Displaying items by tag: Russia

Fuels procurement and costs have been weighing on the minds of Indian cement producers since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Two news stories this week show some of this. The first concerns recent imports of petcoke from Venezuela. The second covers the closure of captive power plants due to domestic shortages of coal.

At the same time, as the financial results for cement companies for the first quarter of the Indian 2023 financial year have been released, one constant has been hefty hikes in power and fuel costs. Graph 1 below gives a rough idea of the jump in costs major producers have been contending with. One point to note is that, possibly, the larger cement companies may have been better at slowing down the cost inflation from fuel. However, the prevalence of waste heat recovery installations and alternative fuels usage may also be a factor here. Finally, the company approved to buy Ambuja Cement and ACC, Adani Group, also runs India’s biggest coal trader. It will be interesting to see in the medium term how this might affect the fuel costs for its new cement division.

Graph 1: Comparison of Power & Fuel costs for selected Indian cement producers in first quarter of 2022 and 2023 financial years. Source: Company financial reports.

The Venezuelan story demonstrates the greater lengths that Indian cement producers are now going to secure fuel supplies. Reuters reports that cement companies imported at least 160,000t of petcoke from the South American country between April and June 2022 and that more was on the way. JSW Cement, Ramco Cements and Orient Cement are among them. The Venezuelan oil industry has been under US economic sanctions since 2019 but byproducts such as petcoke are not covered by this. Its petcoke has apparently been discounted by 5 - 10% below the price of US alternatives.

Indian cement producers have been prepared to risk US sanctions further by importing coal from Russia. The Business Standard newspaper, using data from Coalmint, reported that Russia became India’s third largest source of coal imports, at 2.06Mt, in July 2022. Before the war it was the sixth-largest source of coal to the country. Again, Reuters covered how cement companies were doing this in July 2022, when it revealed that UltraTech Cement had used India-based HDFC Bank to purchase coal using Chinese Renminbi, not the US Dollar as is more common for international purchases of commodities. In a conference call for the release of its first quarter results, UltraTech Cement’s chief financial officer Atul Daga confirmed the purchase and described it as “opportunistic.” He added that, “If something more surfaces, we will pick it up.” As the data for July 2022 shows, it may or may not be UltraTech Cement that is buying Russian coal right now but other parties in India certainly are.

Some of the wider economic implications about India buying Russian coal in the face of US and European sanctions include whether any retaliation might be forthcoming and a general sign that the dominance of the US Dollar as the world’s reserve currency is not guaranteed. The former seems doubtful given the size of India’s markets. Yet if the sanctions against Russia drag on then a shift in the global economic status quo becomes more likely, especially if opportunistic purchases become regular ones.

The situation facing captive power plants illustrates one more turn of the screw on energy costs for industrial manufacturers. 30% of captive power plants in India are reportedly closed due to the high cost of coal or an inability to even import it. Although it is worth noting that it is unclear whether, proportionally, more or less of these are serving cement plants. As N Srinivasan, the vice-chairman and managing director of India Cements told the Business Standard newspaper, “Most of our plants have coal based captive power generation. The cost of captive generation is now more than the grid cost. Hence, we shut down all captive power units and resorted to grid power.”

The International Energy Agency (IEA) forecast in July 2022 that Indian coal demand would grow by 3% year-on-year to 1.16Bnt in 2023 due to expanded electrification and economic growth. In its view, global coal demand will be driven principally by China but also by India to a lesser extent. However, unhelpfully, it added that uncertainty was also rising with ongoing developments in the war in Ukraine having a prominent effect. This is unlikely to assist Indian cement producers and their fuel buyers who will be asking themselves: how long will the current situation last and can the prices be passed on to consumers? There is one small silver lining in the current group of economic storm clouds hanging over cement producers at least. The second quarter of the Indian financial year is monsoon season, when economic activity slows down. It won’t slow the trend down but it may reduce the fuel bill a little.

