Analysis

It’s been a tough week for ARM Cement with the announcement that PricewaterhouseCoopers placed the company into administration on 18 August 2018. Given the performance of the company of late, this is not a surprise. It reported a growing net loss of US$55m in 2017 due to poor demand in Kenya and Tanzania.

First, the company made a series of personnel changes to the board of the company at the start of last week, according to Business Daily and other local press. This was led by the announcement on 13 August 2018 that Pradeep Paunrana would step down as the chief executive officer (CEO). This is significant since Paunrana’s father Harjivandas set up the company, previously known as Athi River Mining (ARM), in 1974. Paunrana was reported as owning 9% share in the company in late 2017 with his family controlling a further 14%. He will remain as a board member. Paunrana’s departure was also joined by Wilfred Murungi who stepped down as chairman following 24 years as a director of the firm and Surendra Bhatia, who will retire as deputy managing director. Although ARM Cement is yet to announce who its new CEO will be it has said that Linus Gitahi will become the new chairman and he has also been appointed as a non-executive independent director. Former Lafarge executive Thierry Metro has also been appointed as a non-executive independent director.

Then, over the weekend PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) announced in the local press that it had placed the beleaguered company into administration. Muniu Thoiti and George Weru have been appointed as the lead administrators tasked with the job of either rescuing the company or preserving the best possible value for its creditors. On 20 August 2018 the local stock exchange, the Nairobi Securities Exchange, suspended trading of ARM Cement for seven days.

ARM Cement blamed its woes in 2017 on elections in Kenya causing reduced cement demand, a coal import ban in Tanzania causing production issues at its Tanga cement plant and increased competition in both countries. Those last two reasons carried resonance this week with the news that the Petroleum Development Corporation and Dangote Industries Tanzania had signed a long-term gas deal. Dangote Cement has also had energy supply problems in the country, being forced to resort to diesel generators at its Mtwara plant. Due to this its 3Mt/yr cement plant only sold 0.2Mt of cement in the first half of 2018, a decrease of 48% year-on-year from the same period in 2017. The forced reliance on diesel also caused earning losses that negatively affected its wider Pan-African area margins.

The general consensus in the local press is that the CDC Group forced the latest changes in management. The UK government-backed investment company owns a 41% stake in ARM Cement. In June 2018 it replaced two of ARM’s board members and appointed a new executive director and a new company secretary following resignations. CDC Group injected US$140m into the firm in mid-2016 in return for a 40% stake in the business. When the Nairobi Securities Exchange suspended trading, ARM Cement shares were a tenth of the value CDC Group paid for its stake. Given that the share value of ARM has steadily fallen since 2016, the question that occurs is: why did CDC Group take so long before taking action?

Two thoughts occur at this point. One: whatever else emerges in the coming weeks and months about how ARM Cement has ended up in administration, it is unfortunate that a burgeoning multinational producer took a hit in more than one country at the same time in an area with such growth potential for construction. As has been proved, market potential and performance are not the same thing. Two: if this is any indication of how the UK government will act in the post-Brexit world generally, then investing in pound sterling assets before the end of March 2019 may be unwise.

There have been quite a few new cement plant project announcements in the past week, with expansions announced in Mexico, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, India and Uzbekistan. 11.8Mt/yr of new capacity has been announced in just a week, mostly from a whopping 9.0Mt/yr project in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia, the first in that Province. Notable in this project, as well as two of the others, is the involvement, once again, of large Chinese-based cement plant manufacturers and / or finance and associated influence from Chinese parties.

Of course, this trend is nothing new. The rise of Chinese cement plant manufacturers, particularly into Africa and other developing cement markets, has been covered in previous Global Cement Weekly columns. However, it does appear to be stepping up a notch in 2018 compared to previous years. So far this year we have reported on 21 confirmed Chinese cement plants being built in 15 countries other than China, from the planning stage to ‘up-and-running.’ A total of 37.2Mt/yr, more than the capacity of Germany, is being built across Algeria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Zambia. That’s not including a similarly large number of news stories where the supplier is not explicitly stated. This is seen a lot in Indian projects, as well as in Vietnam, where the cement sector appears to still be expanding, despite the government’s pronouncements. In many of these cases, and elsewhere, these unidentified suppliers are likely to be Chinese.

