Global Cement News

Cemex took a major step towards cutting its debts last week when it announced the sale of selected assets in the US for US$400m. Two cement plants in Odessa, Texas and Lyons, Colorado were included in the deal along with three cement terminals and businesses in El Paso, Texas and Las Cruces, New Mexico. Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua (GCC) was announced as the buyer.

Together the two plants being sold hold a cement production capacity of 1.5Mt/yr giving a rough cost of US$267/t for the assets. This compares to the cost of US$170/t that the European Cement Association (CEMBUREAU) estimates is required to build new capacity. Back in August 2015 when Taiheiyo Cement’s Californian subsidiary CalPortland purchased Martin Marietta Materials’ two cement plants in the state it paid US$181/t. Summit Materials paid far more at US$375/t in July 2015 when it purchased Lafarge’s cement plant in Davenport, Iowa, although that deal included seven cement terminals and a swap of a terminal. Other sales in 2014 to Martin Marietta Materials and Cementos Argos also hit values of around US$450/t involving lots of other assets including cement grinding plants and ready mix concrete plants.

Back on Cemex, the current sale to GCC maintains its position as the third largest cement producer in the US after the HeidelbergCement acquisition of Italcementi completes in July 2016 subject to Federal Trade Commission approval. However, it holds it with a reduced presence. Its cement production capacity will fall to 13Mt/yr from 14.5Mt/yr. It loses cement production presence in Colorado although it may retain distribution if it holds on to its terminal in Florence. In Texas it retains the Balcones cement plant near San Antonio and up to nine cement terminals depending on which ones it sells to GCC.

Selling assets in the US must be a tough decision for Cemex given that a quarter of its net sales came from the country in 2015. This was its single biggest territory for sales. This share has increased in the first quarter of 2016 as the US market for construction materials has continued to pick up.

Withdrawing from western Texas with its reliance on the oil industry makes sense. The plant it has retained in that state, the Balcones plant, is within the so-called Texas Triangle and so can hopefully continue to benefit from Texas’ demographic trends for continued housing starts and suchlike. Colorado is one of the middling US states in terms of population and likely to be a lower priority than other locations. The sales will see Cemex retrench its cement production base in southern and eastern parts of the country with the exception of the Victorville plant in California.

We’ve been watching Cemex keenly as other multinational cement producers have merged and laid out plans to merge in recent years. Saddled by debts, Cemex has appeared unable to either buy more assets itself and has remained distant from any talk of merger activity itself. The sales announcements in the US reinforce the image of a company taking action to relieve itself of its debts in 2016 following sales in Thailand, Bangladesh and the Philippines, and amended credit agreements and more borrowing. However, sales of cement plants in west Texas and Colorado outside of the strong markets in the US don’t quite suggest a company that has really committed yet to reducing its debt burden. Cemex continues to walk a tightrope between keeping the creditors at bay and riding the recovery in the US construction market.

This article was updated on 14 June 2016 with amended production capacity data for the Odessa cement plant

Nigeria: AshakaCem, a subsidiary of Lafarge Africa and member of the LafargeHolcim group, has appointed Alhaji Rabiu Abdullahi Umar as its new managing director. AshakaCem said in a statement that Umar was appointed to succeed Leonard Palka, a Polish national, who has resigned from the company.

AshakaCem in Gombe State is one of the four cement companies controlled by Lafarge Africa in Nigeria. Formerly the companies were known as Lafarge Cement WAPCO Nigeria before the name was changed in 2014.

In April 2016 the shareholders of BP voted against a pay package of US$20m for the company's chief executive officer (CEO) Bob Dudley. The vote was non-binding to BP but it clearly sent a message to the management. Subsequently, the chairman Carl-Henric Svanberg acknowledged the mood amongst the company's investors and stated in his speech at the annual general meeting that, "We hear you. We will sit down with our largest shareholders to make sure we understand their concerns and return to seek your support for a renewed policy."

The link to the cement industry here is that many of the world's major cement producers are public companies. Similar to BP they internally set CEO and leading executive pay and remuneration packages. Just like BP, cement companies too could run into similar complaints from their shareholders, for example, should the construction and cement markets have similar jolts that the oil industry has faced since mid-2014.

To be clear: this article is not attempting to pass judgement on how much these CEOs are being compensated. It is merely seeing how compensation compares amongst a selection of leading cement companies. LafargeHolcim's revenue in 2015 was greater than the gross domestic product of over 90 countries. Running companies of this size is a demanding job. What is interesting here is how it compares and what happens when it is perceived to have grown too high, as in the case of BP.

It should also be noted that this is an extremely rough comparison of the way CEO pay and wage bills for large companies are presented. For example, the CEO total salary includes incentives, shares and pension payments. The staff wage bills includes pension payments, social charges and suchlike.

Graph 1: Comparison of CEO total remuneration from selected cement companies in 2015. Source: Company annual reports. 

