Analysis

Lafarge's third quarter financial results have coincided with the alarming news that terrorists attacked one of its cement plants in Nigeria. Thankfully nobody was hurt at the Ashaka plant. The suspected Boko Haram insurgents reportedly came looking for French nationals but the plant had been mostly evacuated following an earlier more violent incident at a nearby town. Instead they stole explosives and trucks and fled.

The resonance here with Lafarge's global financial situation is that rebel action elsewhere in the world was noted as having an adverse effect on the cement producer's coffers for the third quarter of 2013. In Iraq cement volumes have reportedly fallen by 15% in the year-to-date and almost halved in the third quarter, hit by an inability to transport cement across the country since June 2014, when Islamic State fighters captured parts of northern Iraq.

Looking at the nine months so far in 2014, Lafarge's sales have fallen by varying amounts with the exception of one territory: Middle East and Africa. Here, bucking the trend, sales rose by 3% to Euro2.8bn. The area had been the group's single largest sales region so far in 2014. Of course countries such as a South Africa are much more stable, but most other countries in the territory have had recent terrorism campaigns where a European-backed cement plant might present itself as a target.

This is not good news for a corporate balance sheet relying on these same countries to keep the profits up. However, as Lafarge states in its outlook, 'emerging markets continue to be the main driver of demand and Lafarge will benefit from its well-balanced geographic spread of high quality assets.' Spreading its bets geographically should pay off.

Also in its outlook, Lafarge announced that it intends to pause its stand-alone divestments pending completion of the planned merger with Holcim. The move suggests that the company is prioritising the impending merger over debt reduction. With Lafarge's and Holcim's recent formal notification to the European Commission of their proposed merger to obtain regulatory approval, the last of its necessary notifications worldwide, the merger is getting closer. So far, the original expectation of closure in the first half of 2015 does not look unreasonable.

When former British prime minister Harold Macmillian was asked what causes governments trouble, his apocryphal reply was, "Events, dear boy, events." The same applies to building materials producers. There may be more 'events' before the merger completes.

The 'revelation' this week that South Korean cement producers have been paid US$127m to use/dispose of Japanese coal that is thought to be radioactive certainly sounds scary. If it is true that cement made with contaminated coal has led to the construction of radioactive buildings and roads, this may have prised open a 'can of worms' for coal producers, exporters and cement players alike. According to local media, four South Korean firms - Ssangyong Cement, Tongyang Cement, Lafarge Halla Cement and Hanil Cement - received the money to use the coal between March 2011, when the Fukashima nuclear power plant started to leak radiation, until 2013. A total of 3.7Mt of cement is 'under suspicion.'

Caesium-137 is formed by fission reactions that start with uranium-235 in nuclear reactors. The Fukushima reactor that started leaking in 2011 used this type of fuel. Once it leaked, caesium-137 was deposited into the sea and onto the land, presumably also making its way into nearby coal deposits.

As it is a metal with a melting point of just 28.5°C and a boiling point of 671°C, the caesium-137 would vaporise if it were to enter a cement production line operating at 1450°C as a metal. However, caesium will not enter the cement-making process as a metal due to its rapid and explosive reaction with water. An interesting slow-motion of this reaction can be seen here.

Instead, caesium will enter the cement-making process either as its oxide or a simple salt (e.g.: caesium chloride) in the coal. The salt will be ionized in the heat of the flame, sending caesium ions into the kiln and thus direct contact with the clinker as it is being formed. Here it will become part of the matrix of the clinker and hence the final cement product. All the time the caesium-137 is radioactive.

And it stays radioactive once it is in the finished product, for example in a building or road surface. Its half-life, the time that it takes for half of the caesium-137 to decay to meta-stable barium-137 (emitting radiation as it decays), is unfortunately very well matched to the life-span of concrete buildings at 30.7 years. This means that after about 100 years of building life the building would still be around 10% as radioactive as it was when it was built.

This would certainly be a problem if the coal was highly contaminated. However, a few questions come to mind. Firstly, if the coal contains 20-73 becquerels per kilogramme (Bq/kg) of caesium-137, as has been claimed by Lee In-young, an opposition spokesman for the New Politics Alliance for Democracy party and member of the National Assembly's Environment Labour Committee, why is this a problem when the Japanese legal limit for eating caesium-137 in contaminated vegetables is all the way up at 500Bq/kg? When the most dangerous mechanisms of caesium-137 poisoning relate to accumulation in soft tissue, how can driving along a caesium-137-containing highway constitute a health risk?

