Displaying items by tag: Japan

US: Japan’s Kuraray has completed its acquisition of Calgon Carbon. As a separate subsidiary, Calgon Carbon will be reported as part of the Functional Materials company of Kuraray, along with Kuraray’s Carbon Material business division. The Functional Materials company includes the Methacrylate division and Medical division. Calgon Carbon produces filtration technologies and systems for a variety of industries, including cement.

Japan: Taiheiyo Cement has released its financial results for the nine months to 31 December 2017. They show a 10.3% rise in revenue for the nine month period to US$5.96bn from US$5.40bn in the first nine months of 2016. Its operating profit was up by 10.1% from US$403m to US$444m over the same period but its net profit fell by 43% to US$297m from US$520.9m. For the full year to 31 March 2018, Taiheiyo Cement advises that it anticipates a revenue of US$7.9bn, an operating profit of US$611m and a net profit of US$347m.

Japan: Tetsuya Horimoto has been appointed as the managing director of Schmersal Group’s new subsidiary in Japan, Schmersal Japan. He succeeds Tekashi Kabe who ran the group’s sales office in Tokyo. Horimoto is an electronic engineer with management experience at companies in the automation sector. He is also a TÜV-certified Functional Safety Engineer. The company, which operates switchgear and control device products, will continue operating out of its Tokyo office.

Japan: Ube Industries has made changes to the personnel of its cement business. Yoshiaki Ito has been appointed as General Manager of Production and Technology Division with responsibility for Material Recycle Division, Cement and Construction Material Company. Previously he was the General Manager of the Isa Cement Plant. Tadashi Matsunamni has added responsibility for the company’s Technical Development Centre to his existing roles as Senior Managing Executive Officer, Company President of Cement and Construction Materials Company and General Manager of Cement Department. He takes over this duty from Masataka Ichikawa.

Two of Japan's largest cement producers have reported reduced domestic cement sales in the country this week. First, Taiheiyo Cement revised its forecast for its 2017 financial year, ending on 31 March 2017, bringing its estimated net sales down by 2.3%. Then, Ube Group reported that its cement sales had fallen by 7.2% year-on-year to US$1.05bn in the first half of its financial year. Both producers blamed poor weak demand locally, but Ube also cited a poor export market.

Graph 1: Domestic and export cement sales in Japan, 2006 - 2015. Source: Japanese Cement Association.

This last point is interesting because it differs from the latest data released by the Japanese Cement Association (JCA). As can be seen in Graph 1 JCA figures show that exports of cement have been rising since 2013. So far this trend looks likely to continue in 2016. Ube's different experience may arise from its market mix and its distribution of cement plants and transport infrastructure. Both of its cement plants are based in the south of the country. Commentators have attributed the boost in exports to the devaluation of the Yen in 2015 as well as strong brand perception overseas. Unfortunately, this overall rise in exports has been matched by a fall in domestic sales at the same time and this is causing a headache for the major producers. Production too has started to drop since 2014 (Graph 2).

Graph 2: Cement production in Japan, 2006 - 2015. Source: Japanese Cement Association.

Japan's cement market is dominated by four producers - Taiheiyo Group, Mitsubishi Materials, Ube Industries and Sumitomo Osaka Cement - which hold nearly three quarters of the nation's production capacity between them. According to Global Cement Directory 2016 data, Taiheiyo Cement and its subsidiaries is the market leader with over 30% market share with the other three holding 10 - 20% each.

Graph 3: Cement production capacity share in Japan (Mt). Source: Global Cement Directory 2016.

Taiheiyo's downgraded forecast follows poor first quarter results, in which its net sales for its cement business fell by 16% to US$1.19bn. This follows a slight rise in net sales for its cement business in its 2016 financial year due to a boost in sales from its overseas subsidiaries, particularly in the US, that surpass a fall in domestic sales. Sales volumes were 14.7Mt domestically and 4Mt in exports in 2016. Mitsubishi Materials has posted a similar picture with cement sales and profits rising in 2016 before suffering in the first quarter of 2017. Mitsubishi Materials blamed the poor market on a delay in construction work mainly due to labour shortages and sluggish growth in demand from the public sector. Ditto Sumitomo Osaka Cement.

