
Displaying items by tag: lost time injury
Italy: Buzzi Unicem reduced its specific gross scope 1 CO2 emissions by 4% year-on-year to 664kg/t cementitious product in 2022 from 689kg/t in 2021. As part of its Sustainability Report for 2022 it revealed that specific CO2 emissions varied from a low of 500kg/t in Luxembourg to a high of 812kg/t in Ukraine. Its specific thermal consumption fell slightly to 4084MJ/t clinker and its thermal substitution rate was 29.9%.
The company’s Lost Time Injury Frequency Rate (LITFR) was 4.9 and two fatalities were reported. It also noted that six employees – five Ukrainian and one Russian – died as a result of the war between Ukraine and Russia that started in February 2022. In addition, six staff were wounded, one taken prisoner and two were reported missing from its Ukrainian workforce.
The building materials producer noted that it had met some of its five-year sustainability targets set in 2017, including a 5% reduction in specific CO2 emissions, the implementation of structural engagement projects at all of its production sites with a high economic, environmental and social impact and the achievement of increasingly safe working conditions.
Quarry health & safety in Australia
26 February 2020The Queensland state government in Australia took a blunt approach to health and safety earlier this month when a report it commissioned said that it expected 12 deaths to occur in the mines and quarries sector over the next five years unless changes were made. This is far removed from the usual news stories that industry magazines like Global Cement and others cover. Typically, these are either plants or companies reaching Lost Time Injury (LTI) milestones or sad (but thankfully rare) reports of death.
The forecast in Queensland was based on a review of fatalities in the sector that the state commissioned from Sean Brady, Department of Natural Resource, Mines and Energy, looking at the years 2000 to 2019. Year-by-year the figures were significantly lower than those occurring in the 1900 to 2000 period but didn’t appear to have any discernable pattern. However, when presented as a 12-month rolling sum of fatalities, a two to three year cycle seemed to occur. Brady then went on to look at how the fatalities happened, how the industry behaved and reacted and what could be done to improve the situation. His recommendations included looking more deeply at the causes of seemingly unrelated accidents and then changing overall organisational behaviour and insight through methods such as adopting principles of High Reliability Organisational theory, simplifying the reporting system and changing the standard safety indicators like LTI.
That last point is interesting given the prevalence of LTI indicators on corporate sustainability reports in the cement industry. The point that Brady cites here is that LTI can become a measure of how well injuries are managed, not how safely an organisation is performing. For example, the definition of what an injury is can be manipulated, leading to distortion, as can workers being brought back to work before they recover or into lighter duties. Instead he recommends that ‘serious accidents’ be used in place of LTI. These are defined as incidents that result in a fatality or incidents where an individual requires admission to hospital for treatment of an injury. The preference here is based on so-called ‘serious accidents’ being unambiguous and transparent because they are defined by a third-party medical practitioner.
Wider critiques of health and safety measurements have identified under-reporting of incidents arising from safety incentive programmes, safety culture, employee perceptions of reporting and workplace bullying. This isn’t to say that the LTI measure is not fit for purpose. It has undoubtedly led to higher safety conditions around the world, with reduced injury and mortality from working conditions, and it allows for comparisons between organisations. Yet, any health and safety metric or indicator could be liable to bias or manipulation either unconsciously or consciously. Serious accidents, for example, could be potentially undermined by an organisation having its own medical centre and would also suffer from different health care systems in different locations. Throw in different legislative frameworks around the world and comparing countries can also start to become confusing.
This tension between data and real-life safety is acknowledged by the Global Cement and Concrete Association (GCCA) in its sustainability guidance from late 2018. It distinguishes between so-called ‘lagging’ indicators, like LTI and fatalities, which show the effectiveness of a safety programme after the fact and the importance of continual safety improvement plans that aim to prevent adverse events before they happen. It is easy to become lost in a dust storm of facts and figures on health and safety but, as the Queensland authorities and the GCCA agree, measuring health and safety is a means to an end. The aim is zero harm to everyone involved.
Report shines light on causes of Queensland quarry fatalities
25 February 2020Australia: A report commissioned by the Queensland Ministry of Mines has investigated the causes of all 47 deaths in mines and quarries in the state between 2000 and 2019, concluding that systemic, organisational, supervision or training failures caused the deaths in almost all cases. The report proposed that the state government should require quarry operators to use the Serious Accident Frequency Rate (SAFR) as their metric for health and safety monitoring, calling the Lost Time Injury Frequency Rate (LTIFR) unreliable because it is prone to manipulation, being “a measure of how the industry manages injuries after they have occurred. It is possible, therefore, to reduce the LTIFR without making the industry safer,” said the report’s author Sean Brady.
In the Australian 2019 financial year, ending 31 July 2019, six people died in Queensland’s quarries and mine.