Displaying items by tag: South Korea

South Korea/Thailand: Austria’s Unitherm Cemcon has commissioned a MAS kiln burner at a cement plant in South Korea. The order was issued in late 2018 for three MAS burners. The first burner was delivered in February 2019 and the other two in March 2019. In May 2019 Unitherm Cemcon says it supported the commissioning of the first burner.

The scope of supply included two 43MW MAS/4/KO SO type burners for coal and heavy oil and one 87MW MAS/7/KO SO.X type rotary kiln burner for coal, heavy oil and solid secondary fuels. All three burners have been executed with a divisible burner jacket tube. One MAS/7/KO.SO.X is already successfully operating in another line, firing up to 6t/hr of coal and around 10t/hr of solid secondary fuel.

The burner manufacturer has also been awarded a contract to supply a hot gas generator for a plant in Thailand. The scope of supply includes: engineering and manufacturing drawings for the hot gas generator combustion chamber; a combined 45MW oil and coal burner; a primary air fan; a gas electric pilot burner; a flame monitoring device; and an oil valve train with burner management system.

Peru: Local cement despatches rose by 3.2% year-on-year to 11.1Mt in 2018 from 10.8Mt in 2017. Consumption rose by 3.7% to 11.2Mt from 10.8Mt. Data from the Asociación de Productores de Cemento (Asocem) showed that cement exports fell by 26% to 0.27Mt from 0.36Mt. Imports increased by 60% to 0.98Mt from 0.61Mt. Clinker exports rose by 63% to 0.9Mt and imports rose by 49% to 0.78Mt. 85% of cement imports came from Vietnam. 33% of clinker imports came from South Korea and 31% came from Vietnam.

Peru’s been the place over the last week with news reports of new production capacity and its targeting as a key export market by Vietnam.

Local press reported this week that three new cement grinding plants are planned to start production in 2019. Cemento Inka plans to build a 0.6Mt/yr grinding plant at Ica near Pisco. It also plans to upgrade the kilns at its plant at Cajamarquilla near Lima. Then Mixercon, a ready-mix concrete firm, wants to spend US$20m towards building two new plants in northern Lima, also in 2019. It also has plans to open distribution centres around the capital too.

For a local industry generally dominated by local often family-controlled producers this is quite a change. The larger companies – Pacasmayo, UNACEM and Yura – normally dominate the headlines and the market here. Unsurprisingly then that Pacasmayo and Yura also have upgrades planned for their plants in 2019 too.

Changes to capacity started in late May 2018 when Salaverry-based importer Invecem was said to be buying equipment for a 0.25Mt/yr grinding plant. Then things really started moving when Unacem bought Cementos Portland (Cempor), a joint venture between Chile's Cementos Bío Bío and Brazil’s Votorantim Cimentos. The foreign companies were planning to build a plant near Lima but the project was delayed by a legal battle over environmental issues intitiated by Unacem. This was followed by Cal & Cemento Sur (Calcesur), a subsidiary of Grupo Gloria, announcing that it was going to add a new production line to its cement and lime plant in Puno.

With this level of interest in grinding plants going on it’s unsurprising that Vietnam, a major exporter of cement, has taken an interest. Imports of cement to Peru rose by 65% year-on-year to 0.94Mt in the 12 months from December 2017 to November 2018 from 0.57Mt in the same period previously. Imports of clinker rose by 37% to 0.78Mt from 0.57Mt. This compares to a rise of 21% to 0.61Mt in cement imports in 2017 and a fall of 1.2% to 0.51Mt in 2016. In the 12 months to the end of November 2018 most of that imported cement (81%) came from Vietnam followed by 14% from China and 3% from Mexico. Clinker imports have been more varied with 39% from South Korea, 31% from Vietnam, 19% from Ecuador and 11% from Japan. The general situation for the clinker producers has been a slight increase in cement production to 10Mt for the 12 months to the end of November 2018 and slightly higher increases in despatches.