As highlighted by such decision as Tokyo Cement's move to resume exporting clinker to Sri Lanka in early 2015, Japan's cement industry is working hard to compensate for falling demand at home. Increasing exports in Asia Pacific among other massive exporters such as China, Vietnam and South Korea is impressive, although the prominent foothold by Japanese companies in the recovering US market may offer some advantage here. On-going weak demand in China though cuts out one major market for Chinese exporters. However, being a major exporter in a region of major cement producers must be a concern. Although commentators such as Ad Ligthart dismiss the chances of China flooding the world with cheap cement, if they are wrong and Japan continues its reliance on exports it may find itself in deep water. The other risk is if the US authorities decide to get tougher on foreign exports it may knock out one more market for Japanese exports. Too much reliance on exports is always dangerous. In this context, it’s no surprise that Japanese cement producers are blaming the government for insufficient infrastructure spending.

We report on development from Japan this week with the creation of a low-alkali cement for use at nuclear waste sites. Professor Katsuyoshi Kondo, Joining and Welding Research Institute at Osaka University, and Nippon Steel & Sumikin Cement Co have prepared a process that mixes silica dioxide extracted from rice chaff with cement.

As press reports explain, the team has developed technology to extract highly purified silica with numerous holes measuring 5 – 7nm in diameter by washing rice chaff with organic acid and burning it. The surface area of the silica extracted from rice chaff is 50,000 - 90,000 times larger than that contained in existing cements, enhancing the reaction between silica and calcium hydroxide and thus lowering the alkaline level.

The stated application for this new research is for underground nuclear waste disposal sites. At these locations extremely high durability is required for long periods of time, potentially for tens of thousands of years.

Normally the concern with alkali-silica reactivity is between alkali in the cement and a sensitive aggregate over a shorter time period. Under high moisture and high alkali content the resulting concrete can crack leading to reduced-performance. However, the issue with nuclear waste storage is that it has to be stored underground and for long periods of time. This means that the cement can potentially react with groundwater producing calcium hydroxide making the groundwater alkaline. This can then react with aggregates in the clay and bedrock at the storage site. Clearly this is undesirable for a long-term storage site of hazardous materials.

In the wake of the Fukushima disaster, this kind of development will be of high interest in Japan. It will also have applications around the world wherever radioactive waste sites are built.

One example of the demanding construction conditions facing builders in these environments is the original sarcophagus used to encase the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant reactor in 1986. Building it used more than 7,000t of steel and 410,000m³ of concrete. Erected in a hurry under horrendous conditions, the container was never sealed properly and the structure was only given a design lifespan of 20 to 30 years. Currently a replacement, New Safe Confinement, is being built at a projected cost of Euro2bn for completion in 2017. The structure will be up to 100m tall and 165m long with a lifetime of at least 100 years.

One of the issues raised in the documentary film 'Into Eternity' is what exactly should one daub on the entrance to a long-term waste dump? Given that the Onkalo spent nuclear fuel repository in Finland is planning to stay sealed for 100,000 years, how should its planners communicate to people, who potentially rediscover it in the future, that they should stay away? One suggestion quoted here is to put Edvard Munch's The Scream on the door. However, we have difficulty today in reading and interpreting Ancient Egyptian writing and art from 5000 years ago. What this means for any of our descendants unlucky enough to stumble upon a buried nuclear waste site is anyone's guess. At the very least though using a low-alkali cement that will last as long as possible is a good start.

