Analysis

Back in the May 2016 issue of Global Cement Magazine we asked key people at the Portland Cement Association how they thought the US presidential election might affect the local cement industry. Wisely, for an advocacy organisation with offices in Washington DC, no one would be drawn, citing a lack of information. At that point it was still unclear who was going to be on the final ticket. However, we all missed a trick because one candidate, Donald Trump, had been talking about building ‘a border fence like you have never seen before’ since at least mid-2014. And that fence could potentially require a lot of cement.

Researchers at market analysts Bernstein’s sent a note to clients last week ahead of the Republican National Convention looking at the implications of if Donald Trump became president of the US and actually set out to build his 40ft high concrete wall between the US and Mexico. The result would be a 2.4Mt boost in demand for cement from cement producers near to the border. In terms of market demand Bernstein concluded that this would add over 1% to cement demand in both 2018 and 2019, a healthy ‘shot in the arm’ to the already pepped-up US cement industry, which is currently growing at around 5%/yr.

Map 1: Map of cement and ready-mix concrete plants near to the US - Mexico border. Source: Bernstein Materials Blast. Note – Bernstein does not show the Capitol Cement plant in San Antonio.

Needless to say, Bernstein’s calculations pile-drive assumptions into assumptions, atop of Trump’s political rhetoric. It bases its calculations on a border wall similar to the Israeli West Bank barrier built out of precast concrete panels. It also tries to model how much concrete and cement would be required depending on the differing height’s Trump has trumpeted at his rallies.

The kicker to this tongue-in-cheek analysis is that the construction company that stands to benefit the most from this infrastructure project is Mexican!

Cemex has significantly more cement plants and ready-mix concrete plants than any other company within a 200-mile zone either side of the border. Looking at integrated cement plants alone, it has six plants in the regions near to the proposed wall from the east and west coasts. Its nearest competitors, CalPortland with four plants and Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua with three plants, are more regionally based in the western US and Chihuahua state in Mexico. Clearly Cemex didn’t rate the chances of Donald Trump’s wall actually happening when it agreed to sell its Odessa cement plant to Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua in May 2016.

All of this goes to show that, wherever you stand on the Donald Trump presidency bid, if you manufacture cement near the US-Mexican border you might be working overtime if he (a) actually becomes president, (b) actually manages to start building his wall and (c) actually decides to make it using cement. Yet before anybody starts popping champagne corks consider this: there might also be unintended consequences for the cement sector. Restricting current legal and illegal migration trends from Mexico to the US might have a greater negative effect on the US cement industry, and the overall economy, than ordering one large infrastructure project. Working that one out is harder than a guesstimate of how much cement a border wall might consume. Probably best not to ask at this stage who might actually pay for the Great Wall of Donald Trump.

Another week and another massive Indian cement industry deal. This week Nirma has won the bidding for the assets of Lafarge India that LafargeHolcim is selling. Before we get too carried away though, the diversified conglomerate entered into a letter agreement with LafargeHolcim on 7 July 2016 to pay US$1.4bn for three cement plants and two grinding plants with a total cement production capacity of 11Mt/yr.

It is worth noting that this is only a letter agreement. LafargeHolcim signed one previously with Birla Corporation for some of the same assets in August 2015. Unfortunately, an ambiguous amendment to the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) (MMDR) Act struck in January 2015 made it unclear how easily mineral rights could be transferred with an industrial plant sale. After much likely internal squabbling Lafarge India said it was selling all of its assets in January 2016 followed by threats of legal action by Birla.

Some commentators in the Indian media have flagged the new deal as expensive for Nirma. It will be paying US$127/t for the new capacity compared to the US$118/t that UltraTech Cement is offering Jaiprakash Associates for its laboured deal. The Nirma deal comprises integrated cement plants at Sonadih in Chattisgarh, Arasmeta in Chattisgarh and Chittorgarh in Rajasthan, and cement grinding plants at Jojobera in Jharkhand and Mejia, West Bengal. Other assets include 63 ready mix concrete plants, two aggregate plants and a blending unit.

