Analysis

Shock news this week: Dangote Cement has decided to slow its expansion in Africa. The announcement from CEO Onne van der Weijde topped a half-year financial report that trumpeted high revenues and sales volumes of cement but one that also had to explain why earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortisation (EBITDA) had fallen by 10% year-on-year. The decline was blamed on lower cement prices and higher fuel costs, as well as the costs of setting up new cement plants.

The mixed bag of results can be demonstrated by a 38.8% leap in cement sales volumes in Nigeria to 8.77Mt for the half year. Dangote attributed this in part to price cut in September 2015. This then netted an increase in revenue of 4.2% to US$677m but its EBITDA in Nigeria fell at a faster rate than the group total.

As an indication of some the pressures facing Dangote at home, it reported that its fuels costs rose by 32.3% to US$14.4/t in the reporting period. The backdrop to this has been the general poor state of the Nigerian economy. The International Monetary Forum (IMF) forecast that its gross domestic product (GDP) will fall by 1.8% in 2016 in its World Economic Outlook Update published in mid-July. Given that over three-quarters of Dangote Cement’s sales revenue came from Nigeria in 2015 this might explain the decision to slow its expansion plans down.

Outside of Nigeria, Dangote did extremely well in its West & Central Africa region, pushing up sales volumes, revenue and EBITDA by triple figure percentages helped by commissioning of a new plant in Ethiopia. Exports were also highlighted as a key part of this region’s strategy to neighbouring countries. It also stated that its recent procurement of about 1000 trucks in Ghana would ensure that an increased share of that country’s imported cement would come from Dangote’s Ibese plant in Nigeria. South & East Africa was a different story, however with sales volumes and revenues rising as new cement plants bedded in but the region was dogged by currency devaluations and poor economies.

Dangote Cement’s response to its current situation is to protect its margins through cost cutting, by adjusting its prices and by slowing its expansion strategy to a five-year programme. However, it isn’t alone in its struggles to preserve profit in its Nigerian business. LafargeHolcim also reported a ‘challenging’ market in its first quarter results for 2016. Its cement sales volumes fell in that quarter due to what it said were energy shortages and logistics-related issues. Its mid-year financial report, out on 5 August 2016, will make interesting reading to see if its experience in Nigeria matches Dangote’s.

Elsewhere, it appears that both PPC and LafargeHolcim have also been struggling in South Africa. PPC’s revenue from cement sales within the country fell by 5% year-on-year to US$171m its half-year to the end of March 2016. It blamed the drop on increased competition. LafargeHolcim noted similar problems in South Africa without going into too much detail in its first quarter.

With the Nigeria Naira-US Dollar exchange rate devalued by over 50% since the start of 2016 and the Nigerian economy bracing itself for a recession, it seems unlikely that Dangote Cement could do anything else than slow down its expansion plans given how much of its revenue comes from within Nigeria. As we also report this week, PPC is in a similar bind. Its CEO had to reassure shareholders that the group’s new plant in Zimbabwe would be finished on schedule later in the year. Controlling imports and exports of cement in Africa has suddenly become more important than ever.

Both companies need to expand internationally to protect themselves from regional economic downturns but the current situation in each of their home territories is preventing this. In the meantime their own export markets are set to become more important than ever. Any target markets that declare themselves ‘self-sufficient’ in cement will be a big impediment to this.

And the winner of the Italcementi assets in Belgium is… Cementir. The Italian multinational cement producer picked up Compagnie des Ciments Belges for Euro312m this week. The deal included all of Italcementi's cement, ready-mix and aggregates assets in Belgium, Italcementi's stake in an existing limestone joint-venture with LafargeHolcim and a portion of HeidelbergCement's limestone quarry in Antoing. It was offered by HeidelbergCement to the European Commission to ensure approval of its acquisition of Italcementi.

The assets from Compagnie des Ciments Belges comprise one 2.5Mt/yr integrated cement plant, three terminals and 10 ready-mix concrete plants. As ever, the add-ons confuse the final price but the deal values the cement production capacity at Euro125/t or US$138/t. This figures seems low compared to the other big sale this week of Holcim Lanka to Siam City Cement. There, the Thai producer picked up an integrated cement plant and a grinding plant with a combined cement production capacity of 1.6Mt/yr for US$400m. That values the cement production capacity at US$250/t.

