Displaying items by tag: Hacking

Many people have been adapting to home working over the last few months due to the coronavirus pandemic and the resulting lockdowns. The digital tools have been present for years but current events were all that was needed to force everyone to try it out en masse, moving much of the back office, supporting and managerial functions to the homes of staff. Some of this communal clerical working may never come back in the views of some commentators. Other functions related to networking, such as sales or knowledge transfer, have moved to different channels like webinars and social networking or have resorted to older methods like using the telephone more. The balance between real world and remote networking may change but a return to some level in favour of the former seems likely.

The core processes of cement manufacture are resistant to this trend as workers need to be on site to mine limestone and maintain production lines. Although, that said, Global Cement Magazine has covered examples of remote commissioning and maintenance of equipment at plants in recent issues. Prior to this there has been steady work on remote monitoring of equipment and plants by both suppliers and producers and moves by cement companies to focus on digital operation such as LafargeHolcim’s ‘Plants of Tomorrow’ Industry 4.0 from 2019 or Cemex’s work on autonomous cement plant operations with Petuum.

Some ways in which cement companies have coped with social distancing recently have been revealed as they have published their best practice guides. Last week, for example, Holcim Philippines was promoting its various online customer interaction tools including its existing sales platform and a new online customer engagement program to ‘provide updates on the company’s directions, share knowledge and best practices on Health and Safety and to bond with business partners while quarantines are in place.’ Other companies have done similar things like the Cemex Go platform. On the supplier side there have been various announcements as companies have pushed their digital offerings. Meanwhile, the companies offering automation or remote operation products have been handed a unique stage to promote their wares.

Another example of cement companies trying something new in digital is the pilot that was announced this week by Siam Cement Group with the Bank of Thailand to test out payment systems using a central bank digital currency (CBDC). This likely has very little to do with the cement industry and much more to do with the sheer size of that conglomerate in Thailand. As the second largest company in the country, it’s an obvious target to try out something new like this at scale. The project will run from July 2020 until the end of the year. It will build on work that the central bank has carried out on Project Inthanon, a project between the bank and the eight financial institutions to study and develop a method for domestic wholesale funds transfer using wholesale CBDC. Any benefits using a CBDC eventually bring to Siam Cement Group and other producers in the country are likely to be limited to finance departments but savings are always welcome wherever they arise.

One cautionary note to consider though is that introducing changes to national currency systems can have impacts upon cement companies through general effects to the economy as a whole. The classic example of this in recent years is that of banknote demonetisation in India in late 2016. Cement production growth declined for about half a year at the time due to the disruption it caused.

The downside of this increased reliance on digital products and platforms is increased exposure to cybercrime. There was a rare good-news story in this area recently when Schmersal Group revealed that it had intercepted a network attack in progress in May 2020. It promptly took its IT network offline and disconnected its various systems, from the telephones, to its business software, to its production processes and automated storage systems, at all of its locations. Systems were then gradually cleansed and restored over the next two weeks. Schmersal’s response is commendable but chillingly it ended its press release by saying that, “the attack demonstrated that standard protection from antivirus programs and a firewall is powerless in the event of a targeted attack with previously unknown malware.” Companies had the same vulnerabilities before the pandemic but the increased reliance on digital platforms has heightened the potential risk. As we mentioned last time we covered this topic companies that admit to large scale malware attacks are hard to find most likely because it looks bad. Although since that article was published, Buzzi Unicem admitted that a ransonware attack on its information systems originating from its Ukrainian operations were delaying its financial disclosures in mid-2017.

In the longer term it will be interesting to see how much of the altered working patterns or methods created by the coronavirus lockdowns remain afterwards. The current situation isn’t quite like the ‘disruptive innovation’ business theory pedalled by Clayton M Christensen that has led in-part to established companies setting up start-up incubators to try and spot the next big new thing. Yet, existing trends are being sped up and this may lead to some surprises that were coming down the road anyway. For example, buying someone shares in video networking tool Zoom would have made a nice Christmas present this year! Hindsight is a wonderful thing.

Last month’s prize for the most clichéd phrases in the cement news nearly went to UK technology firm Hanhaa and its ‘internet of packaging.’ At first glance the phrase seems like a hackneyed marketing play on the ‘internet of things,’ where objects outside of normal computers start to get networked, allowing for ‘added value.’ Silly wording maybe, but the intent is serious. Tracking is a vital part of logistics for industries like cement. The investors in Hanhaa, BillerudKorsnäs, may be on to something. Indeed, in 10 years time we may be kicking ourselves that we didn’t see it.

One drawback with networking everything though is that all sorts of items start to become vulnerable to computer hacking. The famous industrial example in recent years was the so-called Stuxnet virus, an alleged attempt by US and Israeli intelligence services to physically damage parts of the Iranian nuclear industry. It was intended to damage centrifuges by looking for Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) made by Siemens in very particular circumstances. A good overview on Stuxnet can be gained by watching Alex Gibney’s documentary ‘Zero Days.’

The problem for cement plants is that they also use PLCs for process control in common with other heavy industry. Effectively, whoever built Stuxnet has shown criminals how to attack any industrial plants that uses PLCs. Unsurprisingly, given the drip-drip of bad publicity, Siemens made a point of saying that it had gained a cybersecurity certification from TÜV SÜD, a German inspection and certification organisation, for some of its related products in late 2016.

Actual examples of cement plants being attacked are hard to find. Low-level cyber intrusions are likely to be treated akin to, say, individuals trespassing on a plant grounds and more serious incidents are probably kept quiet. ThyssenKrupp’s Industrial Solutions division, that builds cement plants amongst other things, reported that it had data stolen in an online attack from somewhere in Southeast Asia in 2016. Data espionage is one thing. Physical damage to an industrial plant is quite another. Previous to this, an unnamed German steel plant was reported to have been damaged by a systematically planned attack in 2014. Another way hackers can mess up your day is via extortion attempts or so-called ransonware attacks where systems are shut down until a ransom is paid. Recent examples of this in the wider public sphere include attempts to extort the San Francisco Municipal Railway in November 2016 and the St Louis Public Library system in January 2017. Despite shutting down their systems neither organisation paid up.

From our perspective, the Global Cement website runs using a common content management system (CMS) that runs on commonly used server software. Due to this we constantly receive low-level hacking and exploit attempts from automated scripts attempting to find weaknesses in the setup. New exploits are found, hacking attempts occur, software is updated and the cycle continues. However, the key difference between the Global Cement website and a cement producer is the turnover. A cement plant operates in millions or hundreds of millions. In this way, for hackers the return on investment of hacking an industrial plant is far higher. even if it is using limited-run proprietary software and equipment. And even if critical parts of a plant’s system are security hardened, hackers may be able to find a way in via less secure areas and then work their way across. Staff smartphones accessing a local wifi network, contractors using insecure USB drives, and hackers using social engineering techniques such as confidence tricks to gain system logins by phone are just some methods that could grant intruders digital access.

A report by Ponemon placed the average annualised cost of cyber crime to the industrial sector worldwide at US$8.05m. Although the authors point out sample size issues with their calculation, industry is the fifth most affected sector in terms of losses after finance, utilities, technology and services. Networking innovations in industry such as the ‘internet of packaging’ are potential game changers as added value from the network effect and suchlike becomes factored in. The risk though is that these kind of innovations also offer opportunities to criminals and anarchists. It’s likely only a matter of time until a serious hacking attack at a cement plant becomes public knowledge.

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