Displaying items by tag: Italcementi

And the winner of the Italcementi assets in Belgium is… Cementir. The Italian multinational cement producer picked up Compagnie des Ciments Belges for Euro312m this week. The deal included all of Italcementi's cement, ready-mix and aggregates assets in Belgium, Italcementi's stake in an existing limestone joint-venture with LafargeHolcim and a portion of HeidelbergCement's limestone quarry in Antoing. It was offered by HeidelbergCement to the European Commission to ensure approval of its acquisition of Italcementi.

The assets from Compagnie des Ciments Belges comprise one 2.5Mt/yr integrated cement plant, three terminals and 10 ready-mix concrete plants. As ever, the add-ons confuse the final price but the deal values the cement production capacity at Euro125/t or US$138/t. This figures seems low compared to the other big sale this week of Holcim Lanka to Siam City Cement. There, the Thai producer picked up an integrated cement plant and a grinding plant with a combined cement production capacity of 1.6Mt/yr for US$400m. That values the cement production capacity at US$250/t.

Increasing its presence in western Europe makes a lot of sense for Cementir. It’s one of the smaller European multinational cement producers with 14 cement plants, often white cement producers, in Italy, Turkey, Denmark, Egypt, the US, China and Malaysia. Altogether this comes to 15.1Mt/yr in cement production capacity. In its press release, Cementir described Gaurain-Ramecroix, the cement plant it is buying, as the largest integrated cement plant in France-Benelux, region with ‘state-of-the-art’ technology and long-life mineral reserves.

Italcementi reported a 2.9% year-on-year fall in cement and clinker sales volumes in Belgium in 2015, noting a general reduction in cement consumption in all areas of the construction industry. The mineral reserves were confirmed at least as environmental clearance as granted and work began at the new Barry quarry at Gaurain-Ramecroix.

Cementir has rebuilt its revenue since hitting a high of Euro1.15bn in 2007 although it dipped again in 2014. Despite this ordinary portland and white cement sales volumes have been slowly falling from a high of 10.5Mt in 2011 to 9.37Mt in 2015. That said though its businesses in Scandinavia generated just under half of its operating revenue in 2015. So far in 2016, total group revenue rose by 2.8% to Euro210m in the first quarter of the year, with a fair portion of that attributable to Scandinavia. Bolting on a cement and concrete business in (relatively) nearby Belgium makes sense in this context provided the construction market eventually rallies.

Yet, another on-going Cementir acquisition back home in Italy may make the company reflect on the risks of buying assets in Belgium. Cementir is drawing closer to purchasing the cement and concrete arm of Sacci as it plans to pick up five cement plants and assorted ready-mix concrete assets for the bargain price of Euro125m, following a protracted bankruptcy. Cementir may remember that Lafarge sold some of these assets to Sacci for Euro290m in 2008 before the situation deteriorated. The top brass at Cementir must be praying that the Sacci’s fate doesn’t await them in Belgium.

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) gave HeidelbergCement permission to complete its acquisition of Italcementi assets in the US on 17 June 2016. This was the second and final major competition body that could have challenged the purchase, following approval by the European Commission in late May 2016. Although the FTC consent now faces a month for comment the deal is looking likely to complete towards the end of the summer.

HeidelbergCement and Italcementi have gotten away with having to sell just one cement plant and 11 terminals in the US. The Lafarge-Holcim merger in 2015 had it tougher. Those companies were forced to sell two cement plants, two slag grinding plant and a host of terminals. Admittedly LafargeHolcim is now the biggest cement producer in the US (and the world) but HeidelbergCement will hold more integrated cement plants in the US following its acquisition.

As predicted the FTC took exception with the proximity of the company’s assets in West Virginia and Pennsylvania following the acquisition. So the parties have agreed to sell the Essroc Martinsburg integrated cement plant in West Virginia. When Global Cement visited the plant in late 2013 the staff told us that cement from the plant was distributed from central Ohio eastwards to western Pennsylvania and south to southern Virginia. The plant also switched over to a FLSmidth dry production line in 2010 giving it a clinker production capacity of 1.6Mt/yr, making it one of the newer plants in the Essroc stable.