However, unlike UltraTech, Nirma is a relatively new entrant in the cement industry. Its main industries are in detergents and soda ash manufacture. It invested US$194m in a 2.28Mt/yr cement plant in Rajasthan that was commissioned in November 2014. It also ran into environmental issues over a proposal to build a new cement plant at Mahuva in Gujarat. One report compiled under request by the Indian Supreme Court in 2011 cited the presence of Asiatic lions as a reason for concern!

Lions aside, Nirma may be paying over the odds for its new cement business but it will gain a bigger presence in the industry quickly and diversify from its other existing industries in which it faces fierce competition. The Lafarge India plants are mostly in eastern Indian states compared to Nirma’s plant in Rajasthan in the west, giving it a reasonable geographic spread.

Nirma reportedly plans to finance the purchase through a leveraged buyout and the Mint business newspaper has described this as the largest transaction of its kind in India to date. The risk here will be how the Indian cement market plays out in the short term. LafargeHolcim reported that its cement volumes fell in 2015, although this has since picked up in the first half of 2016. UltraTech did better in its 2015 – 2016 financial year but it reported a slow construction market. Longer-term demographic trends suggest that the cement industry will grow, especially in the east of the country. With this in mind it may be a while before Nirma’s cement business roars.

Boy, is the UltraTech Cement and Jaiprakash Associates deal dragging on. The agreement by UltraTech to buy cement plants from Jaiprakash Associates reached its latest revision this week when UltraTech upped its offer to US$2.40bn from the US$2.36bn offered at the end of March 2016. The deal also includes an additional US$70m for a cement grinding plant under construction in Uttar Pradesh.

This time round the haggling took place to the background music of Jaiprakash Associates’ mounting debts. It owes US$4.45bn to a group of lenders led by ICICI Bank. A repayment window was due to close on 30 June 2016. Defaulting this deadline could have switched the account to non-performing asset status. So, according to reports in the Indian media, the lenders forced a strategic debt restructuring scheme on Jaiprakash Associates. Or in other words they took control of the company. Alongside all of this UltraTech was allegedly trying to renegotiate the terms of the deal agreed in March 2016 following amendments to the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) (MMDR) Amendment Act, 2015.

How paying more for the same assets benefits UltraTech remains to be seen. In addition US$1.78bn worth of Jaiprakash Associates’ debts will be transferred to UltraTech, according to Rahul Kumar, Director & CFO of Jaiprakash Associates. At US$118/t for new-ish production capacity it still seems like a good deal. Doubtless the devil lies in the (unseen) detail. Reports in the Indian media speculate that the lenders may have threatened UltraTech with rival bids.

To add to the confusion, the deal covers cement plants with a production capacity of 21.2Mt/yr but this total includes both integrated cement plants (clinker producing) and standalone cement grinding plants. Given the difference in cost to build a clinker production line compared to a grinding mill this makes assessing the value of the deal difficult.

UltraTech have described the purchase as a ‘geographic market expansion,’ which will allow its entry into markets of India including the Satna cluster in
Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand and coastal Andhra Pradesh. It has also stated that its cement production capacity (clinker and grinding) will rise to 91.1Mt/yr following the deal. As ever, the latest revised agreement is dependent on shareholder, creditor, high court and regulatory approval. UltraTech plan to complete the transaction by July 2017. What can possibly go wrong!?

Back in 2001 a UK government advisor gained infamy for trying to use the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 to bury bad news. This week’s column is trying hard NOT to be about the UK vote to leave the European Union (for more on that try our editorial director’s column in the latest issue of Global Cement Magazine). They’ll be plenty of time for that later on when the repercussions for the cement and construction industries sink in. However, it has inadvertently buried some bad news coverage for LafargeHolcim.

The French newspaper Le Monde reported on 21 June 2016 that Lafarge’s Syrian subsidiary paid money to Islamic State (IS) militants in order to keep its Jalabiya cement plant in operation in 2013 and 2014. The paper said that the plant was kept in operation until September 2014 as the result of ‘agreements with local armed groups, including the Islamic State.’ It added, that Lafarge ‘indirectly financed the jihadist organisation.’

LafargeHolcim issued a statement on the story on same day. However, it didn’t deny the accusations. It stated that the company, as Lafarge, was under control of the plant in Jalabiya between 2010 and September 2014 and that the safety of its employees had always been its first priority. Part of the statement read, “Once the conflict reached the area of the plant, the first priority for Lafarge was the safety and security of the employees, while planning for the eventual closure of the plant. In September 2014, Lafarge stopped operating the Jalabiya plant. After that, all employees were evacuated, put on paid leave and were no longer allowed to access the plant. In December 2015, given the evolution of the situation in Syria, the decision was taken to terminate all employee contracts and, where possible, transfer employees to other parts of the group.”