India: 30% of plants in India’s 78GW captive power plant network have temporarily closed due to high coal prices. 40GW-worth of capacity (55%) is coal-fired, with an annual consumption of 200Mt/yr. The Business Standard newspaper has reported that total Indian coal imports fell by 10% to 23.8Mt in July 2021 from 26.3Mt in June 2021. Deliveries of coal to non-power sector consumers fell by 33% year-on-year at the beginning of August 2021. The Indian Cement Manufacturers Association (CMA) and nine other national industry associations have contacted the government to urge the formation of policies for the equitable distribution of available coal.

India Cements has imported two shipments of Russian coal for use in cement production. The company’s power and fuel costs rose by 54% year-on-year in the first quarter of its 2023 financial year, which began on 1 April 2022. Its vice-chair and managing director Narayanaswami Srinivasan said “Most of our plants have coal-based captive power generation. The cost of captive generation is now more than the grid cost. Hence, we shut down all captive power units and resorted to grid power.”

Philippines: Eagle Cement’s sales rose by 24% year-on-year to US$246m in the first half of its 2023 financial year from US$199m a year earlier. Its income was US$53.4m, down by 20% year-on-year from US$66.6m. Eagle Cement attributed the decline to cost impacts resulting from the Russian invasion of Ukraine and bottlenecks in global supply chains. Its operating expenses were US$26.1m, up by 35% year-on-year.

India: India imported 2.03Mt of coal from Russia in July 2022, making the widely sanctioned nation its third largest source of coal that month. The figure represents a 10% month-on-month increase from 1.85Mt-worth of Russian coal imports in June 2022. The Economic Times newspaper has reported that the single largest importer of thermal coal in July 2022 was UltraTech Cement, with 170,000t.

Italy: Buzzi Unicem recorded a net profit of Euro88.7m in the first half of 2022, down by 58% year-on-year from Euro210m in the first half of 2021. The group said that its recurring profitability worsened across its markets, with the exception of Russia. It also noted ‘substantial stability’ in the Czech Republic. Its consolidated sales, including those of its Brazilian and Mexican businesses, were US$2.41bn, up by 18% from US$2.05bn.

The group recorded cement sales volumes of 14.2Mt, down by 4.1% from 14.8Mt. Volumes fell by 27% in Eastern Europe and by 28% in Italy, but rose by 27% in Central Europe and by 8% in the US. Excluding Russia, the producer’s fuel costs per tonne of cement rose by 8.8% year-on-year to approximately Euro8.80, and its total energy costs rose by 20% year-on-year to Euro234m.

It implemented continued price rises across all markets except Mexico during the half, with the sharpest rises recorded in Italy and Ukraine.

A disturbing story has emerged this week concerning attempts by an unknown party to seize control of Holcim Russia. The situation marks a dangerous new phase for multinational companies operating in Russia. This includes a number of building materials producers and their suppliers.

The public side of events started on 26 July 2022 when Holcim Russia announced on its website that a legal case concerning an unpaid loan against it had been initiated at a court in Chechnya and that someone was also trying to change ownership documents with the Federal Tax Service. This was then followed by an interview by Forbes Russia with the new alleged owner of the construction materials company explaining how he had made the so-called acquisition. Holcim Russia immediately hit back hard with multiple and well researched reasons why this couldn’t be so. These included the supposed private investor’s apparent lack of a business past, a long criminal history, psychiatric records, social media accounts of an individual of seemingly modest means and so on. Kommersant FM has since reported that the court in Chechnya took the side of the asset raider but that both the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Ministry of Industry and Trade are now investigating the case.

Taking loans from a mystery businessman with no apparent past does not look credible for a multinational like Holcim and its subsidiaries. This particular method was also flagged up by one of the legal sources quoted by Kommersant FM as a recognisable corporate scam in Russia dating back to the 2000s. What is more certain is that Holcim reported that it had a 100% interest in Holcim Russia in its annual report for 2021. It then said it was going to leave the Russian market in late March 2022 following the start of the war in Ukraine a month earlier. By May 2022 it said that it had attracted the interest of 30 possible buyers. Only this week Holcim’s chief executive officer Jan Jenisch confirmed in the company’s second quarter conference call that divestment discussions were 'active' and ongoing with a 'solution' expected in the coming months. The timing of Holcim Russia’s sudden difficulties is therefore noteworthy given that a potential buyer has not yet been publicly announced.