The 'revelation' this week that South Korean cement producers have been paid US$127m to use/dispose of Japanese coal that is thought to be radioactive certainly sounds scary. If it is true that cement made with contaminated coal has led to the construction of radioactive buildings and roads, this may have prised open a 'can of worms' for coal producers, exporters and cement players alike. According to local media, four South Korean firms - Ssangyong Cement, Tongyang Cement, Lafarge Halla Cement and Hanil Cement - received the money to use the coal between March 2011, when the Fukashima nuclear power plant started to leak radiation, until 2013. A total of 3.7Mt of cement is 'under suspicion.'

Caesium-137 is formed by fission reactions that start with uranium-235 in nuclear reactors. The Fukushima reactor that started leaking in 2011 used this type of fuel. Once it leaked, caesium-137 was deposited into the sea and onto the land, presumably also making its way into nearby coal deposits.

As it is a metal with a melting point of just 28.5°C and a boiling point of 671°C, the caesium-137 would vaporise if it were to enter a cement production line operating at 1450°C as a metal. However, caesium will not enter the cement-making process as a metal due to its rapid and explosive reaction with water. An interesting slow-motion of this reaction can be seen here.

Instead, caesium will enter the cement-making process either as its oxide or a simple salt (e.g.: caesium chloride) in the coal. The salt will be ionized in the heat of the flame, sending caesium ions into the kiln and thus direct contact with the clinker as it is being formed. Here it will become part of the matrix of the clinker and hence the final cement product. All the time the caesium-137 is radioactive.

And it stays radioactive once it is in the finished product, for example in a building or road surface. Its half-life, the time that it takes for half of the caesium-137 to decay to meta-stable barium-137 (emitting radiation as it decays), is unfortunately very well matched to the life-span of concrete buildings at 30.7 years. This means that after about 100 years of building life the building would still be around 10% as radioactive as it was when it was built.

This would certainly be a problem if the coal was highly contaminated. However, a few questions come to mind. Firstly, if the coal contains 20-73 becquerels per kilogramme (Bq/kg) of caesium-137, as has been claimed by Lee In-young, an opposition spokesman for the New Politics Alliance for Democracy party and member of the National Assembly's Environment Labour Committee, why is this a problem when the Japanese legal limit for eating caesium-137 in contaminated vegetables is all the way up at 500Bq/kg? When the most dangerous mechanisms of caesium-137 poisoning relate to accumulation in soft tissue, how can driving along a caesium-137-containing highway constitute a health risk?

Also, the coal may well start the cement making process with 25-73Bq/kg of caesium-137 but the clinker will have a lower level. This is because for every 1t of clinker the plant will typically consume just 100-200kg of coal. The caseium-137 and hence the radiation will therefore be spread out over a larger mass. A level of 50Bq/kg in the coal would translate to a clinker level of 5-10Bq/kg. This is around 100 times lower than the Japanese vegetable limit. After this, the clinker is extended with additives to make cement. This is then added to aggregates and / or sand when concrete or mortars are made, further diluting the caesium-137, perhaps to as low as 1-5Bq/kg. It is arguable that South Korea has received a higher caesium-137 dose from Japan via air and sea than via coal imports.

In light of all this, it appears that those calling for investigations on scientific grounds, like Lee, may be misguided. However, there may be political gain. The histories of Japan and South Korea are long, violent and distrustful. Indeed, according to a BBC World Service poll conducted earlier in 2014, South Korea and China jointly have the most negative perceptions of Japan of all world nations. In this environment stories about radioactive coal become much easier to believe in.

In reality the Japanese vegetable limit is well above the likely levels that might be found in any cement products resulting from the use of this coal. It is consistent with EU limits set more than 20 years earlier (600Bq/kg). A search on the US Environmental Protection Agency's website fails to bring up any formal limit. Instead it states that everyone is exposed to caesium-137 from atmospheric fallout to a low level and that the most dangerous cases are where waste metal processors unwittingly come across sources.

So on the surface then, the South Korean reaction seems like a storm in a teacup. One question remains though. If the caesium-137 levels in the coal are so much lower than the Japanese vegetable limit, why are Korean firms being paid to take it out of Japan?