The FTC also flagged up competition concerns in five metropolitan areas: Baltimore-Washington, DC; Richmond, Virginia; Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, Virginia; Syracuse, New York; and Indianapolis, Indiana. In light of this the proposed consent agreement requires the merged company to divest seven Essroc terminals in Maryland, Virginia and Pennsylvania and a Lehigh terminal in Solvay, New York. Two additional Essroc terminals in Columbus and Middlebranch, Ohio are to be sold at the option of the buyer and subject to FTC approval. Finally, Essroc’s terminal in Indianapolis is to be sold to Cemex.

Funnily enough, the FTC took about a year to approve both the merger of Lafarge and Holcim and HeidelbergCement’s purchase of Italcementi. This compares to the European Commission which took nine months to approve the Lafarge-Holcim deal but which took 11 months to clear the HeidelbergCement-Italcementi one. Given the greater overlap of assets of the Lafarge-Holcim merger in both Europe and the US one might have thought that the approval process would have taken longer. Or maybe bureaucracy moves at a speed all of its own. Read into this what you will. The creation of the world’s second largest multinational cement producer draws closer.

In April 2016 the shareholders of BP voted against a pay package of US$20m for the company's chief executive officer (CEO) Bob Dudley. The vote was non-binding to BP but it clearly sent a message to the management. Subsequently, the chairman Carl-Henric Svanberg acknowledged the mood amongst the company's investors and stated in his speech at the annual general meeting that, "We hear you. We will sit down with our largest shareholders to make sure we understand their concerns and return to seek your support for a renewed policy."

The link to the cement industry here is that many of the world's major cement producers are public companies. Similar to BP they internally set CEO and leading executive pay and remuneration packages. Just like BP, cement companies too could run into similar complaints from their shareholders, for example, should the construction and cement markets have similar jolts that the oil industry has faced since mid-2014.

To be clear: this article is not attempting to pass judgement on how much these CEOs are being compensated. It is merely seeing how compensation compares amongst a selection of leading cement companies. LafargeHolcim's revenue in 2015 was greater than the gross domestic product of over 90 countries. Running companies of this size is a demanding job. What is interesting here is how it compares and what happens when it is perceived to have grown too high, as in the case of BP.

It should also be noted that this is an extremely rough comparison of the way CEO pay and wage bills for large companies are presented. For example, the CEO total salary includes incentives, shares and pension payments. The staff wage bills includes pension payments, social charges and suchlike.

Graph 1: Comparison of CEO total remuneration from selected cement companies in 2015. Source: Company annual reports. 

There isn't a great deal to comment here except that compared to the average wage these are high from a rank-and-file worker perspective! The total salary for Eric Olsen, the CEO of LafargeHolcim, is lower than HeidelbergCement and Italcementi, which seems odd given that LafargeHolcim is the bigger company. However, Olsen has only been in-post since mid-2015. By contrast, Bernd Scheifele became the chairman of the managing board of HeidelbergCement in 2005. Carlo Pesenti, CEO of Italcementi and part of the controlling family, took over in 2004. Albert Manifold, CEO of CRH, also sticks out with a relatively (!) low salary given the high revenue of the company.

Graph 2: Comparison of CEO remuneration to average staff cost and total company revenue in 2015. Source: Company annual reports. 

This starts to become more interesting. HeidelbergCement's higher CEO/staff and CEO/revenue ratios might be explained by Scheifele's longer tenure. Yet Italcementi definitely sticks out with a much higher CEO wage compared to both the average staff wage and the company's revenue. Again, CRH stands out with a much lower CEO/staff ratio. Dangote's CEO/staff ratio is low but its CEO/revenue ratio is in line with the other companies' figures.

Consider the figures for China Resources and this suggests that CEO/revenue ratio may be more important than the CEO/staff ratio. The implication being that the market will only tolerate a ratio of up to about 0.05%. Any higher and the CEO's family has to own the company. Which, of course, is the case with Carlo Pesenti and Italcementi. Until HeidelbergCement takes over later in 2016 that is.

That’s as far as this rough little study of CEO remuneration at cement companies will go. So, next time anybody reading this article from a cement company asks for a pay rise, consider how much your CEO is receiving.

HeidelbergCement released more detail on its plans to buy Italcementi last week. The main points were that Italcementi’s operations in Belgium will be sold, the Italcementi brand will be retained, its research and development (R&D) centre will assume responsibilities for the entire group and up to 260 job losses are expected in Bergamo. The integration plan is expected to be complete by 2020.