The company may yet face prosecution for the dealings if it is found to have financed any terrorist organisation. Emmanuel Daoud, a specialist in international law quoted by various media sources, speculated that the outcome of any potential investigation might depend on whether the company was protecting its staff or protecting its profits. Additional complications also arise from the subsequent merger of France’s Lafarge and Switzerland Holcim to form LafargeHolcim.

It should be remembered though that cement plants and their staff are often very real targets in regional conflicts. They can also be held under switching jurisdictions. We reported that a Lafarge Syria plant near Aleppo was attacked and set on fire in 2014. Before the site was abandoned to protect the staff the site was first under the auspices of the Syrian army and then the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party. Paying ‘taxes’ to the loosing side in a civil war might well be interpreted as funding terrorists in the aftermath.

A similar story resolved itself this week with the news that seven quarry workers kidnapped in Nigeria were released. Unfortunately there was one death and injuries sustained in the ambush that trapped them. Sy van Dyk, the chief executive of Macmahon, the company involved, refused to comment to local press on whether his company had paid a ransom to release the workers.

This all links to the wider issue of how multinational companies should deal with armed groups and de-facto governments in unstable areas. For example, the UK and US governments discourage paying ransoms to kidnappers because they say it encourages it as a business. Yet, other European nations notably paid to release their nationals during the earlier stages of the Syrian conflict and elsewhere. This in turn offers insight towards why Lafarge, a French multinational company, might have been more likely to negotiate with armed groups in Syria than say a British or American one. If an official investigation into Lafarge’s dealings follows then more details may emerge but there are no easy answers to these kinds of issues.

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) gave HeidelbergCement permission to complete its acquisition of Italcementi assets in the US on 17 June 2016. This was the second and final major competition body that could have challenged the purchase, following approval by the European Commission in late May 2016. Although the FTC consent now faces a month for comment the deal is looking likely to complete towards the end of the summer.

HeidelbergCement and Italcementi have gotten away with having to sell just one cement plant and 11 terminals in the US. The Lafarge-Holcim merger in 2015 had it tougher. Those companies were forced to sell two cement plants, two slag grinding plant and a host of terminals. Admittedly LafargeHolcim is now the biggest cement producer in the US (and the world) but HeidelbergCement will hold more integrated cement plants in the US following its acquisition.

As predicted the FTC took exception with the proximity of the company’s assets in West Virginia and Pennsylvania following the acquisition. So the parties have agreed to sell the Essroc Martinsburg integrated cement plant in West Virginia. When Global Cement visited the plant in late 2013 the staff told us that cement from the plant was distributed from central Ohio eastwards to western Pennsylvania and south to southern Virginia. The plant also switched over to a FLSmidth dry production line in 2010 giving it a clinker production capacity of 1.6Mt/yr, making it one of the newer plants in the Essroc stable.

The FTC also flagged up competition concerns in five metropolitan areas: Baltimore-Washington, DC; Richmond, Virginia; Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, Virginia; Syracuse, New York; and Indianapolis, Indiana. In light of this the proposed consent agreement requires the merged company to divest seven Essroc terminals in Maryland, Virginia and Pennsylvania and a Lehigh terminal in Solvay, New York. Two additional Essroc terminals in Columbus and Middlebranch, Ohio are to be sold at the option of the buyer and subject to FTC approval. Finally, Essroc’s terminal in Indianapolis is to be sold to Cemex.

Funnily enough, the FTC took about a year to approve both the merger of Lafarge and Holcim and HeidelbergCement’s purchase of Italcementi. This compares to the European Commission which took nine months to approve the Lafarge-Holcim deal but which took 11 months to clear the HeidelbergCement-Italcementi one. Given the greater overlap of assets of the Lafarge-Holcim merger in both Europe and the US one might have thought that the approval process would have taken longer. Or maybe bureaucracy moves at a speed all of its own. Read into this what you will. The creation of the world’s second largest multinational cement producer draws closer.