Displaying items by tag: Debts

Fernando A González and Cemex took to the virtual airways this week with Cemex Day 2021. The investors’ update comprised the usual greatest hits package explaining how well everything is going: earnings growth and leverage levels about to hit desired targets, selective investments and divestments on the way, new production capacity round the corner and punchy sustainability goals turning up earlier than expected. Or at least that’s the way that chief executive officer González and the team told it.

To be fair to Cemex, it seems to be in a good place right now. It weathered 2020 well and now its first quarter results in 2021 compared to the same period in 2019, before coronavirus hit, are looking rosy with cement sales volumes growth of 9%. How much of that is attributable to pent up demand from 2020 remains to be seen though. Its strategy of focusing on markets in North America and Europe appears to have paid off in recent years with its competitors copying it as they have retreated from riskier climes and concentrated on core territories. Its obsession with righting the ratio between its debts and earnings is closer than ever to being realised, with a 4.07x net leverage ratio in 2020 and a target of 3x or lower planned for 2023. That last target is crucial both materially and psychologically for the company as it starts to put it back in the same financial field as its Western multinational competitors and opens up new investment opportunities.

From a production angle, the big news from the event was a 10Mt/yr cement production expansion project between now and 2023. This wasn’t quite as promising as it sounded, as just under half of this was attributed to legacy projects in Mexico, Colombia and the Philippines and some of the new projects had already been announced, but it does bookmark a move from divesting plants to upgrading and building new ones.

The new projects comprise an additional 5.7Mt/yr capacity from on-going debottlenecking, new integrated plants, new grinding plants and reopening idle or mothballed plants. During the event José Antonio González, the Executive Vice President of Strategic Planning & Business Development broke it down into 3.5Mt in Mexico, consisting of 1.5Mt additional grinding capacity at the integrated Tepeaca plant, a 0.5Mt/yr expansion at the integrated Huichapan plant and 1.5Mt/yr from bringing both idled lines back into production at the CPN Hermosilla plant in Senora to support the US market. That last one notably was partly announced in February 2021. In Europe and the US the group plans to add 1.2Mt/yr including expanding grinding capacity at two plants in Europe with details to be announced later. Finally, the company plans to add 1Mt/yr of additional capacity in South American including restarting an idled 0.5Mt/yr kiln at a plant in the Dominican Republic and building a new 0.5Mt/yr grinding mill in Guatemala.

Cemex has also stepped up its target reduction in CO₂ emissions to below 475kg CO₂/t of cementitious material, an approximately 40% reduction in CO₂ emissions compared to 1990 levels, by 2030. The previous target for 2030 of 520 kg CO₂ has been brought forward to 2025. This compares to LafargeHolcim’s similar target of 475kg CO₂/t by 2030, HeidelbergCement’s target of 500kg CO₂/t by 2030 and CRH’s target of 530kg CO₂/t by 2030. The group is planning to spend US$60m/yr on its decarbonisation projects. This compares to a spend of around US$140m/yr on its 10Mt/yr cement production capacity expansion drive over the next three years. Or to put it another way, the group is spending more on growing than sustainability.

Unfortunately, it wasn’t all good public relations for Cemex this week with the news in the Colombian press that one of its former executives is set to be investigated by the authorities over his alleged involvement in the ongoing Maceo cement plant corruption case. The background to this one is that in 2016 Cemex fired several senior staff members, and the local subsidiary’s chief executive resigned, in relation to the building of a new integrated plant at Maceo. This followed an internal audit and investigation into payments worth around US$20m made to a non-governmental third party in connection with the acquisition of the land, mining rights and benefits of the tax free zone for the project. Legal proceedings followed in Colombia and the US. Many large companies have legacy problems to deal with. Just take LafargeHolcim’s continued connection to Lafarge Syria’s conduct in the early 2010s. At the time of writing the Maceo plant is still yet to start operation and is likely to be one of the ongoing projects mentioned above.

Cemex’s second quarter results are due to arrive towards the end of July 2021 but the group is presenting an upbeat image. Sales are up, debts are down, divestments are out and expansions are in. Confidence is important for a multinational trying to convince the rating agencies to give it back its investment grade, so whether this is strictly true or not it certainly knows how to talk the talk. One question going forward at least is how strictly Cemex will want to stick to its core markets if the good times really have returned?