Whoever has tried their luck at taking over Holcim Russia has done so at a time when anti-Western sentiment is high in Russia. For example, the government attempted to pass a new law seizing the assets of Western companies trying to leave the country in July 2022. Any intervention by the authorities is likely to take some of this into account and they may be wary of helping an organisation with perceived European links. Naturally, the nationalist card was played up in the interview with Forbes Russia. For its part, Holcim Russia has commented that the ongoing 'illegal action' might lead to production delays for building materials supporting key housing and infrastructure projects. Whatever is going on it must be a tense time for Holcim Russia and its 1500 employees. We’ll leave the last word to Holcim Russia’s general manager Maxim Goncharov who has described the situation as the “theatre of the absurd.” He is not wrong.

Russia: Switzerland-based Holcim has written to multiple Russian government ministries to challenge a court ruling changing the benefactors of its Russian business. Local press has reported that the producer is subject to attempted assets raiding, with multiple anonymous submissions to the Russian Federal Tax Service requesting structural changes to its legal entities in Russia.

Holcim decided to leave the Russian market in March 2022 following the invasion of Ukraine.

Vietnam: High costs have resulted in the cancellation of four planned new integrated cement lines by a local cement producer. Viet Nam News has reported that the producer in question presently faces costs of US$59.9 - 64.1/t cement, with a net loss of US$8.55 - 10.30/t. Coal prices are US$237/t, more than triple those at the start of 2022 of US$85.5/t. Gypsum and diesel prices rose by 50% over the first half of 2022. The producer reportedly attributed the coal price rise to the effects of the Covid-19 conflict and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

India: UltraTech Cement has imported a 157,000t shipment of coal from Russia for US$25.8m, which it paid in Chinese Yuan. ET NOW News has reported that this is the first instance of an Indian entity using the currency in international trade. The deal has a value of US$164/t, 50% below average South African coal prices and 20% below average Australian cement prices in India. The deal reportedly signals the possible end of Indian coal prince inflation in the medium – long term.

From 2027, the 27 member states of the European Union (EU) will begin to charge third country-based cement exporters for the CO₂ emissions of their products sold inside the bloc. The new Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is a lynchpin in the strategy to realise a 55% reduction in EU industries' CO₂ emissions between 1990 and 2030. Starving foreign cement industries of a source of income may also help to make them change their ways. A regional solution leveraged through an unfair head start, however, might cause progress to falter where it is most needed in the global fight against climate change.

Carbon leakage has hung over the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) since its inception in 2005. Cembureau, the European cement association, has reported a 300% five-year increase in third-country cement imports up to 2021, with spikes matching those in ETS credit prices. Companies from Turkey to Australia have produced and transported their cement into the EU, at great CO₂ cost, while benefitting from a competitive edge over domestic producers, it would seem. Lawmakers rectified the situation by maintaining free allocations of ETS credits to EU industries, including cement, which received US$92m-worth in 2021.¹ In the wake of the Paris Agreement, an emissions pricing mechanism on cement imports first came before a vote of the member states in February 2017.

In what would become a recurring theme, opposition from all sides of the issue defeated the proposal. Most interesting was the international response: Brazil, China, India and South Africa voiced ‘grave concern’ over the proposed CBAM. A Russian representative at the Department of European Cooperation lamented the possible necessity of ‘response measures,’ while US Climate Envoy John Kerry coolly urged the EU to wait until after the COP26 climate change conference in November 2021. The outbursts were surprising given that the mechanism clearly conformed to World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules: free allocations were always expected to phase out in a mirror image of the CBAM phase-in. The proposal eventually adopted on 22 June 2022 set the end date for both as 2032.

In 2020, the EU imported US$383m-worth of cement and concrete across its external borders, down by 17% year-on-year from US$463m in 2019.² Imports had previously more than doubled decade-on-decade from US$204min 2009. China accounted for US$167m-worth (43%) of global cement and concrete exports to the EU in 2020, followed by Vietnam with US$34m (9%) and the UK with US$30m (7.9%). Other significant sources include Belarus (US$28m - 7.4%), Russia (US$13.8m - 3.6%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (US$13.5m - 3.5%), Serbia (US$13.1 million - 3.4%), Israel (US$13m - 3.4%), Turkey (US$12.6m - 3.3%) and the US (US$10.3m - 2.7%).