Also, the coal may well start the cement making process with 25-73Bq/kg of caesium-137 but the clinker will have a lower level. This is because for every 1t of clinker the plant will typically consume just 100-200kg of coal. The caseium-137 and hence the radiation will therefore be spread out over a larger mass. A level of 50Bq/kg in the coal would translate to a clinker level of 5-10Bq/kg. This is around 100 times lower than the Japanese vegetable limit. After this, the clinker is extended with additives to make cement. This is then added to aggregates and / or sand when concrete or mortars are made, further diluting the caesium-137, perhaps to as low as 1-5Bq/kg. It is arguable that South Korea has received a higher caesium-137 dose from Japan via air and sea than via coal imports.

In light of all this, it appears that those calling for investigations on scientific grounds, like Lee, may be misguided. However, there may be political gain. The histories of Japan and South Korea are long, violent and distrustful. Indeed, according to a BBC World Service poll conducted earlier in 2014, South Korea and China jointly have the most negative perceptions of Japan of all world nations. In this environment stories about radioactive coal become much easier to believe in.

In reality the Japanese vegetable limit is well above the likely levels that might be found in any cement products resulting from the use of this coal. It is consistent with EU limits set more than 20 years earlier (600Bq/kg). A search on the US Environmental Protection Agency's website fails to bring up any formal limit. Instead it states that everyone is exposed to caesium-137 from atmospheric fallout to a low level and that the most dangerous cases are where waste metal processors unwittingly come across sources.

So on the surface then, the South Korean reaction seems like a storm in a teacup. One question remains though. If the caesium-137 levels in the coal are so much lower than the Japanese vegetable limit, why are Korean firms being paid to take it out of Japan?

It won't surprise anyone to know that cement sales have fallen in the west African countries that are suffering from the on-going Ebola outbreak. However the scale may yet be instructive for this and other crises that may affect the cement industry in the future. The local data that follows mostly comes from a report by the World Bank published in early October 2014 looking at short and medium term economic impacts, as well as Global Cement research conducted towards the Global Cement Directory 2015.

All three of the principal countries involved – Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea – have low gross domestic products (GDP). They do not have cement kilns but they do have grinding plants and cement import infrastructure run by both local and international firms. They also lack readily accessible limestone deposits. In the short term (in 2014) a health crisis is expected to hit manufacturing through transportation and market disruptions stemming from both direct health implications and behavioural responses.

Liberia's cement sales fell by 60% in the third quarter of 2014, a drop the World Bank attributed to causes other than the rainy season. Quarterly cement sales more than tripled in 2013 from around 10,000t to over 25,000t marking the commissioning of a new mill at the Liberia Cement Corporation (HeidelbergCement) grinding plant. Dangote also has an import terminal in the country and is building its own grinding plant. The drop in cement sales since June 2014 has nearly undone all this production growth.

Neighbouring Sierra Leone has seen a steady fall in weekly cement sales since June 2014. Similar to Liberia, it has a HeidelbergCement-run grinding plant with Dangote planning expansion soon. Guinea, which had about a sixth of the notified cases of Ebola in mid-October 2014, has seen its cement imports fall by 50% in the year so far compared to 2013.

Before readers become too depressed though, it should be considered that Nigeria has been declared Ebola free by the World Health Organisation after six weeks with no new cases. It may have been relatively expensive to contain Ebola through public health measures but the alternatives for the regional economies could have been worse. More cases are expected to arrive in Nigeria but the country has shown that Ebola can be stopped.

Immediate cement operators threatened by the epidemic include HeidelbergCement with its five grinding plants in west Africa. How an uncontrolled or high case Ebola epidemic affects Dangote's expansion plans in its 'backyard' will also be hard to predict. West Africa is the obvious place for the Nigerian cement giant to build itself up before it tackles other markets in sub-Saharan Africa that have stronger competition like South Africa's PPC. Take this market stability away and Dangote faces a direct economic threat to its growth beyond the humanitarian horror of the epidemic. What also has implications for the cement industry in Senegal, the second biggest cement producer in the region, where there are two integrated plants.

The World Bank report concludes that Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea could lose US$129m in GDP in a low case scenario or up to US$815m in a high case scenario. To give this some context, Sierra Leone's GDP was US$2.7bn in 2013. In a high case situation it could lose US$439m or an amount equivalent to 16% of its GDP in 2013. If and when the fight against Ebola turns, this still leaves a severe economic recession for the survivors in what is already one of the poorest countries in Africa. Cement, one of the indicators of a country's economic and industrial development, is intricately bound up in this.

Angola made similar noises to Nigeria this week when one of its government ministers declared that the country was self-sufficient in terms of cement production. The comments came from Industry minister Bernarda Martins at a visit by the Angolan president to the China International Fund Luanda Cement plant. Martins' words echoed those made by Joseph Makoju, Chairman of the Cement Manufacturing Association of Nigeria, who declared that his country was making more cement than it consumed back in 2012.

