Analysis

Cementos Argos’ deal to buy the Martinsburg cement plant in West Virginia from HeidelbergCement makes a lot of sense. After all, the Colombian-based cement producer has seen its US cement assets perform well so far in 2016 with a cement sales volumes increase of 29% year-on-year to 1.99Mt and an overall sales revenue boost of 19.7% to US$700m. Compare that to the challenges the company has faced so far this year on its home turf in Colombia. There, cement sales volumes fell by 15.5% to 2.47Mt and sales revenue fell slightly to US$465m.

Argos has picked up the Martinsburg cement plant and eight cement terminals in the surrounding states for US$660m. The sale was mandated by the US Federal Trade Commission as one of the conditions of HeidelbergCement’s purchase of Italcementi including its US subsidiary Essroc, the current owner of the plant.

Symbolically, the purchase takes Argos right up to the Mason–Dixon line, the old survey line sometimes used to describe the dividing line between the so-called ‘north’ and ‘south’ in the US. The cement plant is south of the line in West Virginia but some of the cement terminals are firmly in the north-east. Outside of the company’s home turf in Colombia it has a maritime presence around the Gulf of Mexico. Although Martinsburg is inland, the new terminals in Norfolk, Virginia and Baltimore push Argos’ distribution network up the east coast. This could potentially push Argos into conflict with the subject of last week’s column, McInnis Cement, a Canadian cement plant under construction with eventual aspirations to sell its cement to the US.

Back in the US specifically the new plant will bring Argos’ total of integrated cement plants to four, joining Roberta in Alabama, Newberry in Florida and Harleyville in South Carolina. All together the producer will have a production capacity of around 6Mt/yr in the US following the acquisition. Back in 2014 when Global Cement visited Martinsburg the plant was distributing its cement about 60:40 via truck and rail. At that time the plant was shifting cement in an area from central Ohio eastwards to western Pennsylvania and south to southern Virginia, as well as in North Carolina.

Argos has paid US$300/t for Martinsburg’s production capacity of 2.2Mt/yr. As ever determining the cost of the terminals proves difficult. This compares to the US$267t/yr that Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua (GCC) paid to pick up two plants from Cemex in May 2016 or the US$375/t that Summit Materials paid Lafarge for a cement plant and seven terminals in July 2015. Previous Argos purchases in the US were around US$220 – 250/t for deals with Lafarge and Vulcan in 2011 and 2014 respectively. It is also worth considering that Essroc upgraded Martinsburg significantly in 2010 to a dry-process kiln and that the site has a waste-to-solid-fuel plant from Entsorga due to become operational in 2017.

The purchase of Martinsburg by Argos seems like an obvious move. It predicts a compound annual growth rate of 5.4% for cement consumption in the American states it operates within between 2016 and 2020. However, this may be optimistic given that the Portland Cement Association’s chief economist Ed Sullivan has downgraded his consumption forecasts for the US as a whole to 3.4% from 5% as he waits for the recovery to really kick in. The southern US states have also recovered faster since a low in 2009 than the northeastern ones. The purchase marks a new chapter in Cementos Argos’ expansion strategy

The McInnis Cement plant at Port-Daniel-Gascons in Quebec, Canada must be the most famous cement plant that hasn’t been built yet. Every single step of the project’s list has seemed dogged with infamy. Public money it seems comes with public scrutiny. This week, one of the principal investors took control of the plant following allegations of massive budget overruns and the disappearance of the company’s president.

To start with the money, the plant was originally budgeted at US$1bn for a 2.2Mt/yr facility. This has always seemed like an inflated figure given that the general cost of a new or greenfield cement plant is up to US$200/t. The original price tag for McInnis is double this figure. Throw in the need for infrastructure at the site and the requirement of a marine terminal and the cost starts to become a little more realistic with government backing. The importance of the sea links can’t be under stressed given that the plant is targeted at the US market. No port: no cement plant.

This then leads to the quagmire of criticism the project has found itself stuck within. American cement producers took exception to a foreign government-backed plant trying to eat their lunch so they went legal. When the government-subsidised project bypassed the normal environmental clearances Lafarge Canada backed a challenge in 2013. Then in 2014 the provincial opposition in Quebec attacked the local government’s financial involvement in the project describing it as a ‘sinkhole’ in return for a minority stake.

Once these hurdles were overcome, work on building the plant began until the Globe and Mail newspaper revealed in late June 2016 that the project was ‘massively’ over-budget by up to US$350m and that the Quebec government was not prepared to provide any more money. The budget over-run alone is enough to build a cement plant in a more conventional location! Six weeks later and the project has most likely had its chief executive fired and one of the investors has stepped in to run things.