Increasing its presence in western Europe makes a lot of sense for Cementir. It’s one of the smaller European multinational cement producers with 14 cement plants, often white cement producers, in Italy, Turkey, Denmark, Egypt, the US, China and Malaysia. Altogether this comes to 15.1Mt/yr in cement production capacity. In its press release, Cementir described Gaurain-Ramecroix, the cement plant it is buying, as the largest integrated cement plant in France-Benelux, region with ‘state-of-the-art’ technology and long-life mineral reserves.

Italcementi reported a 2.9% year-on-year fall in cement and clinker sales volumes in Belgium in 2015, noting a general reduction in cement consumption in all areas of the construction industry. The mineral reserves were confirmed at least as environmental clearance as granted and work began at the new Barry quarry at Gaurain-Ramecroix.

Cementir has rebuilt its revenue since hitting a high of Euro1.15bn in 2007 although it dipped again in 2014. Despite this ordinary portland and white cement sales volumes have been slowly falling from a high of 10.5Mt in 2011 to 9.37Mt in 2015. That said though its businesses in Scandinavia generated just under half of its operating revenue in 2015. So far in 2016, total group revenue rose by 2.8% to Euro210m in the first quarter of the year, with a fair portion of that attributable to Scandinavia. Bolting on a cement and concrete business in (relatively) nearby Belgium makes sense in this context provided the construction market eventually rallies.

Yet, another on-going Cementir acquisition back home in Italy may make the company reflect on the risks of buying assets in Belgium. Cementir is drawing closer to purchasing the cement and concrete arm of Sacci as it plans to pick up five cement plants and assorted ready-mix concrete assets for the bargain price of Euro125m, following a protracted bankruptcy. Cementir may remember that Lafarge sold some of these assets to Sacci for Euro290m in 2008 before the situation deteriorated. The top brass at Cementir must be praying that the Sacci’s fate doesn’t await them in Belgium.

Back in the May 2016 issue of Global Cement Magazine we asked key people at the Portland Cement Association how they thought the US presidential election might affect the local cement industry. Wisely, for an advocacy organisation with offices in Washington DC, no one would be drawn, citing a lack of information. At that point it was still unclear who was going to be on the final ticket. However, we all missed a trick because one candidate, Donald Trump, had been talking about building ‘a border fence like you have never seen before’ since at least mid-2014. And that fence could potentially require a lot of cement.

Researchers at market analysts Bernstein’s sent a note to clients last week ahead of the Republican National Convention looking at the implications of if Donald Trump became president of the US and actually set out to build his 40ft high concrete wall between the US and Mexico. The result would be a 2.4Mt boost in demand for cement from cement producers near to the border. In terms of market demand Bernstein concluded that this would add over 1% to cement demand in both 2018 and 2019, a healthy ‘shot in the arm’ to the already pepped-up US cement industry, which is currently growing at around 5%/yr.

Map 1: Map of cement and ready-mix concrete plants near to the US - Mexico border. Source: Bernstein Materials Blast. Note – Bernstein does not show the Capitol Cement plant in San Antonio.

Needless to say, Bernstein’s calculations pile-drive assumptions into assumptions, atop of Trump’s political rhetoric. It bases its calculations on a border wall similar to the Israeli West Bank barrier built out of precast concrete panels. It also tries to model how much concrete and cement would be required depending on the differing height’s Trump has trumpeted at his rallies.

The kicker to this tongue-in-cheek analysis is that the construction company that stands to benefit the most from this infrastructure project is Mexican!

Cemex has significantly more cement plants and ready-mix concrete plants than any other company within a 200-mile zone either side of the border. Looking at integrated cement plants alone, it has six plants in the regions near to the proposed wall from the east and west coasts. Its nearest competitors, CalPortland with four plants and Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua with three plants, are more regionally based in the western US and Chihuahua state in Mexico. Clearly Cemex didn’t rate the chances of Donald Trump’s wall actually happening when it agreed to sell its Odessa cement plant to Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua in May 2016.

All of this goes to show that, wherever you stand on the Donald Trump presidency bid, if you manufacture cement near the US-Mexican border you might be working overtime if he (a) actually becomes president, (b) actually manages to start building his wall and (c) actually decides to make it using cement. Yet before anybody starts popping champagne corks consider this: there might also be unintended consequences for the cement sector. Restricting current legal and illegal migration trends from Mexico to the US might have a greater negative effect on the US cement industry, and the overall economy, than ordering one large infrastructure project. Working that one out is harder than a guesstimate of how much cement a border wall might consume. Probably best not to ask at this stage who might actually pay for the Great Wall of Donald Trump.

