Analysis

South African authorities have started a new investigation into imports of cement from Pakistan. This time the inquiry will examine trade dumping allegations made by local producers including Afrisam, Lafarge, NPC Cimpor and PPC.

The application made by the cement producers provided evidence that the difference between the price of cement (the dumping margin) in Pakistan and for imports from Pakistan in 2013 was 48%. Or, in other words, the price of Pakistan cement imported to South Africa was nearly half that of what is was being sold for in the country that it was actually produced in.

The data submitted to the International Trade Administration Commission of South Africa comes from a report by Genesis Analytics on Pakistan cement prices in 2013 and tax information from the South African Revenue Service. Neither source is readily available for more detailed analysis here but data released by XA International Trade Advisors suggests that cement imports from Pakistan rose to 1.1Mt/yr in 2013 and at a value of US$59m. Roughly, this gives a price of US$55/t. This compares to an average price of US$90/t, from the All Pakistan Manufacturers' Association for the first nine months of the 2012 – 2013 Pakistani fiscal year, giving a dumping margin similar to the allegation by the South African cement producers.

Separate industry sources quoted by the Pakistan media on the story reported that the country supplies 1.5 - 1.6Mt/yr of cement to South Africa, its biggest export market, receiving a revenue of US$125m. Although this suggests a dumping margin lower than the one presented to the authorities it is still high.

Other information of note in the investigation notification is that the Pakistan cement imports are only competing heavily with the local bagged cement market in the Southern African Customs Union, which also includes neighbouring Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. The notification discounts bulk cement imports from Pakistan as being 'prohibitively' expensive suggesting that the Pakistan cement producers have no import infrastructure in southern Africa or that something else is stopping them. For example, the country's market leader for production, Lucky Cement, has export facilities in Karachi with silos and automatic ship loaders. Yet it's only 'brick-and-mortar' presence overseas are projects building an integrated plant in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and a grinding plant in Iraq.

It may also be worth considering that South African industry newcomer Sephaku Cement hasn't joined the dumping allegation. The Dangote subsidiary was set to start producing clinker in late August 2014. This is out of character considering how prominent the Nigerian-based cement producer has been in campaigning against imports to its home nation. However, the Aganang plant in Lichtenburg, North West Province is over 700km from the coast and presumably safe from foreign imports at present.

One final question occurs. How are Pakistan cement producers able to dump bagged cement on the South African market at prices lower than what they are selling it for at home? If individual producers sold their excess at home at a lower price they could potentially undercut their competitors and make a profit. There are many barriers, from input costs to industry structural issues and other reasons that may be preventing this. However, if the South African cement producers succeed in their latest attempt to block imports from Pakistan it may add more impetus to remove such barriers.

Of the five African cement news stories in this edition of Global Cement Weekly, three concern the actions of Nigerian cement giant Dangote Cement. This week it has announced a new captive power plant in Nigeria and the fact that Sephaku Cement, which is owned by Dangote to the tune of 64%, is now in a position to produce cement from its Aganang plant in South Africa. These two items are fairly typical of the type of announcement that Dangote makes in the African market, and the high frequency with which it makes them. It is the third story, of course, which is unusual.

We have heard, for a couple of years now, that Dangote has designs on becoming a pan-African cement giant. Certainly it is the pre-eminent producer in west Africa, with its influence rapidly spreading to the east, north west and south of this vast continent. Few others, (but perhaps South Africa's PPC), can claim to have such influence and, unopposed, there seems no limit to Dangote's ambitions.

This week we heard just how bold those ambitions are. For the first time Africa's No. 1 cement producer has said that it wants to break out of Africa and enter new markets. No longer satisfied with operating at home, a company release has identified the Middle East and Latin America as potential hunting grounds, either for new capacity or acquisitions. The proposed list of LafargeHolcim cast-offs, which includes few assets in either region (LINK), will also have received significant attention in the Dangote boardroom.