Following an update in HeidelbergCement’s preliminary financial results for 2015 in February 2016, this was more focused on the practicalities of taking over a company. Sales of assets in Belgium were expected from the moment the deal was announced in July 2015. Between them the two companies operate three of the country’s four cement plants, holding 73% of the market by cement production capacity. Selling up Italcementi’s Belgian subsidiary Compagnie des Ciments Belges will maintain the existing market balance. Once this is done, from a cement sector perspective, interaction from the European Commission on the deal should merely be a formality.

Interestingly, no plans to sell assets in the US were announced. This is more ambitious on HeidelbergCement’s part because the acquisition has far bigger implications in that country. Merging Italcementi’s Essroc subsidiary and HeidelbergCement’s Lehigh Hanson subsidiary will see HeidelbergCement become the new second largest cement producer in the US with around 16.4Mt/yr. LafargeHolcim had a relatively easy ride from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) having to sell two integrated cement plants, two slag grinding plants and a series of terminals. As HeidelbergCement will become the second largest cement producer it seems unlikely that the FTC will be too demanding. However, post-acquisition the cement producer will own cement plants within 75 miles of each other in Pennsylvania and in Maryland and West Virginia. The FTC may take exception to this but perhaps HeidelbergCement is trying their luck to see if it can get away with it.

The decision to retain Italcementi’s i.Lab R&D centre in Bergamo, Italy raises questions about what will happen to the Heidelberg Technology Centre (HTC) in Leimen, Germany. The focus here is on making Bergamo the ‘product’ R&D division for the entire group. i.Lab was opened in early 2012 to fanfare, based in a building designed by architect Richard Meier and it cost Euro40m to build. How this fits with HeidelbergCement’s existing Global R&D team at the HTC remains to be seen.

Job losses of up to 260 personnel at Bergamo are regrettable but hardly unexpected. It may not be much comfort for any staff members facing redundancy but this figure is well below the figures bandied about in the media in late 2015 of first around 1000 and then nearer 500. Another 170 personnel will also be offered relocation packages taking the impact of the reorganisation up to about 400 of Italcementi’s 2500 workforce in Italy.

Looking at the wider situation with the acquisition this week, HeidelbergCement announced a record contract for Norcem, its Norwegian subsidiary, to supply 280,000t of cement over three years for an infrastructure project. Then, Carlo Pesenti, the chief executive officer of Italcementi, was reported making comments about the business’ expansion plans in Thailand and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Projects in Myanmar and Cambodia look likely once the acquisition is complete. Finally, the ratings agency Moody’s was drumming up attention for a market report by pointing out the implications for the multinational cement producers in India if a proposed rise in infrastructure spending gets approved. In summary HeidelbergCement and Italcementi are unlikely to benefit due to their southern Indian spread of assets and local production overcapacity.

HeidelbergCement may not be getting it all its own way but the acquisition of Italcementi remains on track so far. All eyes will be on how the US FTC responds to the deal.

LafargeHolcim was the last of the major non-Chinese cement producers to report its annual financial results when it did so on 17 March 2016. With the full set in, as it were, Global Cement will compare the progress of the world’s largest multinational cement companies in 2015.

The first thing to note is that whilst cement production growth rates have hardly been inspiring in 2015, growth or holding the status quo is occurring. The emerging markets have faced challenges in 2015 following the prolonged depression in the construction sector in Europe since 2008. As Wolfgang Reitzle and Eric Olsen put it in the forward of the 2015 LafargeHolcim annual report, “…our share price has been significantly affected, mainly by the volatility associated with emerging markets.”

Figure 1: Cement & clinker sales volumes from five major cement producers, 2011 – 2015. Source: Annual reports. Note: Sales volumes are calculated for LafargeHolcim for 2011 – 2013.

Figure 1 shows cement and clinker sales volumes for the major cement producers from 2011 to 2015. This graph isn’t quite as depressing as it looks because it shows a drop in cement production for the major producers and it has started to show remedial action being taken. Where growth isn’t happening in a market, pressure builds to find it through mergers and acquisitions.