China

China’s first emissions trading scheme will be one year old on 16 July 2021. The scheme, covering more than twice the CO₂ emissions accounted for under the EU ETS, may lend an apparent synergy to EU energy policy and that of the bloc’s main trade partner.³ On the contrary, Chinese carbon credits cost 8.5% the price of EU ETS credits on 29 June 2022, with a growth rate of just 10% year-on-year, compared to 53% in EU ETS credit prices. Unlike their European equivalent, they are also restricted to the energy sector. Chinese cement exporters are unready to meet the CBAM on its own terms. The inclusion of indirect emissions further disadvantages plants operating in China’s 57% coal-powered economy. Premier Li Keqiang has warned countries to be on their guard against a ‘new green trade barrier.’

These concerns ought to be considered in light of the scale and diversified nature of the China-EU trade partnership. The eventual inclusion of polymers, hydrogen and ammonia under the CBAM still does not extend its scope beyond 3% of Chinese imports to the EU by value, enabling China to retain the leverage it has previously proved willing to exercise against those who threaten the perceived interests of global trade.

China plans to reach net zero CO₂ emissions by 2060 through an energy transition in which it invested US$266m in 2021, more than the next six ranked countries combined.⁴ In the medium-term future, the CBAM may become a green bridge, connecting with Chinese emissions reduction policies in a single carbon border measure to raise money for developing countries’ sustainable transitions, as suggested by former governor of the People’s Bank of China Zhou Xiaochuan. Until then, China seems well positioned to ensure that a fair share of the costs arising from the CBAM pass to importers and the consumer.

Turkey

Turkey provided 3.3% of the EU’s cement and concrete imports in 2020, but the volume corresponded to 13% of Turkey’s total exports of the same. Thus, the country has a high exposure to any adverse effects of the CBAM – quantified at an estimated US$789m/yr by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.⁵ Turkey’s ratification of the Paris Agreement in late 2021 is among the positive outcomes of the CBAM. The country now plans to align with the CBAM. In this, the Turkish cement industry will rely on a share of a US$3.2bn loan from the World Bank, France and Germany.

The UN has yet to receive an updated climate action plan from the Turkish government in line with its pledges. Should Turkey fail to transition within the short timeframe provided by the CBAM, its cement sector might increase its existing focus on the West African market, where it holds 55% and 46% market shares for cement and clinker imports to Ghana and Ivory Coast respectively. The beleaguered industry has one greater refuge still: the US market, which consumed 18% of Turkish cement exports in 2020.

North America

Discussions of the CBAM’s impacts in Canada and the US are tied to those countries’ on-going deliberations over possible adjustment mechanisms of their own. At present, individual provinces and states are responsible for implementing carbon pricing. An international emissions trading scheme, called the Western Climate Initiative, already exists between the US state of California and the Canadian province of Quebec. The Canadian government is conducting a consultation on federal Border Carbon Adjustment (BCA) credits in the context of economy-wide pricing.⁶ Carbon border adjustment was previously an item on the US Trade Policy Agenda in 2021, but disappeared in 2022. President Biden pledged to impose 'carbon adjustment fees or quotas on carbon-intensive goods from countries that are failing to meet their climate and environmental obligations' during his candidateship in the 2020 US presidential election. On 7 June 2022, two weeks before the EU adopted CBAM, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse introduced a carbon border adjustment bill to the US Senate, which it referred to its Committee on Finance.⁷

North American legislators will need to follow the European Parliament in building a broad centrist majority in order to pass their CBAMs. If they succeed, the world will gain a low-carbon axis of cement markets, bringing their trade partners behind them.

Other European countries

The UK cement industry expects to pay an extra US$30.1m/yr on account of the CBAM.⁹

A November 2021 report by the Ukraine Resource & Analysis Centre (Society and Environment) concluded that Ukraine's 'largest and most technological' cement producers will experience no critical influence from the CBAM when exporting to the EU.⁸ At that time, the Ukrainian strategy consisted of an alignment with any future CBAM. On 31 May 2022, The European Business Association calculated Ukrainian cement producers' total CBAM tax bill as US$3.36m/yr.¹⁰

Montenegro introduced its own emissions trading system, modelled on the EU ETS, in February 2021, a move which Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia have both announced their intent to follow.¹¹

Norway has called for international acceptance of the CBAM, but questioned the practicality of including indirect carbon pricing.