The selection of the Middle East and Latin America, however, is not accidental. The Middle East is a high growth area and provides a platform for possible 'pincer-movement' expansion into more impenetrable markets in central Africa like Chad and (South) Sudan. The Middle East also means proximity to India. Dangote may also want to dampen the influence that Indian, Pakistani and Iranian exports have in the region. Potential tie-ups with Dangote's growing operations in east Africa are clear.

The selection of Latin America, on the face of it at least, is less obvious. There are numerous strong and growing local and regional producers. Not least of these is Colombia's Cementos Argos, which has increased its influence in the USA through strategic acquisitions. There are also numerous domestic large Brazilian producers but Dangote may feel like there is room for more to joint the party. Cade, the Brazilian competition authority, has certainly agreed that competition could be improved in Brazil following its recent investigations. Could Brazil be a prime target?

Wherever Dangote decides to play its first non-African card, it will be a major step for the company and African cement producers. How long until we see the first African-owned cement plant on another continent?

The comic book series 'Watchmen' takes its title from the Latin phrase 'Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?' which is translated as 'Who watches the watchmen?' Commonly used today to warn against government, police and judicial corruption, the saying might also apply to those groups who watch big industry such as the Atlas of Environmental Justice.

This initiative is an online database compiled by the Environmental Justice Organisations, Liabilities and Trade (EJOLT) to map environmental conflicts around the world. It's a great tool, it is professionally presented and the project is backed by the European Commission. EJOLT's goals are to give those fighting for environmental justice a voice and to gather data to allow policy change.

As ever the problem with any form of user-content database is who vets the submissions and how much of 'reality' does the data actually represent compared to a more curated project. The mass use of Wikipedia shows that these issues can be overcome to some extent, while user-submitted online hotel and restaurant reviews often suggest otherwise.

All three conflicts registered in the EJ Atlas in southern England, where the Global Cement office is based, offer incomplete or misleading data. The entry for the third runway expansion at Heathrow airport doesn't present the economic benefits of expanding the airport or what the alternatives are. Rightly, the activists will argue that they have significantly smaller resources compared to the big industrial multinationals to fight their corner. Unfortunately this shows in the EJ Atlas and the user-submitted data approach it uses.

At the time of writing only 15 cases are tagged as cement-related out of a total of 1154. This is far fewer cases than you might expect with no mention, for example, of any of the regular environmental scuffles the cement industry faces in North America. The cases it does list are mainly based in Latin America with other clusters in southern Europe and India. Of these, three have been mislabelled and are not even related to the cement industry. The rest are mainly concerned with pollution due to waste incineration and mineral extraction worries. The waste incineration listings have a certain irony about them considering that these cement plants are almost certainly praising themselves for their reduced carbon emissions!

In the online world big companies can sometimes be at a disadvantage to nimble activist campaigns. Journalists from national media outlets can easily find campaigns with a web or social media presence to provide counterpoint for editorial. A good example is the Stop Titan Action Network that formed to fight Titan America's cement plant in Castle Hayne in North Carolina, US.

If the EJ Atlas accrues more attention and/or carries on past its project deadline of 2015 then the problems with the atlas may be fixed as activists log more cases, industry refutes them and the moderators weigh up the arguments in line with the project's aims of environmental justice. As previous online examples have shown, engagement may be better than ignoring these kind of initiatives.

Regular readers of Global Cement will have become familiar with the tales of doom and gloom coming out of Titan Cement's various markets in recent years. With significant numbers of assets in Greece (economic turmoil), Egypt (political instability) and the USA (massive drop in cement consumption), Titan was hit hard by the economic downturn.

However, reading Titan's 2014 first half report was a nice surprise this week. Titan reported improvement in every single market that it operates in. Rewind by just 12 months, it is hard to imagine this kind of turnaround. The group reported a net profit, albeit just Euro2.9m, but this is a massive improvement on the Euro21.8m loss made in the first half of 2013. It reported its ninth successive quarter of revenue improvement in the second quarter of 2014.