Another week and another massive Indian cement industry deal. This week Nirma has won the bidding for the assets of Lafarge India that LafargeHolcim is selling. Before we get too carried away though, the diversified conglomerate entered into a letter agreement with LafargeHolcim on 7 July 2016 to pay US$1.4bn for three cement plants and two grinding plants with a total cement production capacity of 11Mt/yr.

It is worth noting that this is only a letter agreement. LafargeHolcim signed one previously with Birla Corporation for some of the same assets in August 2015. Unfortunately, an ambiguous amendment to the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) (MMDR) Act struck in January 2015 made it unclear how easily mineral rights could be transferred with an industrial plant sale. After much likely internal squabbling Lafarge India said it was selling all of its assets in January 2016 followed by threats of legal action by Birla.

Some commentators in the Indian media have flagged the new deal as expensive for Nirma. It will be paying US$127/t for the new capacity compared to the US$118/t that UltraTech Cement is offering Jaiprakash Associates for its laboured deal. The Nirma deal comprises integrated cement plants at Sonadih in Chattisgarh, Arasmeta in Chattisgarh and Chittorgarh in Rajasthan, and cement grinding plants at Jojobera in Jharkhand and Mejia, West Bengal. Other assets include 63 ready mix concrete plants, two aggregate plants and a blending unit.

However, unlike UltraTech, Nirma is a relatively new entrant in the cement industry. Its main industries are in detergents and soda ash manufacture. It invested US$194m in a 2.28Mt/yr cement plant in Rajasthan that was commissioned in November 2014. It also ran into environmental issues over a proposal to build a new cement plant at Mahuva in Gujarat. One report compiled under request by the Indian Supreme Court in 2011 cited the presence of Asiatic lions as a reason for concern!

Lions aside, Nirma may be paying over the odds for its new cement business but it will gain a bigger presence in the industry quickly and diversify from its other existing industries in which it faces fierce competition. The Lafarge India plants are mostly in eastern Indian states compared to Nirma’s plant in Rajasthan in the west, giving it a reasonable geographic spread.

Nirma reportedly plans to finance the purchase through a leveraged buyout and the Mint business newspaper has described this as the largest transaction of its kind in India to date. The risk here will be how the Indian cement market plays out in the short term. LafargeHolcim reported that its cement volumes fell in 2015, although this has since picked up in the first half of 2016. UltraTech did better in its 2015 – 2016 financial year but it reported a slow construction market. Longer-term demographic trends suggest that the cement industry will grow, especially in the east of the country. With this in mind it may be a while before Nirma’s cement business roars.

Boy, is the UltraTech Cement and Jaiprakash Associates deal dragging on. The agreement by UltraTech to buy cement plants from Jaiprakash Associates reached its latest revision this week when UltraTech upped its offer to US$2.40bn from the US$2.36bn offered at the end of March 2016. The deal also includes an additional US$70m for a cement grinding plant under construction in Uttar Pradesh.

This time round the haggling took place to the background music of Jaiprakash Associates’ mounting debts. It owes US$4.45bn to a group of lenders led by ICICI Bank. A repayment window was due to close on 30 June 2016. Defaulting this deadline could have switched the account to non-performing asset status. So, according to reports in the Indian media, the lenders forced a strategic debt restructuring scheme on Jaiprakash Associates. Or in other words they took control of the company. Alongside all of this UltraTech was allegedly trying to renegotiate the terms of the deal agreed in March 2016 following amendments to the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) (MMDR) Amendment Act, 2015.

How paying more for the same assets benefits UltraTech remains to be seen. In addition US$1.78bn worth of Jaiprakash Associates’ debts will be transferred to UltraTech, according to Rahul Kumar, Director & CFO of Jaiprakash Associates. At US$118/t for new-ish production capacity it still seems like a good deal. Doubtless the devil lies in the (unseen) detail. Reports in the Indian media speculate that the lenders may have threatened UltraTech with rival bids.

To add to the confusion, the deal covers cement plants with a production capacity of 21.2Mt/yr but this total includes both integrated cement plants (clinker producing) and standalone cement grinding plants. Given the difference in cost to build a clinker production line compared to a grinding mill this makes assessing the value of the deal difficult.

UltraTech have described the purchase as a ‘geographic market expansion,’ which will allow its entry into markets of India including the Satna cluster in
Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand and coastal Andhra Pradesh. It has also stated that its cement production capacity (clinker and grinding) will rise to 91.1Mt/yr following the deal. As ever, the latest revised agreement is dependent on shareholder, creditor, high court and regulatory approval. UltraTech plan to complete the transaction by July 2017. What can possibly go wrong!?