Analysis

Last week we looked at the prospect of two new Angolan cement plants, a situation that will reportedly lead the country to being ‘self sufficient in cement.’ When we hear this phrase, very often from relatively small markets in Africa or Asia, the obvious next step invariably follows: The country in question will become a regional powerhouse for cement exports.

But try telling that to the desperate Vietnamese cement producers, swamped by chronic overcapacity and very low prices, both at home and abroad. In an effort to shift more of Vietnam’s cement mountain, this week the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) proposed big changes to its handling of cement exports. At the moment cement is subject to a 5% export tax and does not receive VAT refunds. This means that Vietnamese cement has become less competitive than Chinese, Thai, Indonesian and Japanese cement on the regional market, compounding the oversupply situation at home.

The MPI now proposes to scrap the tax and allow for VAT refunds to avoid a colossal 36-47Mt oversupply of cement by 2020. It is quite staggering that this response hasn’t been considered before. This is especially the case, given that the VICEM’s General Director Tran Viet Thang asked for the government to look at the rules back in February 2017. Indeed the Vietnam Cement Association predicted an oversupply of nearly 50Mt/yr by 2020 in January 2017.

Vietnam exported 14.7Mt of cement and clinker in 2016 according to its domestic statistics service. The country was the seventh largest exporter of cement and clinker in 2016 in value terms, with a total value of US$431.7m. China, as one might suspect, topped the list, but only at US$683.6m, around 58% more than Vietnam. Given that China’s cement capacity is around 20 times that of Vietnam, this highlights the extent to which Vietnam is trying to rely on imports.

A market-led response to this would be to close some of the cement plants down and stop commissioning any new ones. China has made some inroads into this approach and Vietnam is following suit… to some extent. That said, however, Trinh Dinh Dung, the Deputy Prime Minster, inaugurated the second production line at the Thanh Thang Cement plant on 4 July 2017 and Long Son Cement will open its second production line at Long Son in late August 2017. That new line will add nearly another 3Mt/yr of capacity to the national total just by itself. On top of this, Thai-owned Siam City Cement Vietnam opened a new ‘terminal’ in Vietnam in late June. Thailand ranked above Vietnam in the cement and clinker export list for 2016 at US$612.2m, suggesting that, contrary to the obvious implication, the port could even be used to ship out Thai exports into Vietnam!

This is not the first time we have heard about Vietnam’s massive cement surplus but it is the first time that the government appears to have registered it as needing attention. A market-led economy would simply shut the plants down but Vietnam plays by different rules. Will changing the rules on tax help it sell out its surplus? Call us in 2020…

The old joke about buses only coming along in pairs might just apply to Angolan cement plants this week with the inauguration of Nova Cimangola’s new 2.4Mt/yr cement plant in Luanda. It follows the announcement of the start of an upgrade project to build a clinker kiln at Cimenfort’s grinding plant in Benguela. In cement industry terms for a country with a production capacity below 10Mt/yr these projects are right on top of each other!

Nova Cimangola’s new plant has been a well-publicised project internationally. Sinoma International Engineering coordinated the line for US$400m in 21 months using components from well-known suppliers. Loesche provided a number of raw material, cement and coal mills for the project, including the country’s first vertical roller mill, as well as other components and parts. Loesche’s Austrian subsidiary A Tec also got involved as an EPCM (Engineering, Procurement & Construction Management) partner.

Cimenfort’s clinker kiln project is the third phase of a process to turn its grinding plant at Catumbela in Benguela into a fully integrated unit since it opened in 2012. Earlier phases saw the grinding plant’s capacity increase to 1.4Mt/yr from 0.7Mt/yr by using a new roller press. Work on the kiln is now scheduled to start in January 2018 with completion scheduled for 2020.

If Cimenfort makes it to clinker production they will join the country’s three main producers: Nova Cimangola, Fabrica de Cimento do Kwanza Sul (FCKS) and the China International Fund. Getting that far is by no means certain as the Palanca Cement plant project demonstrates. That scheme was backed by Brazil’s Camargo Corrêa, the owners of InterCement, and local business group Gema. However, the regulators bailed out Portugal’s Banco Espírito Santo, the financial backer of the project, in 2014 effectively killing it. Another project that has gone on the back burner is Portugal’s Secil’s plan to build a second plant next to its grinding plant in Lobito. Originally approved by the Angolan government in 2007 the project has been kicked around since then through various revisions to the local investment body. It was last reported as being under consideration by the president’s office of Angola in 2016.

Ministry of Industry figures place cement production capacity at 8.3Mt/yr compared to a consumption of 6Mt/yr. In contrast to this Secil’s parent company Semapa reported that the Angolan cement market contracted in 2016 by 25% to 3.9Mt in line with the poor state of the general economy, pushed down by poor oil prices. It blamed the decrease in cement consumption on a halt in public infrastructure spending and the negative effect that local currency devaluations had on clinker imports and other incoming raw materials. With the International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasting economic growth to pick up for Angola in 2017, improvements in the construction and cement sector are expected by Semapa but they hadn’t been seen so far during the first quarter of the year.