Away from Titan's improved fortunes there have been other good announcements from an increasingly strong-sounding global cement industry. Other troubled multinationals, France's Vicat Group and Italy's Cementir Holding, have announced improved profits and regional producers Semen Indonesia and Tabuk Cement (Malaysia) have posted revenue improvements. There have been announcements of new integrated projects in Russia, Peru, Pakistan, Zambia, and the UK (yes... the UK!). There was also news of a joint Turkish-Ivorian grinding plant project in Ivory Coast.

The exceptions that highlight this recent positive trend were results from Siam Cement and HeidelbergCement. Siam Cement is being buffeted by continued instability in its native Thailand and its net profit was down accordingly. HeidelbergCement, slightly worryingly, followed last week's poor results from Lafarge and Holcim with a lower second-quarter profit. Cement sales, however, were up.

However, it looks like the worst could be behind Titan – and if it's behind Titan, could it be behind everyone else too? As Titan America's new CEO said this week, "Our company has successfully weathered economic storms on both sides of the Atlantic." Let's hope the seas are calm for the time being.

It has been another week of financial results from the global cement industry, with big hitters Lafarge and Holcim reporting what some might call 'concerning' numbers for the first half of the year. Both cement producers are, of course, making preparations ahead of their proposed merger, which could come to pass within 12 months, all being well. But are things well?

In the first half of 2014, Lafarge saw its earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) decrease by 2%, with sales down by 5%. Lafarge noted that its shrinking size, this week highlighted by the sale of its Pakistani assets, and adverse exchange rate effects did not help matters. CEO Bruno Lafont was up-beat in asserting that North American and European markets would see improvements over the rest of 2014. Meanwhile, things are slightly better at Holcim, which reported an increased EBITDA (albeit just by 0.2%) as well as like-for-like sales that were up by 4.8% compared to the first half of 2013. However, its increased sales volumes and revenues could not prevent a fall in net income.

If one takes these results together, the first half of 2014 seems to been one of general stagnation for the future LafargeHolcim. It is important to remember that even more asset sales are inevitable, mainly from the weaker performer Lafarge. We are left to ponder how the new LafargeHolcim will perform in 12 months time.

At present, without serious improvement across all world economies, it is likely that LafargeHolcim (and other multinational producers) will continue to be on relatively shaky ground post-merger. The reality is that many of the promising markets that the company will serve are no longer rapidly-growing emerging economies, but are instead caught up in lower-than-expected growth (for example in Indonesia, India, China and Brazil), political disputes (for example in Algeria, Thailand, Eastern Ukraine and the Middle East) and other damaging events (for example the Ebola outbreak in West Africa). The global economy is certainly 'uneven,' as Holcim's CEO Bernard Fontana said in Holcim's results statement, but it also seems to be getting more uneven. Simple geographical and income groupings for countries, for example 'Far East = Profit,' are becoming increasingly out of date.

Navigating such a rapidly-changing world is, in one sense, less difficult for larger companies than smaller ones because risk can be spread over a much wider range of economies. However, larger companies are also slower to react to changes and the appropriateness of their responses may not be ideally tailored to individual markets. When LafargeHolcim comes to be, it will likely suffer also due to the inherent difficulties of merging two such large firms that may not see eye-to-eye on all issues. This will have to be done without some of its best assets and a lot of its 'run-time' will be dedicated to the merging process. In such an environment it is easier to be distracted from its main tasks: is it possible that this effect is already becoming apparent? As Lafarge and Holcim's latest results show, there is little room for deterioration in their results.

There is a key question: Is the LafargeHolcim first half EBITDA slide a sign of poor markets or related to preparations for the merger that shareholders will tolerate as they anticipate future riches? Will LafargeHolcim be profitable in the long-run?