease in sales volumes. Total sales of cement and clinker, for example, fell by 11.5% to 217Mt in 2025 from 245Mt in 2024. CNBM also noted an impairment provision of around US$400m for “the exit of capacity in respect of certain cement and clinker production lines in the course of production capacity replacement and other factors…” As Graph 1 shows above, cement production in China has been shrinking and companies like CNBM are paying for this by retiring their production lines.

In comparison, Anhui Conch’s revenue fell but its profit rose in 2025. It increased its profit by improving its efficiency and cutting costs. It also managed to keep its drop in cement and clinker sales volumes lower than the industry average by increasing overseas and export sales. The group was also keen to point out that its installed capacity of wind, photovoltaic power generation and energy storage reached 1377MW by the end of 2025.

BBMG had a tougher time of it in 2025 with revenue down significantly and profit much reduced. However, this was caused by a major decrease in revenue from the group’s property development business. Sales volumes of cement and clinker fell by 1% to 83Mt in 2025 but booked gross-floor area from the property development business plummeted by 52% to 532,000m². Building materials made up 70% of group revenue in 2024. In 2025 they made up 86%.

As has been usual in recent years, Huaxin Cement performed best out of the larger cement producers featured here. Its revenue and profits grew in 2025. This was due to its growing overseas business that reached 20Mt in 2025, up by 25%. Domestically, cement and clinker sales volumes fell slightly. Notably, operating revenue from the overseas part of the business surpassed that of the Central China Region, becoming the group’s largest division. The company completed its acquisition of Nigeria-based Lafarge Africa in 2025. It also achieved the successful maiden voyage of its first self-owned international cargo vessel, to Mozambique.

Finally, China Resources Building Materials Technology (CRBMT) reported falling turnover but rising profit. Cement sales volumes were down but concrete and aggregate volumes were up. The group noted that average prices for cement, concrete and aggregates all fell in 2025. The profits appear to have risen due to cutting costs in a variety of ways.

The financial results above are just a snapshot from some of the larger cement companies in China. However, the picture is starting to look better than it has in previous years. Some commentators are even starting to predict modest profit rises in 2026 with price rises reported in Anhui, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Jilin and other provinces in March 2026. The domestic profits reported at the cement companies covered here mostly appeared to be related to cost cutting. It’s a start though for a sector that has been adjusting downwards over the last five years. The next step will be to stabilise sales volumes of cement. One hurdle in 2026 will be how local cement companies and the wider Chinese economy deal with the energy shock from the Iran war. China is reportedly better prepared for higher oil prices compared to many of its Asian neighbours but there may be many unforeseen consequences.