The National Development and Reform Commission and other government bodies in China released plans this week to cap clinker production capacity at 1.8Bnt/yr by the end of 2025. Energy efficiency of existing capacity will be used as the driver to determine which production lines can remain open. 30% of capacity will be required to be above the benchmark energy efficiency level. Plants below this line will be obliged to upgrade or face elimination.
Points of interest from the longer release include detail on how the authorities intend to promote energy efficiency. Installing improved production line equipment is as might be expected. However, there is also a drive towards low-carbon fuel substitution such as an increased thermal substitution rate (TSR) through the use of alternative fuels (AF), promotion of renewable energy sources and, interestingly, no new cement plants will be able to add captive coal power plants. The government is targeting a TSR of 10% by the end of 2025 with 30% of lines using AF in some form or another. A plan to reduce the clinker factor in cement is also being pushed through for the increased use of blast furnace slag, fly ash, carbide slag, manganese slag and other supplementary cementitious materials. This last point might have big implications for the ferrous slag export market but that’s a story for another day.
Working out how much these new measures will affect the cement sector in China in the short term is not straightforward since it’s unclear what the country’s actual production capacity is and how much of it is actually active. Data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China showed that cement output was 2.02Bnt in 2023. The China Cement Association (CCA) estimated that the capacity utilisation rate was 59% in 2023. So, if the sector were using all of its integrated cement plants flat out, then one might crudely suppose that the national production capacity might be around 3.5Bnt/yr. This guess does not take into account the prevalence of blended cements and a whole host of other factors so should be treated with caution. Given that cement output fell by 5% year-on-year in 2023, output could be just over 1.8Bnt in 2025 if the rate of decline holds. Research by Reuters in April 2024, suggested that the capacity utilisation rate hit 50% in that month, suggesting that the sector could meet the target in 2024 if it’s a particularly bad year. So, provided the production cap is enacted along the same lines of peak-shifting, where plants are temporarily shut for periods, then the target looks well within reach.
As reported in April 2024, the Chinese cement sector has faced rationalisation in recent years as the real estate market collapsed. Output peaked in 2020 and then fell subsequently. Most of the big producers endured falling sales volumes, revenue and profit in 2022, although some managed to resist the continuing decline in 2023. One coping mechanism has been to focus on overseas markets as proposed by the government’s Belt and Road initiative. Huaxin Cement has been a particular proponent of this strategy. The CCA says that China-based companies have invested in and built 43 clinker production lines in 21 countries with a cement production capacity of 81Mt/yr. Another 43Mt/yr of capacity is currently being built outside of China with yet another 25Mt/yr of capacity proposed for construction.
It is interesting, then, to note that the CCA issued an official warning this week to its members to invest ‘cautiously’ in Uzbekistan. The association said in a statement that at the end of April 2024 the country had 46 integrated production lines with a cement production capacity of 38Mt/yr. This is double the country’s demand for cement. Half of this production capacity is managed by China-based companies. It added that the utilisation rate was currently 50%, that the price had dropped by about 40% since 2020 and that competition was ‘fierce.’ Incredibly, another 7Mt/yr of capacity is expected to be added in 2024. The CCA has advised Chinese companies to consider the state of the Uzbek cement market before making any more investments.
The two news stories we have explored this week cover two sides of the same issue: Chinese cement overcapacity. The local market is finally slowing down after a period of phenomenal growth and the big question is what is the actual market demand now that all the big stuff has already been built. The government gives every impression it is using the decline to meet its sustainability goals. Like institutions in many other places it has set itself targets that it seems likely to meet. The flipside of overcapacity at home is investment overseas. China-based plant equipment manufacturers have certainly done well out of this situation. Yet in Uzbekistan, at least, it looks like the cement sector in China has also managed to export its overcapacity. This has created the absurd situation where the CCA has implored its members and others to exercise the same self-discipline abroad that the government extols at home. Another way to put this might be that Chinese cement companies are increasingly unable to make money at home… or in Uzbekistan. This then leaves a query over where else enthusiastic Chinese cement investors may be causing market imbalances. One solution might be for the Chinese government to impose a cap on clinker production by its companies outside the mainland. Whatever happens next though, the introduction of a capacity cap in mainland China marks a decisive change to the local cement sector.