India: The Andhra Pradesh branch of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) has approved Sagar Power’s resolution plan for the start of operations at the mothballed Panyam cement plant at Kurnool. Sagar Power intends to pay US$13.5m, together with RV Consulting Services, to settle the debts from the plant’s previous owners, according to the Times of India newspaper. The partners also plan to inject a further US$20.2m of fresh capital into the venture.

Mexico: Cemex has concluded the sale of subordinated notes with a value of US$1.0bn. The company says that it will use the proceeds from the bonds sale for various purposes, including debt repayment.

Chief financial officer Maher Al-Haffar said, “The purpose of this transaction is to further Cemex in its pursuit of an investment grade capital structure and a commensurate leverage ratio.”

Cemex’s transition from a multinational building materials producer to a regional one continued this week with the launch of its ‘Operation Resilience’ strategy. The plan is a stew of coronavirus response, earnings growth, debt reduction, portfolio sharpening and sustainability measures. Yet the intent to “construct a portfolio more weighted towards the US and Europe” marks a public confirmation of the company’s direction in recent years.

Chart 1: Geographic breakdown of Cemex’s revenue in the first half of 2020. Source: Cemex.

This direction of travel for the company has at least two threads that can be seen in the announcements surrounding its new strategy. The first covers the geographical spread of its current portfolio of assets. European countries and the US represented a little under half of Cemex’s revenue in the first half of 2020 as can be seen in the chart above. So focussing on these territories makes sense from an existing portfolio perspective, especially if growth has continued throughout the coronavirus crisis, as is the case in the US. In the general information accompanying its new strategy it broke down revenue by business line so far in 2020 as cement (42%), concrete (41%) and aggregates (17%).

To be fair to Cemex, its decision to focus on certain geographical regions mirrors recent moves at other multinational producers like LafargeHolcim and CRH. The former (mostly) sold its operations in South-East Asia in 2018 and 2019. Albert Manifold, the chief executive officer (CEO) of the latter, memorably favoured the safe and stable earnings of investing in assets in Europe or North America over doing so in somewhere ‘more exotic’ in an earnings meeting in 2019. However, Cemex doesn’t seem overly wedded to sticking to assets in Europe and/or the US either. It recently decided to mothball its South Ferriby integrated cement plant in the UK and sold a plant owned by its Kosmos Cement subsidiary in the US earlier in the year. Fernando A González, the chief executive officer (CEO) of Cemex, confirmed this in the questions and answer session after the strategy launch on 10 September 2020. When asked whether the company was considering selling assets in Asia and Latin America he replied that Cemex was open to divestments in Latin America or in the Mediterranean or in Asia but that driving down debt was the motivator, not coronavirus.

Debt is the other factor that has been persuading Cemex to focus on the US and Europe. It has been the smell clinging to its decisions over the last decade since its poorly timed acquisition of Rinker in 2007. The company stuck out with a high debt to earnings ratio when this column looked at the state of the major cement producers as the coronavirus lockdowns started in Europe: hence all the talk of paying down debt in its ‘Operation Resilience’ strategy. The company now hopes to whittle its net leverage down to at most 3x by 2023. At the same time as this market-calming announcement, it is in the process of changing some of its credit agreements such as extending a US$1.1bn loan from 2022 to 2025. It has also priced another US$1bn worth of senior secured bonds this week in its ongoing drive to raise more funds. This reliance on loans may explain why Cemex has shrunk back towards ‘safe’ markets over the last decade.

Cemex isn’t alone in cooing out market-calming noises as the coronavirus crisis continues. Buzzi Unicem has done the same thing this week for example. Yet, these announcements are instructive because they show what’s on the minds of these companies at least, or what they think investors want them to be thinking about. In Cemex’s case it could be summarised as: make more money more efficiently, cut debt and try to factor sustainability into all of this. Note, however, that as dominance in both industry and geopolitics heads east, Cemex is sticking to the west.

Canada: Public pensions and insurance fund Caisse de depot et placement du Québec (CDPQ) has bought the debt from “all present and future accounts receivable arising from contracts” of McInnis Cement. The Journal de Québec newspaper has reported that the move is intended to benefit the company’s liquidity position. CDPQ first vice-president Michel Nadeau said, “It’s a solution to find cash quickly.”