The driver for this increase in Chinese-led cement sector investment is, of course, the severe overcapacity in China’s domestic cement sector. The government is currently undertaking its most drastic capacity reduction measures so far. The ongoing integration of Sinoma and CNBM is one example of the lengths it will go to to reduce the current inefficiencies in the sector. This week the Chinese government reiterated its strict prohibition on new greenfield cement plants. It also warned that any producer that wants to upgrade its plant with a new line must only install the same capacity as the line that will be replaced, amid concerns that some were flouting this rule. This comes as the profits of major producers have been rising. Presumably the government would like them to climb further still.

So where does this leave the more established (read ‘European’) cement plant manufacturers such as Fives, FLSmidth, KHD and thyssenkrupp Industrial Solutions, some of which are fully or partly-owned by Chinese companies? Well, with fewer full-line projects available in developing regions due to the rise of the Chinese, they have become increasingly specialised in specific areas. Those that want European equipment will increasingly specify a pyro-line from Supplier A, a mill or two from Supplier B, conveyors and storage from supplier C, and so on. Arranging this, as it turns out, is something that Chinese plant manufacturers are quite keen to do. Take, for example, FLSmidth working for Sinoma (China) alongside Atlas Copco (Sweden) and Kawasaki Heavy Industries (Japan) on a cement plant in Indonesia. Indeed, FLSmidth signed a framework with CNBM on future collaborations in July 2018. FLSmidth and CNBM already have an extensive ‘back catalogue’ of joint projects. FLSmidth has valuable expertise that Chinese firms need to complete these kinds of projects.

Of course, another European supplier, Germany’s KHD, is mostly owned by China’s AVIC. In a forthcoming interview in the September 2018 issue of Global Cement Magazine, KHD’s CEO Gerold Keune states that the Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) scene is now ‘completely dominated’ by Chinese suppliers. KHD fits in by providing a wide range of equipment but, crucially, great expertise in pyroprocessing and crushing solutions. It itself relies on smaller firms to provide their knowledge to specific parts of a larger project, be it conveyors, feeding systems or silos. Everyone is getting better and better, but in a smaller and smaller area.

Also in the September 2018 issue of Global Cement Magazine will be a report from the VDMA’s Large Industrial Plant Manufacturer’s group (AGAB) in Germany, which highlights another advantage for the Europeans: Digitisation. According to a VDMA survey, the industry anticipates a positive influence from digitisation activities on sales and earnings and expects to see margins improve by up to 10% as a result of the efficiencies it offers over the next three years. In this regard they are ahead of the Chinese mega-suppliers.

The conclusion from this wide-ranging column? The integration of Chinese weight and European know-how is stepping up a notch and will only accelerate from here. Can everyone be ‘winners?’ The next few years may reveal some of the answers.

The Global Cement and Concrete Association (GCCA) announced this week that it intends to take over the work done by the Cement Sustainability Initiative (CSI). This marks a change in how the cement industry as a whole approaches sustainability and in the wider context how the sector manages itself on the world stage.

The CSI was set up in 1999 with the aim of advancing a sustainability agenda for the cement industry. It has done this by laying out strategy for the industry to follow in the form of technology roadmaps and publishing its ‘Getting the Numbers Right’ (GNR) data on CO₂ and energy performance information. By 2018 it had 24 cement company members composed of nine core members, 14 participating members and one affiliate member. It represents around 2.4Bnt/yr of global cement production capacity or over half of the world production, according to Global Cement Directory 2018 data.

The idea behind the membership was that the core members are all members of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) and that the members would contribute ‘modest’ funds to run the organisation. That last point about WBCSD membership is worth noting because members need to stick to conditions such as publishing an annual sustainability report and agree to have the sustainability report reviewed and benchmarked by the WBCSD.

Figure 1: Outline of selected current global cement organisations with a sustainability remit. Source: Association websites, Global Cement Directory 2018.

The GCCA, which formed in early 2018, says it had formed a ‘strategic’ partnership with the WBCSD and that it will take over the work previously done by the CSI from the start of 2019. Although there’s no mention so far whether GCCA members have to actually become WBCSD members with all that this entails. At present the GCCA consists of nine major international cement producers, including over half of the world’s top 10 producers by production capacity, with a production base in every inhabited continent except Antarctica. Roughly speaking it represents just under 2Bnt/yr of global cement production capacity or about half of the world’s total.

Now where this starts to get confusing is that other cement associations exist with their own established advocacy roles and sustainability agendas. The established players include the various regional associations such as the Portland Cement Association in the US, Cembureau in Europe and so forth. The multinational ones also often represent national bodies.