So, Lafarge and Holcim merged and the decision may be now starting to show promise with its sales volumes remaining static year-on-year in 2015 rather than falling. It should be noted here that the drop from 2013 to 2014 is due to the divestments Lafarge and Holcim both made before the merger to satisfy competition bodies and because the sales volumes were calculated here from the separate Lafarge and Holcim annual reports.

Even more so, HeidelbergCement’s plan to buy Italcementi may be a good idea here. Already it has been growing its cement production each year since 2013. The acquisition could potentially speed up the growth considerably. Elsewhere, both Cemex and Buzzi Unicem are showing signs of picking up cement production since 2013.

Figure 2: Earnings before interest and taxation (EBIT) for five major cement producers, 2011 – 2015. Source: Annual reports. Note: Cemex and LafargeHolcim figures have been converted from US Dollars and Swiss Francs respectively at current exchange rates.

Figure 2 shows one indicator of profitability for the major cement producers by comparing their earnings before interest and taxation (EBIT). This is less useful than cement sales volumes because it covers the producers’ entire businesses including aggregate and concrete sectors. However, it does show the problems Italcementi has faced and it offers one reason why the company might have allowed itself to be taken over. Note also how Cemex has continued to increase its EBIT despite its high levels of debts.

Returning to the LafargeHolcim comments about volatile emerging markets, most of the producers reported tough trading in their Asian territories in 2015. The exceptions were Cemex with its reliance on the Philippines booming market and Buzzi with its limited assets in the region. However, Cemex suffered in its own major emerging market in South and Central America. Despite these setbacks though all of the producers featured here benefitted from growing sales volumes in North America, particularly in the US.

Both LafargeHolcim and Cemex announced divestments promptly following their results announcements suggesting that they feel they need to do more to regain the profitability they once had. LafargeHolcim plans to sell assets in South Korea and Saudi Arabia. Cemex has agreed to sell cement plants in Bangladesh and Thailand and a minority stake in its business in the Philippines. This last decision may suggest how serious Cemex is about tackling its debts considering the strong market in that country at present. HeidelbergCement is due to complete its acquisition of Italcementi in the second half of 2016.

Finally, the major changes to the multinational cement producers will continue in 2016 as CRH asserts itself following its major acquisitions from Lafarge and Holcim in 2015. Already its Europe Heavyside Divison reported sales revenue of Euro3.61bn in 2015 surpassing that of Buzzi Unicem. Other international producers such as Eurocement, InterCement and Votorantim were also poised for continuing growing but poor domestic markets (Russia and Brazil) may cripple their ambitions in the short term.

HeidelbergCement has finally provided a little more detail about its acquisition of Italcementi with the releases of its preliminary results for 2015. The key message is that all is well. Expected savings from the takeover are growing, less borrowing is required to make the purchase and the approvals from competition commissions around the world are rolling in.

Looking at the cost savings first, the potential for synergies or operational savings was first estimated at Euro175m at the time of the takeover announcement in late July 2015. At that time HeidelbergCement hoped to be able to deliver almost 30% of this figure in 2016. If it goes ahead this will sweeten the honeymoon period considerably following the completion of the deal. The largest savings were expected to come from the commercial area and in purchasing.

This figure then grew to Euro300m at the time of HeidelbergCement’s third quarter results in November 2015. Now, the effects of financing costs and taxes were included. At this point some more strategy about how HeidelbergCement was planning to use Italcementi’s resources started to emerge in the synergy calculations. HeidelbergCement intends to use its global trading business with Italcementi’s ‘export orientated’ cement plants. Import demand, for example in North America or Africa, that used to be bought from third party sources previously, can now be supplied by Italcementi’s plants after the merger, meeting demand and holding capacity utilisation rates up. With the publication of the preliminary results for 2015 the savings figure has grown to Euro400m with little explanation. If only it were that easy to find Euro100m down the back of my sofa.

The financing has also been proceeding smoothly. The loan value required for the takeover has fallen from Euro4.4bn to Euro2bn. Reasons for this include the exclusion of the risk of a mandatory takeover offer to minority shareholders in Morocco, some of Italcementi’s creditor banks agreeing to waive their change of control clauses and the issuance of a Euro625m bond in January 2016. The bridge financing, available initially from Deutsche Bank and Morgan Stanley, remains at Euro2.7bn.