Claims of self-sufficiency are all about context. A major or fast growing economy such as Nigeria declaring self-sufficiency in cement could suggest a potential paradigm shift. A smaller economy might simply have risen from a low production base to a slightly higher one with little consequence. So what does this mean for Angola?

The southern African country has a population far smaller than Nigeria at 19 million. Yet, its gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, in purchasing power parity terms, was estimated to be US$6484 in 2014 by the International Monetary Fund, a figure slightly higher than Nigeria's. In nominal terms its GDP was the fifth biggest in Africa in 2013.

Global Cement Directory 2015 research (to be published in late 2014) gives Angola's four integrated cement plants with a total cement production capacity of just under 6Mt/yr. The plant the politicians have just visited has reportedly just increased its clinker capacity to 3.6Mt/yr and another 0.6Mt/yr capacity is planned to join the market when an InterCement plant expands in 2017. Together this places the country's production at around 8Mt/yr. Domestic cement demand was placed at 6.5Mt/yr in early 2014 giving the country a cement consumption of just under 350kg/capita.

Transnational African bank Ecobank declared than Angola was becoming Central Africa's cement production hub in a commodities report in July 2014. Out of the sub-Saharan countries it has become the fourth largest producer after Nigeria, South Africa and Ethiopia and the third largest consumer after Nigeria and South Africa. Angola too has restricted cement imports, like Nigeria. In 2014 the Ministry of the Economy, Industry, Commerce and Construction implemented a stoppage on imports in a phased manner under the auspices of its local cement association, the Association of Industrial Cement of Angola.

Where Angola is different to Nigeria is in the composition of the companies that produce its cement. There is no large local presence to rival Nigeria's Dangote. The former colonial links are there with a plant operated by Brazil's InterCement, who inheritied it from Portuguese company Cimpor. Of the rest, Chinese and South Korean investors figure prominently.

Finally, it is also worth noting that Angola has none of the main sub-Saharan players present including Dangote, PPC or Lafarge Africa. Roughly half-way between the African cement powerhouses of Nigeria and South Africa and with a handy coastline, Angola deserves further attention.

It's been an expensive few weeks for Holcim. First, the Venuezuelan state-run outfit Corporación Socialista Del Cemento failed to pay its last instalment of US$97.5m in compensation for its forced nationalisation in 2008. Then the European Court of Justice dismissed Holcim's lawsuit against the European Commission over the theft of 1.6 million emissions allowances in 2010. Here we concentrate on the second story.

Holcim Romania's CO2 accounts held within the Romanian National Registry for Greenhouse Gases were illegally accessed by hackers in November 2010. 1,000,000 CO2 allowances were transferred to an account in Liechtenstein. Another 600,000 CO2 allowances were transferred to a company in Italy, which had account registries in Italy and the UK. Parts were then transferred to accounts in the Czech Republic, the UK and France before being sold on to emissions exchanges in Paris and Amsterdam.

Holcim then tried to sue the Commission, which administers the bloc's electronic emissions trading network, in 2012 for failing to freeze the accounts containing the stolen units, for not returning them and for allowing other companies to turn them in for compliance under the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS). The multinational building materials producer tried to force the commission to pay it Euro17.6m for damages associated with the theft. The amount was equivalent to the 905,000 allowances that remain unaccounted for at a spot price of Euro14.6/unit and an interest rate of 8%.

Other registries were also targeted in early 2011. As much as Euro30m in carbon allowances were stolen at the time, leading to exchanges having to stop trading temporarily.

Although this is a relatively small amount for a multinational company that reported net sales of over Euro16bn in 2013, it feels harsh. If a personal investor had assets stolen from a bank or investment scheme they would expect some sort of compensation.

It should be noted though that it is unclear how the hackers gained entry to Holcim's account details. Successful 'phishing' for account logins via fake emails and the like might suggest lax security on Holcim's side. Or a more conventional hack on the registry server might suggest loose security on the registry's side. Add to this the fact that the price of carbon allowances has fallen since 2010. Reuters estimated that the outstanding allowances would be worth Euro5.1m today.

Hopefully the thefts in late 2010 and early 2011 can be marked down as teething problems. Yet the European Union Emission Trading Scheme is compulsory for 11,000 power stations and manufacturing plants. Any European company that may be less keen on the scheme is unlikely to have its fears settled by high profile cases of carbon credit thefts or the current low price of trading.

Meanwhile, companies and investors involved with China's Guangdong Province carbon emission trading scheme, the world's second biggest such scheme after Europe, may well be watching what happens in Europe closely.