The government’s keenness to describe its cement industry as ‘self-sufficient in cement’ mimics calls from other African countries like Nigeria. The Angolan government banned cement imports in 2015, with the exception of certain border provinces, and this has continued into 2017. However, the ban hasn’t stopped the country exporting cement to its neighbours. Earlier this year the head of Cimenterie de Lukala in the Democratic Republic of Congo blamed the closure of his company’s integrated plant on imports from Angola.

All of this leaves an enlarged local cement industry waiting for the good times to come again. In the meantime, exporting cement and clinker no doubt seems like a promising proposition. In the middle of this are projects like those from Cimenfort and Secil that are looking decidedly dicey in the current economic environment. These companies may have just missed the bus to make their upgrades happen. Still, if they wait around long enough, their chance may come again when the market revives.

Sad news this week from the Talcahuano cement plant in Chile that is to stop producing clinker. Local media reports that the Cementos Bío Bío unit has decided to import clinker from Asia instead, which will reduce its production costs. At the same time it has laid off a third of its workforce. The plant has been producing cement since 1961.

The decision carries echoes of Holcim New Zealand’s closure of its Westport cement plant in 2016, another unit in a country on the Pacific Rim. However, in that country LafargeHolcim has purposely moved towards becoming a distribution company by opening import terminals and depots. Plus the local subsidiary benefits from the cement-trading arm of a multinational company. By contrast, local producer Cementos Bío Bío still retains two integrated plants and a grinding plant in Chile. Following the closure its production share from integrated plants will drop to 2.4Mt/yr (39%) from 3.2Mt/yr (45%). The country will retain a total production capacity of 6.2Mt/yr from its clinker producing plants.

The timing of Cementos Bío Bío’s decision is also interesting given that the Chilean competition authority (TDLC) approved Hurtado Vicuña Group to buy a controlling stake in Cemento Polpaico from LafargeHolcim in early July 2017. The deal was originally announced in October 2016 to sell LafargeHolcim’s 54.3% stake in Cemento Polpaico for US$225m. The sale includes one integrated plant with a cement production capacity of 2.3Mt/yr and two grinding plants. Hurtado Vicuña has not been required by the regulator to sell any of its cement units but it has been asked to sell parts of its concrete business and to abide to a ban on repurchasing the assets within 10 years. Hurtado Vicuña owns Cementos BSA, a subsidiary that runs the El Bosque cement grinding plant in Santiago and it has just started-up production at a new 0.95Mt/yr grinding plant at Quilicura, also near the capital.

In its 2016 annual report LafargeHolcim reported that cement sales volumes of cement fell in Chile due to a fall in the residential construction market in the second half of the year. However it did manage to raise its operating earnings before interest, taxation, depreciation and amortisation (EBTIDA) off the back of higher prices and lower production costs compared to the previous year. Cementos Bío Bío concurred with this assessment of the market in its 2016 report, lamenting the country’s poor economic growth since 2015 and declines in the mining and construction sectors. Despite this its cement despatches rose very slightly to 1.56Mt in 2016. The big drop in its sales occurred in 2014 when its sales fell by 10% year-on-year to 1.51Mt. More recently, Bío Bío noted a 37% decrease in its operating profit for its cement, concrete and lime division for the first quarter of 2017 due to falling sales volumes and margins in cement and lime. However, it did benefit from falling costs for energy and petcoke inputs. The group also announced plans to sell a minority stake in itself in February 2017.

These stories show another country that is realigning its cement industry to a clinker-rich world market. Chile appears to retain a ‘big three’ group of local clinker producers that has shifted with the rise of Cementos BSA and the departure of LafargeHolcim. However, the market share in the cement grinding business has changed significantly as Cementos BSA has gained both an integrated plant and a more national profile, away from the capital, with its grinding plants. Once the local market picks up it will be interesting to see whether this trend towards clinker import and local grinding continues.

Congratulations are due to India’s UltraTech Cement this week for finally completing its US$2.5bn asset purchase from Jaiprakash Associates. The deal has been around in some form or another since at least 2014 when UltraTech arranged to buy two cement plants in Madhya Pradesh for around US$750m. That deal, publicly at least, became a victim of the 2015 amendment to India’s Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) (MMDR) Act. The Bombay High Court eventually rejected it in early 2016 after a period of delays. However, the deal bounced back in a much larger form around the same time and since then everything has gone relatively smoothly.

As chairman Kumar Mangalam Birla put it in his letter to shareholders in the company’s 2016 – 2017 annual report the, “move is essentially for geographic market expansion.” He then went on to mention all the usual keywords like ‘synergy’ and ‘economies of scale’ that you expect from an acquisition. Quite rightly he finished with, “It is with great pride that I record, that UltraTech is the largest cement player in India and the fifth largest on the world stage.” On that last point he meant outside of China but UltraTech does have a small number of assets outside of India, notably in the UAE, Bahrain, Oman and Bangladesh, hinting at an international future for the cement producer.