Finally, competition commission approval has been granted in India, Canada, Morocco and Kazakhstan. Despite holding a cement product capacity of 10.5Mt/yr in India with 4.1Mt/yr additional capacity in development, this was unlikely to be a problem in India, with its total national capacity of 280Mt/yr. The commission implemented the Elzinga Hogarty Test and concluded that there is sufficient competition.

This leaves the possibly trickier approvals outstanding in Europe and the US. Belgium is likely to be the main issue in Europe given that the two companies run 73% or 4.5Mt/yr of the market in production capacity. Divestments are expected here.

In the US, precedent should save HeidelbergCement from interference. HeidelbergCement’s and Italcementi’s combined cement production assets will give it a production capacity of 16.4Mt/yr or around 14% or market share. This will make it the second biggest producer in the country after LafargeHolcim which had its merger approved in 2015. There are no obvious overlaps in their clinker production assets except for a minor one in Pennsylvania which holds both the 2Mt/yr Ordinary Portland Cement Essroc (Italcementi) Nazareth Plant and the 0.13Mt/yr Lehigh White Cement (HeidelbergCement). These two plants are unlikely to be considered in competition with each other.

So, continued smooth sailing is expected for the takeover. Since most of the information regarding the acquisition has come directly from HeidelbergCement it was unlikely to appear otherwise. Let’s see whether this remains the case when Italcementi releases its financial results for 2015 later in the week on 19 February 2016.

Both HeidelbergCement and Italcementi released their third quarter financial results for 2015 this week. The results are worth comparing given the impending acquisition of Italcementi by HeidelbergCement.

HeidelbergCement has reported a rise in revenue of 8% to Euro10.1bn for the first nine months of 2015. Its net profit rose by 27% to Euro762m from Euro599m. Its earnings before interest and income taxes (EBIT) rose by 17% to Euro1.4bn. By region, growth in revenue was reported everywhere except for the group's Eastern Europe-Central Asia region. Notably growth in the group's Asian region is slowing, growth is growing in Africa and markets are recovering in North America and the UK. It is also worth noting that the group's cement and clinker sales volumes fell by 1.1% to 60.6Mt in the first nine months of the year.

Italcementi has reported a rise in revenue of 3% to Euro3.2bn for the first nine months of 2015. It reported a loss of Euro8.1m, down from a loss of Euro63.8m in the previous period. Its EBIT fell slightly to Euro166m. By region the group reported that 'positive' trends in North America, India and Morocco, together with reducing operating expenses in Europe, would be insufficient to counteract revenue losses in France and Egypt. Overall cement and clinker sales fell by 1.4% to 32.1Mt.

Compared to its 2014 results, HeidelbergCement seems set to recover some of its revenue and profit growth after fluctuating income since 2008. Meanwhile, Italcementi has been continuing to cut costs, rebuild its business and profitability. So there are no obvious shocks to the apparent value of either company at this stage. It is also worth noting that the good geographical complementarity of each company's assets could make any potential renegotiation less likely. Everybody looks set to gain something should the purchase go through.

The deal in late July 2015 announced that HeidelbergCement would be purchasing 45% of Italcementi's shares at a price of Euro10.60 per Italcementi share for a total price of Euro1.67bn. The only clause mentioned so far has been 'subject to contractual purchase price reductions'. The deal is still expected to be completed in the first half of 2016 following approval from competition authorities. Approval from the Competition Commission of India was announced in September 2015.

The diverging values of Lafarge and Holcim before their merger in mid-2015 had consequences that led to haggling over the deal and the removal of Bruno Lafont as the proposed CEO of LafargeHolcim. The difference here is that HeidelbergCement is buying Italcementi as opposed to merging with it. However, the performances of both companies remain paramount. Now as then the question will be: is the cost worth it?

For more information read Global Cement's article on the HeidelbergCement purchase of Italcementi in our September 2015 issue.

A member of the Global Cement LinkedIn group recently posed a question about the relative sizes of LafargeHolcim and Nigeria's Dangote Cement in the African cement market. The correspondent wanted to get a handle on their relative sizes and how the situation would change as a result of the merger. Would Dangote lose its position as Africa's number one producer? If so, would its aggressive expansion allow it to regain its position at the number one spot?