An example of the possible adverse effects of the CBAM comes from the EU's ban on Russian cement imports in April 2022. The loss of the EU market was one likely contributor to a rollback of climate regulation there.¹²

Developing countries

Non-governmental organisation (NGO) Oxfam has criticised the CBAM's failure to include an exemption for the least developed countries. The EU's solution is an indirect one: it will put CBAM revenues towards its budget, from which international climate finance funding will be raised to an equivalent level. As Paris Agreement signatories, EU member states already expect to contribute to the achievement of US$100bn/yr in climate finance funds for poorer countries in 2023.

Oxfam has recommended that the EU do more to take account of its disproportionate contribution to cumulative global CO₂ emissions. This would include directly paying CBAM revenues into international climate finance and accelerating the phase-out of free ETS allocations.

Conclusion

On 22 June 2022, the most sustainable cement market in the world successfully harnessed market forces to its emissions reduction ambitions. The European cement industry will be able to celebrate the end of carbon leakage. Cement companies outside of the EU, however, now face increased costs and lower prices for their product. The legislation addresses some of the harm that it causes to less developed countries; those – like China, Turkey and Vietnam – in the middle must meet it head-on.

So far, we have cited governments and lobby groups, but the real question of readiness for the CBAM lies with producers. Global cement companies, including those based in the EU, have implemented their sustainable cement technologies across all continents, and are beginning to reap the rewards of a new world where paying for pollution is unavoidable.

Sources

1. Sandbag, E3G and Energy Foundation, A Storm in a Teacup, Impacts and Geopolitical Risks of the European Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, August 2021, https://9tj4025ol53byww26jdkao0x-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/E3G-Sandbag-CBAM-Paper-Eng.pdf

2. Trend Economy, ‘Imports: European Union: 6810,’ 14 November 2021, https://trendeconomy.com/data/h2/EuropeanUnion/6810

3. Energy Monitor, ‘Carbon trading the Chinese way,’ 5 January 2022, https://www.energymonitor.ai/policy/carbon-markets/carbon-trading-the-chinese-way

4. China Power, ‘How Is China’s Energy Footprint Changing?’ https://chinapower.csis.org/energy-footprint/

5. Politico, ‘EU’s looming carbon tax nudged Turkey toward Paris climate accord, envoy says,’ 6 November 2021, https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism-turkey-paris-accord-climate-change/

6. Canadian Climate Institute/L'Instut Climatique du Canada, 'Border Carbon Adjustments,' 27 January 2022, https://climateinstitute.ca/publications/border-carbon-adjustments/

7. Congress, 'S.4355 - Clean Competition Act,' 7 June 2022, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/4355?s=1&r=6

8.Ukraine Resource & Analysis Centre (Society and Environment), ' The Impact of Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) on the EU - Ukraine trade,' November 2021, https://www.rac.org.ua/uploads/content/624/files/impactcarbonmechanismcbamukrainesummaryen.pdf

9. Burke et al, 'What does an EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism mean for the UK?' April 2021, https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/What-does-an-EU-Carbon-Border-Adjustment-Mechanism-mean-for-the-UK_FULL-REPORT.pdf

10. European Business Association, 'Ukrainian exporters to pay more than € 1 billion in carbon tax to the EU under the CBAM,' 31 May 2022, https://eba.com.ua/en/ponad-1-mlrd-yevro-podatku-na-vuglets-shhoroku-splachuvatymut-ukrayinski-eksportery-v-yes-v-ramkah-svam/

11. Balkan Green Energy News, 'Which Western Balkan countries intend to introduce carbon tax?' 18 May 2022, https://balkangreenenergynews.com/which-western-balkan-countries-intend-to-introduce-carbon-tax/

12. Climate Home News, 'Russian climate action and research is collateral damage in Putin’s war on Ukraine,' 26 May 2022, https://www.climatechangenews.com/2022/05/26/russian-climate-action-and-research-is-collateral-damage-in-putins-war-on-ukraine/