There isn't a great deal to comment here except that compared to the average wage these are high from a rank-and-file worker perspective! The total salary for Eric Olsen, the CEO of LafargeHolcim, is lower than HeidelbergCement and Italcementi, which seems odd given that LafargeHolcim is the bigger company. However, Olsen has only been in-post since mid-2015. By contrast, Bernd Scheifele became the chairman of the managing board of HeidelbergCement in 2005. Carlo Pesenti, CEO of Italcementi and part of the controlling family, took over in 2004. Albert Manifold, CEO of CRH, also sticks out with a relatively (!) low salary given the high revenue of the company.

Graph 2: Comparison of CEO remuneration to average staff cost and total company revenue in 2015. Source: Company annual reports. 

This starts to become more interesting. HeidelbergCement's higher CEO/staff and CEO/revenue ratios might be explained by Scheifele's longer tenure. Yet Italcementi definitely sticks out with a much higher CEO wage compared to both the average staff wage and the company's revenue. Again, CRH stands out with a much lower CEO/staff ratio. Dangote's CEO/staff ratio is low but its CEO/revenue ratio is in line with the other companies' figures.

Consider the figures for China Resources and this suggests that CEO/revenue ratio may be more important than the CEO/staff ratio. The implication being that the market will only tolerate a ratio of up to about 0.05%. Any higher and the CEO's family has to own the company. Which, of course, is the case with Carlo Pesenti and Italcementi. Until HeidelbergCement takes over later in 2016 that is.

That’s as far as this rough little study of CEO remuneration at cement companies will go. So, next time anybody reading this article from a cement company asks for a pay rise, consider how much your CEO is receiving.

Kenya: Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) deputy governor Sheila M’Mbijiwe is seeking re-election to the board of LafargeHolcim majority-owned Bamburi Cement. A notice sent to shareholders stated that the CBK senior executive will be seeking a new mandate when the company holds its 65th annual general meeting on 2 June 2016 in Mombasa. The 58-year-old senior CBK executive, who also sits on the regulator’s Monetary Policy Committee, was set to retire by rotation but is seeking to retain the seat.

Others seeking re-election are Daniel Patterson and D Drouet who are also retiring by rotation but are eligible to seek to be elected again.

A few news stories in recent weeks have emerged concerning falling cement sales in Central Asian countries. Steppe Cement reported in mid-April 2016 that its cement sales had fallen by 12% year-on-year to US$5.98m in the first quarter of 2016 from US$6.79m in the same period in 2015. The cement producer noted an overall drop of 16% in the cement market in Kazakhstan, with a slowing reduction in March 2016 compared to the preceding four months. It forecast that the domestic cement market would contract by 1.1Mt in 2016 to 8.5Mt. The country has a cement production capacity of 11.85Mt/yr according to Global Cement Directory 2016 data. So on average this would see a drop in the capacity utilisation rate to 72% from 81%.

Likewise, Italcementi reported a fall in cement consumption in the fourth quarter of 2015 although overall in 2015 it reported consumption up by 9%. It is currently upgrading its Shymkent cement plant to a dry kiln with testing planned for early 2016. Meanwhile, HeidelbergCement – the other multinational present in the country, reported cement sales growth of over 9% due in part to the ramp-up of its new CaspiCement cement plant. How this will turn out after HeidelbergCement takes control of Italcementi remains to be seen.

Then, Holcim Azerbaijan reported that its sales had fallen by 37% to US$56m in 2015. It blamed the resultant loss it made on not being able to cut its production costs fast enough to match the falling revenue. The parent company LafargeHolcim blamed it on a ‘significant’ decline in public and private construction. Elsewhere, the World Bank reported a 13% drop in the construction sector in the second half of 2015 as the government cut investment.

Tajikistan may have broken this pattern as it reported that its cement production volumes rose by 33% to 373,000t in the first quarter of 2016. Over half of this output came from the 1Mt/yr Huaksin Ghayyur Cement plant that was commissioned in March 2016. The same news source reported government estimates that local demand will be 3.5Mt/yr in 2016. Similarly, Turkmenistan reported growing cement production in 2015 due to the opening of the 1.4Mt/yr Polimeks cement plant in Lebap. Otherwise there has been little reported recently from the cement industries in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan although the World Bank has reported that their economies are in reasonable shape.

The multinational cement producers all noted the economic problems caused by low oil prices in the Central Asian countries in which they operate. In February 2016 this was reinforced by the International Monetary Fund after its latest visit to Azerbaijan. The World Bank also expects little growth in gross domestic product (GDP) in the region in 2016. Low oil prices have followed economic problems in Russia that have also impacted upon the region due to its economic ties with that country and membership of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

This is bad news for the local markets but it is especially bad news for the Chinese cement industry. As China has faced production overcapacity and falling prices at home, its suppliers and producers have sped off down the Silk Road to seek expansion prospects elsewhere. With this route blocked, the Chinese industry faces one fewer opportunity to avoid the crunch at home.

For more information of the cement industries in Central Asia read Global Cement's feature on the region from January 2016