So, some combination of the legal fees, the wrangling over the plant’s unique environmental clearance, the difficulties of the underdeveloped location and potential mismanagement by the company itself have led to the additional costs. This in turn has led to the Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec, a pension fund firm, taking charge. It, like the previous management, also has no experience in building cement plants. Although it clearly knows how to calm investors. The first thing it did after announcing the new financing was to reassure everybody on the plant’s potential. Best not to consider at this stage what happens if the US bans Canadian cement.

McInnis Cement could be compared to other provincial industrial follies such as the closed Gaspésia paper mill in Quebec that also received over US$350m of government money. Yet if there is a project one might compare it to it is London’s Millennium Dome. Conceived as a national exhibition space to celebrate the start of the new millennium in 2000 the UK government of the time backed the project to much derision from the press as the costs spiralled and the visitors stayed away. However, today the venue has become a popular music and events venue. Flop or triumph: all those investors of McInnis Cement must be wondering what their fate will be. If nothing else perhaps renaming the plant once the dust settles (in an environmentally approved way) might be a good idea. Today, the Millennium dome is known as the 0₂.

LafargeHolcim was the last major European cement producer to release its second quarter financial results last week. The collective picture is confused. Cement sales volumes have risen but sales revenue have fallen.

Most of the producers have blamed negative currency effects for their falls in revenue during the first half of 2016. Holding a mixed geographical portfolio of building materials production assets has kept these companies afloat over the last decade but this has come with a price. The recent appreciation of the Euro versus currencies in various key markets, such as in Egypt, has hit balance sheets, since the majority of these firms are based in Europe and mostly use the Euro for their accounting. Meanwhile, sales volumes of cement have mostly risen for the companies we have examined making currency effects a major contributor.

Graph 1 - Changes in cement sales volumes for major non-Chinese cement producers in the first half of 2016 compared to the first half of 2015 (%). Data labels are the volumes reported in 2016. Source: Company reports.

As can be seen in Graph 1, sales volumes have risen for most of the producers, with the exception of LafargeHolcim. Despite blaming shortages of gas in Nigeria for hitting its operating income, LafargeHolcim actually saw its biggest drop in sales volumes in Latin America by 13.2% year-on-year to 11.8Mt. The other surprise here was that its North American region reported a 2.7% fall to 8.8Mt with Canada the likely cause. Vicat deserves mention here for its giant boost in sales volumes due to recovery in France and good performance in Egypt and the US, amongst other territories.

Graph 2 - Changes in sales revenue for major non-Chinese cement producers in the first half of 2016 compared to the first half of 2015 (%). Data labels are the sales reported in 2016. Source: Company reports.

Overall sales revenue for these companies presents a gloomier scenario with the majority of them losing revenue in the first half of the year, with most of them blaming negative currency effects for this. Titan is included in this graph to show that it’s not all bad news. Its growth in revenue was supported by good performance in the US and Egypt. Likewise, good performance in Eastern Europe and the US helped Buzzi Unicem turn in a positive increase in its sales revenue. They remain, however, the exception.

Looking at sales revenue generated from cement offers one way to disentangle currency effects from performance. Unfortunately, only about half of the companies looked at here actually published this for the reporting period. Of these, LafargeHolcim reported a massive rise that was probably due to the accounting coping with the merger process that finalised in 2015. Of the rest - HeidelbergCement, Italcementi and Vicat – the sales revenue from each company’s cement businesses fell at a faster rate than overall sales. Like-for-like figures here would help clarify this situation.

Meanwhile, a mixed global patchwork of cement demand is focusing multinational attention on key countries with growing economies like Egypt and Nigeria. Both of these countries have undergone currency devaluation versus the Euro and are facing energy shortages for various reasons. The exposure of the multinational cement producers to such places may become clearer in the second half of the year.

Shock news this week: Dangote Cement has decided to slow its expansion in Africa. The announcement from CEO Onne van der Weijde topped a half-year financial report that trumpeted high revenues and sales volumes of cement but one that also had to explain why earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortisation (EBITDA) had fallen by 10% year-on-year. The decline was blamed on lower cement prices and higher fuel costs, as well as the costs of setting up new cement plants.

The mixed bag of results can be demonstrated by a 38.8% leap in cement sales volumes in Nigeria to 8.77Mt for the half year. Dangote attributed this in part to price cut in September 2015. This then netted an increase in revenue of 4.2% to US$677m but its EBITDA in Nigeria fell at a faster rate than the group total.

As an indication of some the pressures facing Dangote at home, it reported that its fuels costs rose by 32.3% to US$14.4/t in the reporting period. The backdrop to this has been the general poor state of the Nigerian economy. The International Monetary Forum (IMF) forecast that its gross domestic product (GDP) will fall by 1.8% in 2016 in its World Economic Outlook Update published in mid-July. Given that over three-quarters of Dangote Cement’s sales revenue came from Nigeria in 2015 this might explain the decision to slow its expansion plans down.