As both one of the most rapidly-growing markets in the world for cement and the one with the most potential for future gains, Africa has been discussed in this column on many previous occasions. However, we have previously considered Africa's different regional markets, be it Dangote-dominated West Africa, North Africa, rapidly-growing East Africa or the far south, where PPC is looking to counter Dangote's growing strength.

However, the formation of LafargeHolcim and the news that HeidelbergCement will acquire Italcementi (starting with an immediate 45% stake), has massively consolidated the African market. In conjunction with Dangote's rapid development, these deals have transformed the African cement sector from one with a large number of small national and regional markets into a far more homogeneous entity. A number of key players, namely LafargeHolcim, Dangote Cement, HeidelbergCement and PPC, are present in numerous important markets all over the continent.

In answer to the aforementioned LinkedIn group member, the Global Cement Lafarge-Holcim Merger Report, states that LafargeHolcim controls 47.1Mt/yr of capacity in Africa. The new group is present in markets as diverse as Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa and Zimbabwe. It is currently Africa's largest cement producer.

The second-largest producer at the moment is Dangote Cement, the only African-based large multinational cement producer. According to its website, it has 31.2Mt/yr of capacity currently active in Africa. The group is rapidly expanding. "We hope to commission four other cement plants in Senegal, South Africa, Cameroon and Tanzania before the end of 2015," said Aiko Dangote, Dangote Group President this week.

The new Dangote capacity that we can identify adds 4Mt/yr. This takes Dangote's total to 35.2Mt/yr. This is close to the 37.1Mt/yr of African capacity that LafargeHolcim actually owns, but Dangote is always planning its next move. Indeed this week it was rumoured to have been looking at purchasing Italcementi itself, hence HeidelbergCement's rapid movement.

In its press-release, HeidelbergCement suggests that the purchase of Italcementi will give it a position as strong as Dangote in the African market at around 30Mt/yr. It will add strong positions in Morocco and Egypt to its existing strengths on the West African coast. For its part, South Africa-based PPC currently has around 8Mt/yr of capacity in South Africa (4Mt/yr), Botswana, Zimbabwe and Ethiopia. It is currently installing capacity in the Democratic Republic of Congo and as far afield as Algeria, where it is involved in a joint venture with a local group.

Between them, these 'Big Four' share approximately 116Mt/yr of capacity in Africa. According to the Global Cement Directory 2015, this is just over half of Africa's 225Mt/yr of cement production capacity. This proportion will only increase as Dangote and PPC enlarge their presences.

The multinational players will likely not expand as rapidly, even in Africa. At the launch of LafargeHolcim, Group CEO Eric Olsen was pretty clear that the company does not plan any 'capital-intensive' expansions in the coming years. HeidelbergCement's future actions are less predictable, especially as we are yet to hear about any divestments that may be required from HeidelbergCement and Italcementi in order to satisfy competition authorities around the world.

Whatever happens in the future, it is clear that the African cement industry has undergone a significant transformation in the past few weeks. With per-capita cement consumption far lower than on other continents, there will be plenty of room for growth as well as for more acquisitions, divestments, mergers and expansion projects from the 'Big Four' and others in the coming years.

The Greek debt crisis directly hit the local cement industry on Tuesday 30 June 2015 when Titan Cement reported that it was unable to pay a dividend to its shareholders. The leading local cement producer blamed the capital controls introduced by the government.

It is worth looking at the effects on the domestic cement industry as the Eurozone bureaucracy and the Greek government play 'chicken' with each other while Greece starts the default process, having failed to pay the latest International Monetary Fund (IMF) payment on 30 June 2015. Greece will now join a group, possibly even more select than the European Union, of countries that have failed to pay back the IMF, including current defaulters like Sudan and Zimbabwe.

A better comparison might be made with Argentina which defaulted upon its foreign debts in 2001. Its construction industry fell by 12% year-on-year in 2001 and by a further 30% in 2002. Cement consumption and cement production utilisation rates hit 23% in 2002. One key difference with Greece is that the country has had major financial difficulties for far longer than Argentina. Argentina ran into financial depression in 1998 and defaulted in 2001. Greece ran into financial trouble following the 2008 financial crisis and then received its first bailout in 2010.