So, it looks like an apparent cement demand is up in Peru and the importers are rushing to meeting demand. The question, then, is why haven’t the clinker producers announced projects to squeeze out the grinders? As mentioned above Pacasmayo and Yura have upgrades planned but nothing really large seems to be coming yet. Also, given the tough time Cempor was given by the local companies what kind of opposition are the new projects by Cemento Inka, Mixercon and Invecem likely to face? The country’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate is below the glory days of the 2000s when it topped 6% but it is still one of the strongest in South America with 3.8% forecast for 2019 by the World Bank. This is the country in the region to watch in 2019.

Asia Cement has completed its purchase of Halla Cement this week for US$723m. The deal has created the third largest cement producer in South Korea with a cement production capacity. This includes one integrated plant at Okgye, three slag grinding plants and a distribution network.

Graph 1: Cement producers in South Korea by cement production data from 2016. Chart includes mergers in 2017 and 2018 to represent current market share. Source: Korea Cement Association.

The Halla Cement transaction marks an on-going consolidation process in the local industry. 2017 proved a busy year with the purchase of Daehan Cement by Ssang Yong Cement and Hyundai Cement by Hanil Cement. Assuming the dust has settled this now leaves Ssang Yong Cement and its new subsidiary in the lead by cement production data from 2016 with 12.9Mt or a 23% market share, Hanil Cement next with 12.4Mt or a 22% share and Asia Cement with 10.8Mt or a 19% share. Overall the country produced 56.7Mt of cement in 2016, according to Korea Cement Association data. The remainder of production is shared between six producers.

Fears that the construction industry may have been about to slow down might have prompted Glenwood Private Equity and Baring Private Equity Asia to sell Halla Cement a little earlier than expected. However, they don’t appear to have done too badly out of this. The two private equity firms that bought Halla Cement from LafargeHolcim in 2016 seem to have made a cool US$180m on the deal. At the time it was reported in the local press that they paid US$542m for the cement producer. Glenwood Private Equity was the lead investor followed by Baring Private Equity Asia. They bought Lafarge Halla Cement in May 2016 and then were looking for buyers a year later in August 2017.

Cement consumption in South Korea has followed a rollercoaster path since 1992 hitting a high of 61.7Mt in 1997 and a low of 43.7Mt in 2014. It then rose to 55.8Mt in 2016. The consolidation behaviour by the cement producers suggests either a poor performing market or an uncertain one. Since the gap between the peak and the trough is more than Halla Cement’s production capacity no wonder its private equity owners were keen to get shot of it at the first sign of trouble. So let’s end with the words of Han Chul Kim, Managing Director of Baring Asia, from the time of the purchase from LafargeHolcim in 2016: "We couldn’t imagine a more solid platform from which to access the growth opportunities in the Korean market in the coming years.”

Just before the Christmas break one of the Global Cement editorial staff noticed how many solar projects have been popping up in the industry news of late. Looking at stories on the Global Cement website tagged with ‘solar’ five occurred in a six month period of 2017 out of a total of 13 since 2014. It’s not a rigorous study by any means but projects in the US, South Korea, India, Namibia and Jordan all suggest a trend.

All these new projects appear to be providing a supplementary energy source from photovoltaic (PV) solar plants that will be used to supply a portion of a cement plant’s electrical power requirements at a subsidised cost. Typically, these initiatives are preparing to supply 20 - 30% of a plant’s electricity over a couple of decades. These schemes are often supported by government subsidies to encourage decarbonised energy sources and a general trend in societies for so-called ‘greener’ energy sources in the wake of the Paris agreement on climate change.

Global Cement is familiar with this model of solar power in the cement industry from its use at the HeidelbergCement Hanson plant at Ketton in the UK. The project was realised by Armstrong Energy through local supplier Lark Energy and it provides around 13% of the cement plant’s electrical energy needs. Originally the array started off by supplying 10MW but this was later increased to 13MW in 2015. A key feature is that as part of the agreement with Armstrong Energy, Hanson receives 35% of the solar power generated for free and buys the remaining 65% at a fixed rate. Even at this rate the plant expects to save around Euro11m in energy costs over the lifetime of the solar array. In addition it will save 3500t/yr of CO2.