Outside of Nigeria, Dangote did extremely well in its West & Central Africa region, pushing up sales volumes, revenue and EBITDA by triple figure percentages helped by commissioning of a new plant in Ethiopia. Exports were also highlighted as a key part of this region’s strategy to neighbouring countries. It also stated that its recent procurement of about 1000 trucks in Ghana would ensure that an increased share of that country’s imported cement would come from Dangote’s Ibese plant in Nigeria. South & East Africa was a different story, however with sales volumes and revenues rising as new cement plants bedded in but the region was dogged by currency devaluations and poor economies.

Dangote Cement’s response to its current situation is to protect its margins through cost cutting, by adjusting its prices and by slowing its expansion strategy to a five-year programme. However, it isn’t alone in its struggles to preserve profit in its Nigerian business. LafargeHolcim also reported a ‘challenging’ market in its first quarter results for 2016. Its cement sales volumes fell in that quarter due to what it said were energy shortages and logistics-related issues. Its mid-year financial report, out on 5 August 2016, will make interesting reading to see if its experience in Nigeria matches Dangote’s.

Elsewhere, it appears that both PPC and LafargeHolcim have also been struggling in South Africa. PPC’s revenue from cement sales within the country fell by 5% year-on-year to US$171m its half-year to the end of March 2016. It blamed the drop on increased competition. LafargeHolcim noted similar problems in South Africa without going into too much detail in its first quarter.

With the Nigeria Naira-US Dollar exchange rate devalued by over 50% since the start of 2016 and the Nigerian economy bracing itself for a recession, it seems unlikely that Dangote Cement could do anything else than slow down its expansion plans given how much of its revenue comes from within Nigeria. As we also report this week, PPC is in a similar bind. Its CEO had to reassure shareholders that the group’s new plant in Zimbabwe would be finished on schedule later in the year. Controlling imports and exports of cement in Africa has suddenly become more important than ever.

Both companies need to expand internationally to protect themselves from regional economic downturns but the current situation in each of their home territories is preventing this. In the meantime their own export markets are set to become more important than ever. Any target markets that declare themselves ‘self-sufficient’ in cement will be a big impediment to this.

And the winner of the Italcementi assets in Belgium is… Cementir. The Italian multinational cement producer picked up Compagnie des Ciments Belges for Euro312m this week. The deal included all of Italcementi's cement, ready-mix and aggregates assets in Belgium, Italcementi's stake in an existing limestone joint-venture with LafargeHolcim and a portion of HeidelbergCement's limestone quarry in Antoing. It was offered by HeidelbergCement to the European Commission to ensure approval of its acquisition of Italcementi.

The assets from Compagnie des Ciments Belges comprise one 2.5Mt/yr integrated cement plant, three terminals and 10 ready-mix concrete plants. As ever, the add-ons confuse the final price but the deal values the cement production capacity at Euro125/t or US$138/t. This figures seems low compared to the other big sale this week of Holcim Lanka to Siam City Cement. There, the Thai producer picked up an integrated cement plant and a grinding plant with a combined cement production capacity of 1.6Mt/yr for US$400m. That values the cement production capacity at US$250/t.

Increasing its presence in western Europe makes a lot of sense for Cementir. It’s one of the smaller European multinational cement producers with 14 cement plants, often white cement producers, in Italy, Turkey, Denmark, Egypt, the US, China and Malaysia. Altogether this comes to 15.1Mt/yr in cement production capacity. In its press release, Cementir described Gaurain-Ramecroix, the cement plant it is buying, as the largest integrated cement plant in France-Benelux, region with ‘state-of-the-art’ technology and long-life mineral reserves.

Italcementi reported a 2.9% year-on-year fall in cement and clinker sales volumes in Belgium in 2015, noting a general reduction in cement consumption in all areas of the construction industry. The mineral reserves were confirmed at least as environmental clearance as granted and work began at the new Barry quarry at Gaurain-Ramecroix.

Cementir has rebuilt its revenue since hitting a high of Euro1.15bn in 2007 although it dipped again in 2014. Despite this ordinary portland and white cement sales volumes have been slowly falling from a high of 10.5Mt in 2011 to 9.37Mt in 2015. That said though its businesses in Scandinavia generated just under half of its operating revenue in 2015. So far in 2016, total group revenue rose by 2.8% to Euro210m in the first quarter of the year, with a fair portion of that attributable to Scandinavia. Bolting on a cement and concrete business in (relatively) nearby Belgium makes sense in this context provided the construction market eventually rallies.

Yet, another on-going Cementir acquisition back home in Italy may make the company reflect on the risks of buying assets in Belgium. Cementir is drawing closer to purchasing the cement and concrete arm of Sacci as it plans to pick up five cement plants and assorted ready-mix concrete assets for the bargain price of Euro125m, following a protracted bankruptcy. Cementir may remember that Lafarge sold some of these assets to Sacci for Euro290m in 2008 before the situation deteriorated. The top brass at Cementir must be praying that the Sacci’s fate doesn’t await them in Belgium.