Map 1: UltraTech Cement’s plants in India. Source: UltraTech Cement Corporate Dossier, January 2017.

To give a scale of the deal, UltraTech has increased its number of integrated cement plants in India to 18 from 12 and its cement grinding plants to 21 from 16. Its overall cement production capacity will increase by nearly 40% to 91.4Mt/yr from 66.3Mt/yr. The new assets are in Himachal Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh. The main regions that will benefit are the North, Central and South zones. In particular the Central Zone will see its capacity jump to 21.1Mt/yr from 6.2Mt/yr. This area also includes a new 3.5Mt/yr plant at Dhar in Madhya Pradesh that is scheduled for commercial production in late 2019.

The completion of the Jaiprakash Associates deal was followed by the introduction at the start of July 2017 of the Goods and Services Tax (GST), a rationalisation of some of the country’s central and state taxes. UltraTech promptly said it had reduced its product prices by 2 – 3% in light of tax reductions under the new regime. Some producers were warning of a rise in cement prices in the run-up to the introduction of the GST and the Cement Manufactures’ Association said that the new tax rate was insufficient. However, UltraTech said that the new tax rate of 28% was better than 30 – 31% previously. Other Indian producers also reduced their prices this week following the introduction of the GST.

UltraTech’s expansion and the start of the new tax scheme auger well for the Indian cement industry in 2017. Demonetisation knocked cement production at the start of the year and it may have lowered UltraTech’s capacity utilisation rate as well as reducing domestic sales by cutting housing demand. However, sector rationalisation and a simpler tax approach should help to remedy this. Not all government interaction has been helpful to the cement industry in recent years as the MMDR amendment and demonetisation show but the signs are promising.
Roll on the next set of financial reports.

Further shifts in the South Korean cement industry this week as Ssangyong Cement purchased Daehan Cement. Private equity firm Hahn & Company owns both producers so this looked like a realignment exercise. Yet it follows a corporate version of pass-the-parcel within the local cement industry. Hyundai Cement was acquired by Hanil Cement in the first half of 2017, Halla Cement was bought by investment firms from LafargeHolcim in mid-2016 and Tongyang Cement was bought by Sampyo Group in 2015.

Ssangyong Cement’s purchase is seen in the local media as an attempt to reaffirm its market dominance. Before the Hyundai Cement auction, Ssangyong Cement was the market leader with a cement production capacity of 15Mt/yr and a market share of around 20%. Hanil Cement’s on-going purchase of Hyundai Cement will see it increase its production capacity from 7Mt/yr to over 15Mt/yr. Ssangyong Cement’s transaction for Daehan Cement puts it back in the lead again.

The local industry is notable for the high ratio of cement grinding plants to integrated plants. The Korean Cement Association (KCA) reported that the country had 12 integrated plants to 23 grinding plants in 2015. This compares to other developed countries in relatively remote places such as Australia and Chile that also have high numbers of grinding plants. South Korea doesn’t import that much clinker though. One difference is its prominent steel industry that has hovered around 70Mt/yr since 2014 and which puts it in the top ten of world producers. Subsequently, as POSCO’s Sunghee Han explained at the Global Slag Conference 2016, 13.9Mt of granulated blast furnace slag (GBFS) was produced in 2015 and the majority of this ended up being used as supplementary cementitious materials (SCM) either to grind cement or to make concrete. The size of this slag market underlines the value of the Daehan Cement sale, as it is a major slag cement producer.

Other notable point about the local cement industry includes the presence of a few extremely large multi-kiln plants with production capacities in excess of 7Mt/yr. The country also has a relative scarcity of limestone. South Korea is the fifth biggest importer of limestone in the world at US$34m. It brings limestone in principally from the UAE, Japan, India, Malaysia, and Vietnam. Notably it also has one of the world’s longest single conveyors, with a length of 12.8km, connecting a quarry to Ssangyong Cement’s Donghae plant.

Graph 1: Cement production and consumption in South Korea, 2010 – 2015. Source: Korean Cement Association.

Unlike the European cement-producing nations that this column has covered in recent weeks, fundamental market structural changes do not appear to be driving the merger and acquisition activity in South Korea. As Graph 1 shows, production and consumption fell from 2010 onwards but has started to pick up since 2013. Instead, a general slowing of the economy from 2010 and a relaxation of the rules triggered merger and acquisition activity. Unsurprisingly then, perhaps, given the potential opportunities for market manipulation, that the Fair Trade Commission fined six of the seven major producers a total of US$168m in early 2016 for alleged price fixing. With the private equity firms widely expected to exit the market after a relative short time, the cement industry looks set to remain volatile for the next few years. Doubtless the market regulators will be watching very carefully indeed to see how it all plays out.