The second quarter of 2025 saw Russian GDP growth slow to 1.1% year-on-year, with a revised full-year growth forecast of 0.9%.1 An economy bulked up on injections of military spending (budgeted at 33% of GDP in 2025)2 since the invasion of Ukraine may slowly be keeling over. Faced with this eventuality, the Russian cement industry will likely be reviewing strategies not to be dragged down with the rest of the economy.
Prior to the release of the latest economic data, Russian construction had been forecast to grow at a CAGR of 2.5% in 2026 – 2029. Drivers included anticipated investments in oil and gas, transport, airports and renewable energy.
Purely in cement terms, the data no longer appear to corroborate this outlook. Market leader Cemros expects total domestic demand to drop from 67Mt in 2024, by 10 – 15% year-on-year, to 57 – 60.3Mt in 2025. In the first half of the year, Russia consumed 28.4Mt of cement, just 4% above production volumes of 27.2Mt in the same period. Cemros cited ‘declining cement consumption’ to account for its upcoming instigation of a four-day working week at its plants across Russia from October 2025.
On 12 August 2025, Cemros spoke out about a threat to the interests of the domestic industry: increased imports from Belarus. It said that Belarus’ three-plant industry is supplying Russia with cement at a rate equivalent to the combined production volumes of two-to-three cement plants. Time to cap them, it told the government, suggesting a ceiling of 1.5Mt/yr.
The producer may have received a shock on 18 August 2025, when Belarus-based Krasnoselskstroymaterialy announced an upcoming US$100m upgrade to its 700,000t/yr Vaŭkavysk cement plant in Grobno Oblast, Belarus.
By that time, the Russian cement association, Soyuzcement, had already called for an anti-dumping investigation into all cement imports. It expects that import volumes of 3.74Mt in 2024 may rise to 5Mt/yr ‘in the near-term future.’
Lingering behind these discussions is the fact of high operating costs, partly precipitated by Russia’s continuing burden of international sanctions.
Here, the cement sector’s hopes are riding on a very particular marketing campaign: that of President Vladimir Putin on the global diplomatic circuit. He must sell his war (or peace on his terms) in a way that fends off increased international sanctions or support for Ukraine. Existing sanctions were on show at the Alaska Summit in Anchorage, US, on 15 August 2025, where the Russian leader made his pitch to US President Donald Trump – including a request for de-sanctioning, alongside various proposed punishment measures against Ukraine. Before travelling back to Moscow, the Russian delegation reportedly had to offer to pay cash for aeroplane fuel.3
Though President Trump did not secure a ceasefire, he nonetheless held back from making good on threatened new sanctions, and rated the Alaska Summit ‘10/10.’4 Putin might be equally pleased with the inconclusive outcome as precisely the goal of all his obfuscations. For Russia’s cement producers, costs won’t suddenly rise, but nor will they come down any time soon.
Far from sitting idly by, the industry is seeking new ways to actualise the value of its product. On 20 August 2025, Soyuzcement hosted a meeting of nine producers and four retail chains to strategise ways to increase sales of bagged cement. It will be subject to mandatory digital labelling from 1 October 2025. Discussions included the possibility of batch labelling of bags on the pallet for ease of scanning at retail outlets.
For now, producers’ online media spaces give the impression of work continuing as usual. On 18 August 2025, Cemros announced a US$186,000 renovation of buildings at its Mikhailovsk building materials plant in Volgograd Oblast.
The cement business in Russia is big, established and diffuse. Transformation has been its defining feature in the 33 years since the fall of the USSR, including in the relatively stable latter decades of that period. Should macroeconomic or geopolitical events overtake it once again, we can expect some shapeshifting – but also survival.
References
1. Reuters, ‘Russia's GDP growth slows to 1.1% in Q2, says Rosstat,’ 13 August 2025, www.reuters.com/markets/europe/russias-gdp-growth-slows-11-q2-says-rosstat-2025-08-13/
2. Global Data, ‘Russia Construction Market Size,’ 30 June 2025, www.globaldata.com/store/report/russia-construction-market-analysis/
3. Spiegel, ‘Russen boten Rubio zufolge Barzahlung für Betankung ihrer Flugzeuge an,’ 18 August 2025, www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/trump-putin-gipfel-russen-boten-offensichtlich-barzahlung-fuer-betankung-ihrer-flugzeuge-an-a-fdd9303c-546a-43aa-89dd-4f746b8e9df3
4. Focus, ‘Jäger deutlich: "Putin verkauft Trump eine Illusion - und hat ihn jetzt in der Hand",’ 16 August 2025, www.focus.de/politik/ausland/jaeger-putin-braucht-trump-nicht-zu-fuerchten-er-hat-trump-jetzt-in-der-hand_67785013-a14b-485c-9a4a-51755ec483fa.html