Then there is the World Cement Association (WCA), which formed in 2016. This independent body is a private company run out of an office in London, UK with non-profit aims. It has 45 members but only three quarters are actual cement producers. Of these most are single-country cement manufacturers. The glaring standout is China National Building Material (CNBM) and its subsidiaries, representing over half of the association’s member’s cement production capacity. The production capacity of the WCA’s members is around 1Bnt/yr or a quarter of the global total. More than half of this comes from CNBM and its subsidiaries. Unsurprisingly then that Song Zhi Ping, the head of CNBM, is the president of the WCA. It too supports a sustainability agenda, saying that it, “seeks to co-operate with the WBCSD, CSI and regional and national Cement Associations.” What is noteworthy is how few of the current members of the WCA joined the CSI previously.

There is definitely a need for a global organisation advocating sustainability issues for the cement industry and by taking over the work of the CSI and the GCCA has cornered this part of what a global cement association might do. However, the GCCA represents less cement production capacity than the CSI did. The main omissions are the Indian producers, led by UltraTech Cement, as well as others. It seems likely that they will join the GCCA following the end of the CSI but there is no guarantee.

The other point arises when looking at these various cement associations is: who does what exactly? The CSI’s focus on sustainability gave it a purpose that it did well with a genuine appearance of independence. Its narrow focus also gave it a complimentary role to the existing national and regional associations. Global bodies like the GCCA and the WCA are clearly more into advocacy territory for their members. Also, a more general association approach like the GCCA and the WCA may clash with regional bodies like the PCA and Cembureau. Regional bodies seem better suited to the way governance works globally with regional groups such as the European Union (EU) or government departments in continental sized countries such as the US, China and India. However, a truly global cement body could respond better to coordinated environmental lobbying and fill in the gaps around the world in places with looser regional representation.

Sustainability is the immediate link between the CSI, the GCCA and the WCA. Indeed the WCA recently held a ‘Global Climate Change’ forum in Paris to discuss its own climate action plan. Yet, with the GCCA taking over the work the CSI does and the WCA saying it wants to cooperate with the CSI, the obvious outcome is that the GCCA will become the world’s apex cement association. It will represent the companies with the most cement production capacity, have a presence in every inhabited continent and take the lead on WBCSD issues. Beyond this though it will be interesting to see what, if anything else, the GCCA chooses to do.

Cemex joined the divestment party this week with the news that it plans to sell up to US$2bn worth of assets by the end of 2020. Put that together with LafargeHolcim’s own divestment plan of selected assets worth up to US$2bn as part of its Strategy 2022 and there is potentially a lot of cement production infrastructure going on sale over the next few years.

Both companies say that they will start announcing the latest round of divestments in the second half of 2018. Prices vary considerably around the world - and remember this is not only cement - but at, say, US$250m per integrated plant that could amount to 16 units. That’s a big enough manufacturing base to build your very own cement production empire! So, which markets might the two companies be considering leaving?

Cemex’s weaker areas in its half-year report were its South, Central America and the Caribbean region and, to a lesser extent, its European region. The former reported falling sales, cement volumes and earnings. The latter reported falling earnings on a like-for-like basis with issues noted across cement, ready-mix concrete and aggregate business lines in the UK. Back in Central and South America, problems were noted in Colombia due to a 10% fall in cement sales in the first half. An important point to make here is that despatch figures from the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE) out this week suggest that Colombia’s overall cement market has picked up since April 2018 (see Graph 1), in contrast to Cemex’s experience. Panama, meanwhile, saw cement volumes wither by 22% due to the 30-day strike by construction workers. Other operations to consider for the chop might include Cemex Croatia, which the company attempted to sell to HeidelbergCement and Schwenk Zement in 2017, before the European Commission put an end to that idea.

Graph 1: Annual change of cement despatches in Columbia in 2017 and 2018. Source: DANE.

When asked directly during its second quarter results call which assets it was intending to sell, chief executive officer (CEO) Fernando Gonzalez didn’t answer on commercial grounds. What he did say though was that the company had faced ‘headwinds’ in the Philippines, Egypt and Colombia, particularly in relation to fuel prices. He also said that Cemex had finished its market analysis, that it knew exactly which assets it would like to sell already and that it was in ‘execution’ mode. In Gonzalez’s own words, “we do have a number of assets to be divested, either because they are low growth, or because they are not necessarily integrated to other business lines.”