CDPQ injected US$152m into McInnis Cement on 2 July 2019 as part of a total US$380m private capital refinancing.

Paraguay: Argentina-based Loma Negra has sold its 51% stake in Yguazú Cementos. The El Cronista Comercial newspaper has reported that the proceeds of sale of the 0.8Mt/yr installed cement production capacity subsidiary will go towards paying off Loma Negra’s debts. The company said, “Loma Negra’s objective is to seek and execute projects with high potential. For this reason, after having started marketing operations in Paraguay in 2000, built and operated the factory since 2013 and reached high standards of production and profitability, we have finally decided to finalise its sale.”

Yguazú Cementos sold 260,000t of cement in the first half of 2020, down by 6.8% year-on-year from 267,000t in the first half of 2019. This generated revenues of US$25.4m, up by 39% from US$18.3m and constituting 12% of Loma Negra’s total sales of US$212m over the period. The company valued the asset at US$80m on 30 June 2020. The buyer is a Paraguayan company reportedly connected to remainder shareholder Intercement.

Yguazú Cementos’ 0.4Mt/yr Ascunsción cement plant in Capital District and 0.4Mt/yr Villa Hayes cement plant in Presidente Hayes Department supplied 40% of Paraguay’s cement demand in 2019.

South Africa: PPC has said that it may issue a rights offer for US$68.7m-worth of shares in order to raise funds to ‘repay and restructure debt locally and in other African markets, and to refinance after the economic effects of the Covid-19 pandemic.’ Pretoria News has reported that PPC has forecasted a 20% year-on-year drop in earnings in the year to 31 March 2020 due to ‘a slump in domestic demand and an influx of cheaper Chinese imports, even prior to lockdown.’

Philippines: LafargeHolcim’s sale of its 86% stake in Holcim Philippines to San Miguel Corporation for US$2.15bn has fallen through after the Philippines Competition Authority (PCC) failed to approve the deal within 12 months of its conclusion. Reuters News has reported that the agreement, dated 10 May 2020, covered the exchange of four integrated plants and one grinding plant. LafargeHolcim has been divesting assets to pay off debt. The sale of its Holcim Philippines stake would have completed its withdrawal from the South-East Asia market, where its operations across Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines had been valued at US$4.90bn.

LafargeHolcim has said that three of its four integrated Philippines cement plants have been able to resume operations following the lockdown due to the coronavirus outbreak. It says that it will ‘focus on strengthening operations in the Philippines.’

Yesterday, on 14 April 2020, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecast a 3% gross domestic product (GDP) growth contraction in 2020 due to negative economic effects from the coronavirus outbreak and its containment. Most regions around the world may experience negative growth in 2020 with exceptions only in so-called Emerging and Developing Asia and Low-income Developing Countries. This is just one projection among many coming out at the moment but the prognosis is downward. This begs the questions: how will cement companies cope?

Markets for building materials are not going to disappear in these conditions but demand looks likely to be reduced. Added to this, an industry that’s been facing increasing production overcapacity over the years may be challenged by additional competition effects. Here we will look at the debt profile of some of the major multinational cement producers outside of China. Please note that this is a cursory examination of corporate debt that only looks at simple financial indicators. Company financial officers want to present themselves in best possible light and will have alternatives that point to their strengths. For a detailed view we refer readers to the credit rating agencies and the companies’ published financial information directly.

Graph 1: Net debt and EBITDA for selected multinational cement companies in 2019. Source: Company financial reports and investor presentations. Note, Conversion for reporting currencies to US$, HeidelbergCement uses Result from Current Operations Before Depreciation and Amortisation (RCOBD) and UltraTech Cement results from 2018 – 2019 financial year.

Graph 1 presents a comparison between net debt and earnings before interest, taxation, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) in real terms. The bigger the gap between debt and earnings then the more one starts to wonder how it can be repaid. One feature to note in this graph is the size of the debt of the three largest producers – LafargeHolcim, HeidelbergCement and Cemex – despite the fact that the companies are of different sizes. Cemex’s high debt to earnings ratio has been much commented on previously following its acquisition of Rinker just before the financial crash in 2007 and 2008. Unfortunately though, despite strenuous mitigation efforts, it remains prominent. Other positions to note are those of Buzzi Unicem and Dangote Cement, which have higher earnings than debts. These are envious positions to be in.