As the capital controls show, even initial responses to the financial situations are impacting upon the standard transactions a limited company conducts. The Financial Times ran an article in May 2015 examining the potential effects on businesses of a debt default and Greek exit from the Eurozone (Grexit). In short, business and commerce will continue where possible reacting to whatever comes their way. For example, an olive oil producer reported switching to exports to make profits. Crucially though, another company interviewed, a construction contractor, worried about potential cuts to government or EU-led infrastructure projects.

As Titan reported in its first quarter results for 2015, its Greek market has been dependent on road building. In February 2014 Titan Cement reported its first improved operating results in seven years followed by profit in 2014 as a whole. The other major cement producers, Lafarge subsidiary Heracles General Cement and Italcementi subsidiary Halyps Cement, reported an improved construction market in 2014 with rising cement volumes. However, it was noted by Lafarge that it was developing exports to 'optimise kiln utilisation.' Titan also noted the benefits of exports in its first quarter report for 2015, focusing on a strengthening US Dollar versus the Euro. Given on-going events, one suspects there is going to be a lot more 'development' of this kind.

To set some sense of scale of the crisis Jim O'Neill, former head of economics at Goldman Sachs, famously calculated that, at the height of its growth, China created an economy the size of Greece's every three months. What happens next is down to the crystal balls of economists, although the path of least resistance now seems to be pointing at further default, departure from the Eurozone and Euro and further significant financial pain for Greece.

It looks likely that the local construction market will stay subdued and exports will offer a lifeline. How much the EU is prepared to let Greece default on its bills and then try and undercut its own over-capacity cement industries remains to be seen. However, since the main cement producers in Greece are all multinational outfits, it will afford them some flexibility in their strategy in coping with the fallout. Meanwhile a cement production capacity of around 14Mt/yr for a population of 11m suggests over capacity by European standards. If exports can't help then the situation looks grim.

UPDATE: Here is Global Cement's previous take on Greece from June 2012

A couple of news stories this week from Myanmar present an opportunity to look at the country. Lafarge has opened a cement repacking plant in the Thilawa special economic zone (SEZ). Upcountry meanwhile, Anhui Conch has had a joint venture approved by the government for an upgrade to an existing cement plant in Kyaukse.

Towards the end of 2013 the government announced that 13 companies were to establish joint ventures with the local state-owned cement plants. In addition the Myanmar Investment Commission had approved the construction of nine new cement plants with an aim of a target cement production capacity of 10.53Mt/yr. Following this, Siam Cement Group's on-going investment in a 1.8Mt/yr plant is due for completion in 2016. Semen Indonesia have been pushing for a joint venture since mid-2014 although it was still trying to agree terms in September 2014, according to local media. Italcementi's chief executive Carlo Pesenti also expressed his company's interest in setting up a joint venture in early 2014.

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) investment bank CIMB placed cement demand in Myanmar at 4Mt in 2012 and a local cement production capacity of 3Mt/yr. Cement consumption was placed at 76kg/capita for the country's population of 52.8 million. In contrast, Thai cement engineering supplier LV Technology reported demand of 6Mt in 2012. CIMB recorded Myanmar's capacity utilisation rate at 60%. Cement sales were broken down as 95% by bag and 5% by bulk.

This kind of supply-demand gap excites foreign investors. Neighbouring Thailand has a consumption of 515kg/capita, Myanmar imports cement from Thailand, Indonesia and India and the country's GDP growth rate is currently estimated to be around 8%.

Yet what's notable about Myanmar's industry are the high number of small, low production capacity cement plants. Many of them are wet process plants. Only one plant is reported as being capable of producing over 0.5Mt/yr with the Siam Cement plant project due to significantly bust this record when it is commissioned in 2016. Limited limestone deposits in the country may also make plants larger than 1.5Mt/yr unviable. Fuel is also an issue, with LV Technology advocating a wholesale industry conversion from state-subsidised gas to coal due to power shortages and impending competition issues.

In 2015 Myanmar is set to enact free trade tariffs from its ASEAN membership. Without protection or preparation, its cement plants could face serious consequences from cheaper imports from Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam. The move by the government to encourage joint ventures with foreign partners looks like one way to mitigate this. In a market report in 2013 CIMB described the situation for investors as 'high-growth, high-barrier.' This seems to be an apt description given the experiences of Semen Indonesia.