As covered a couple of week ago, the obvious location for LafargeHolcim to exit is Indonesia. CEO Jan Jenisch continued to refuse to comment on rumours that the company was leaving the country during its second quarter results call. Yet, local production overcapacity, falling earnings and profits and an underperforming but still sparky market make it the ideal candidate. What Jenisch did reveal was that the country had ‘positive momentum.’ Perhaps more importantly he added, “We are not selling because we want to sell. We are selling for high valuations only.”

Other potential locations for LafargeHolcim to leave might include Brazil and parts of the Middle East and Africa. Brazil’s cement market recovery has been a few years coming and was delayed again by a truck drivers’ strike in May 2018. The Middle East Africa area was the worst performing region in LafargeHolcim’s mid-year results with problems noted in South Africa.

With all of this in mind we have a rough idea of what Cemex and LafargeHolcim might be considering selling. The obvious candidates for both companies seem to be solid markets that promise growth after a period of underperformance. Just like Colombia and Indonesia in fact. Looking at the track record for both of them in recent years Cemex has seemed to be more ready to sell individual plants such as the Odessa and Fairborn plants in the US to different buyers. LafargeHolcim for its part has generally gone for larger more complete sales of regional or country-based chunks of its business such as in Chile or Sri Lanka.

Finally, don’t forget that Cemex’s Fernando Gonzalez said in March 2018 that the company was considering acquisitions again after a decade of austerity. He mentioned an interest in India and in Brazil. If he meant that last one then maybe he should give LafargeHolcim’s Jan Jenisch a call.

Earlier this year South Africa’s PPC commented on the drought facing Cape Town. It said that cement manufacturing was not water intensive, that its operations were ‘totally’ self-sufficient from its own surface water sources with capacity for several months and that it was working with the local government which viewed construction as an important economic sector. Point made!

Water conservation is an established part of the sustainability toolkit for cement producers. Yet recent weather patterns in the Northern Hemisphere may also test how well companies are doing. Above average temperatures have been recorded this summer, in some places accompanied by unusually dry conditions. A news story this week about Cemex Colombia being fined for using water from a river shows one aspect of the problems that can face industrial users. Another story that we’ve covered previously has been the legal action taken against producers using water from a site near to the Katas Raj Temples in Pakistan.

Wet process cement manufacturing uses more water than dry process but even modern plants use water for cooling equipment and exhaust gases, in emission control systems such as wet scrubbers. In addition, quarrying and aggregate production may require water, and concrete production also needs water. Issues also arise with quarry dewatering and discharging water into rivers and the like. Global Cement Directory 2018 data indicates that, where known, about 10% of integrated cement plants still use a wet production method.

Graph 1: Specific water consumption by selected cement producers in 2017. Source: Corporate sustainability reports.

As Graph 1 shows there is some variation between the major cement producers with regards to how much water they use. They all operate with different types of equipment and production methods in different geographical locations so the difference between the companies is to be expected. A cement plant in northern Europe that normally experiences high levels of rainfall will have a different approach to water conservation than one, say, in a water stressed area like the Middle East. Incidentally, the definition used to define a water-stressed or scarce area is one where there is less than 1000m³/yr per person. One other point to note here is that each of the companies has a higher consumption figure than the 100 – 200L/t that the Cement Manufacturers' Association of the Philippines (CeMAP) reckoned that an average dry-process cement plant used when it was promoting water conservation back in 2013.

Looking at specific recent success stories, India’s UltraTech Cement reported a specific water consumption of 54L/t of clinker at its Star Cement plant in Dubai, UAE in 2016 – 2017 following a dedicated initiative at the site. An another milestone that UltraTech Cement was keen to point out in its last sustainability report was that three of 13 integrated plants had achieved water sufficiency though the use of the company’s 360° Water Management Model with its use of rainwater harvesting and recharging groundwater. These plants are not dependent on any groundwater or fresh water sources. The other larger cement producers all have similar water management schemes with reduction targets in place.

Climate change models generally predict hotter and wetter weather but changing weather patterns and growing populations are likely to impact upon water management and consumption. Given the integral nature of water in the cement production process, many cement producers have realised the importance of it and treat it as an input material like fuel or limestone. Hence the highlighting of water conservation in company sustainability reports over the last decade. The test for the success of these initiatives will be how producers cope in drought situations where they may be seen as being in competition with domestic users. Thankfully in PPC’s case, Cape Town avoided having to ration water to the general public, as the rains returned in the spring.