Graph 2: Net debt/EBITDA and EBITDA Margin for selected multinational cement companies in 2019. Source and notes as in Graph 1.

Graph 2 shows the ratio of net debt and EBITDA and the EBITDA Margin, a company’s earnings divided by its revenue. This graph better shows the relationship between debt and earnings. This can be seen well in a comparison between LafargeHolcim and HeidelbergCement. The latter has higher debts with respect to its earnings. Its debt jumped in 2016 following its acquisition of Italcementi. LafargeHolcim’s debts ballooned followed its formation by merger in 2015 but this was in line with the jump in its equity. Where it struggled was with slow earnings in the years afterwards. However, bold divestments in South-East Asia in 2018 and 2019 appear to have fixed this.

Other companies to watch in the higher Net debt/EBITDA category include India’s UltraTech Cement and both of the large Brazilian multinationals, Votorantim and InterCement. In recent years UltraTech Cement has been busy buying up other cement producers in India. The difference between the Brazilian companies may reflect the fallout from their fight to buy Cimpor back in 2012. InterCement and its parent company Camargo Corrêa won the battle to acquire the Portuguese company but Votorantim was given selected international assets outside of Brazil. Unfortunately, the Brazilian market then collapsed and Camargo Corrêa has reportedly been trying to sell some or all of its cement assets ever since.

The other financial indicator in Graph 2 is EBITDA margin or earnings/operating profit as a percentage of revenue. Higher is generally seen as better here in comparison to other companies in the same sector. Note how LafargeHolcim is ahead of HeidelbergCement and Cemex, possibly due to its cost cutting and synergies since the merger. InterCement also has a relatively high EBITDA margin, boosted by a pickup by the Brazilian economy in 2019. Again, Buzzi Unicem and Dangote Cement stand out. Both of these are public companies but are associated with family or individual ownership, although in very different markets. Neither has really indulged in any large-scale acquisitions in recent years. Dangote Cement has been steadily expanding but through building its own plants and distribution networks.

We’ve not mentioned CRH as its figures seem ‘average’ compared to the other cement producers discussed here. Average is of course relative for one of the world’s biggest building materials manufacturers with a net of debt of US$7.4bn in 2019! Yet, despite battles with activist investors over board member pay aside, CRH might be the rare producer that knows when to stop expanding. Notably in 2018 after an expansion phase, including acquisitions of Ash Grove Cement and LafargeHolcim assets previously, it publicly decided in 2018 to take a pause. There may be weaknesses in the company’s balance sheets yet to be revealed but they are not apparent using these metrics.

In summary, we’ve focused on corporate acquisitions here as the main source of debt in cement producers. This is simplistic but timing is everything when taking on a large amount of debt. Cemex is still carrying the scars from buying Rinker over a decade ago and InterCement and HeidelbergCement, to a lesser extent, are ones to watch through the next bad patch. Other things to consider are a general move to a more regional model for these producers away from a global one. UltraTech Cement’s focus on the Indian sub-continent or Dangote Cement’s work in Africa are examples of this. This approach could go wrong if the sole regions they operate in suffer disproportionately from the economic fallout from coronavirus. Or, if any producer, even one with high debts, has the good fortune to be present in a territory that suffers less from the downturn it may benefit. On a final note, it is worth mentioning that government data reports that China’s domestic cement production capacity utilisation in the two-week period ending on 10 April 2020 bounced back to 95% following the relaxation of the lockdown.

Brazil: Votorantim Cimentos earned revenues of US$2.47bn in 2019, up by 3.0% year-on-year from US$2.39bn in 2018. Its earnings before interest, taxation, depreciation and amortisation rose by 1.1% to US$513m from US$507m in 2018. Throughout the year, the company says that it paid off approximately US$570m of debt and contracted with a syndicate of banks for a new committed credit facility (CCF) for its alternative fuel substitution and CCF reduction initiatives of US$55.1m, due in August 2024.

On 30 March 2020 Votorantim Cimentos donated US$5.5m to fighting the effects of the coronavirus in Brazil.