Most of the new solar projects announced in 2017 are of a similar scale and ambition to what Hanson Cement has done at Ketton. However, JSW Group’s plans are a magnitude larger. The Indian cement producer wants to build a 200MW solar plant next to its cement grinding plant at Salboni in West Bengal for US$124m. However, it has hedged its bets somewhat by saying that it might build a 36MW thermal power plant instead if its proposal fails.

LafargeHolcim and Italcementi have also experimented with concentrated solar power (CSP) plants for the cement industry. In 2007 LafargeHolcim and the Solar Technology Laboratory of the Paul Scherrer Institute and the Professorship of Renewable Energy Carriers at ETH Zurich started researching using high-temperature solar heat to upgrade low-grade carbonaceous feedstock to produce synthetic gas. The intention was to use the synthetic gas as a substitute for coal and petcoke in kilns.

Italcementi’s project at the Aït Baha plant in Morocco uses a CSP process that can be used with the plant’s waste heat recovery unit. Its moveable trough-style solar collectors follow the sun throughout the day to warm up a heat-transfer fluid during the day and store the heat in gravel beds overnight. In this way the CSP process allows for continuous operation over 24 hours. Before Italcementi’s acquisition by HeidelbergCement in 2016 the company had long-term ambitions to roll-out its CSP process across plants in the Middle East and North African region.

New battery technology of the kind backing the growing electric car industry may be further pushing the cement industry’s preference to PV over CSP power. The other renewable energy source slowly being built to support cement plants has been wind. Like PV it too suffers from cyclical disruptions to its power. Technological entrepreneur Elon Musk (of Tesla car fame) notably supplied the world's largest lithium-ion battery to Southern Australia to support one of its wind farms in late 2017. Around the same time local cement producer Adelaide Bighton announced in a separate deal that it had struck a deal to use wind power to part-power some of its facilities in the same region. At present it doesn’t look like solar power will be completely powering cement plants in the near future but perhaps a renewable fuels rate along similar lines to an alternative fuels rate might be a growing trend to watch.

The Global Cement CemPower conference on electrical power, including waste heat recovery, captive power, grinding optimisation and electrical energy efficiency, will return in January 2019.

Further shifts in the South Korean cement industry this week as Ssangyong Cement purchased Daehan Cement. Private equity firm Hahn & Company owns both producers so this looked like a realignment exercise. Yet it follows a corporate version of pass-the-parcel within the local cement industry. Hyundai Cement was acquired by Hanil Cement in the first half of 2017, Halla Cement was bought by investment firms from LafargeHolcim in mid-2016 and Tongyang Cement was bought by Sampyo Group in 2015.

Ssangyong Cement’s purchase is seen in the local media as an attempt to reaffirm its market dominance. Before the Hyundai Cement auction, Ssangyong Cement was the market leader with a cement production capacity of 15Mt/yr and a market share of around 20%. Hanil Cement’s on-going purchase of Hyundai Cement will see it increase its production capacity from 7Mt/yr to over 15Mt/yr. Ssangyong Cement’s transaction for Daehan Cement puts it back in the lead again.

The local industry is notable for the high ratio of cement grinding plants to integrated plants. The Korean Cement Association (KCA) reported that the country had 12 integrated plants to 23 grinding plants in 2015. This compares to other developed countries in relatively remote places such as Australia and Chile that also have high numbers of grinding plants. South Korea doesn’t import that much clinker though. One difference is its prominent steel industry that has hovered around 70Mt/yr since 2014 and which puts it in the top ten of world producers. Subsequently, as POSCO’s Sunghee Han explained at the Global Slag Conference 2016, 13.9Mt of granulated blast furnace slag (GBFS) was produced in 2015 and the majority of this ended up being used as supplementary cementitious materials (SCM) either to grind cement or to make concrete. The size of this slag market underlines the value of the Daehan Cement sale, as it is a major slag cement producer.

Other notable point about the local cement industry includes the presence of a few extremely large multi-kiln plants with production capacities in excess of 7Mt/yr. The country also has a relative scarcity of limestone. South Korea is the fifth biggest importer of limestone in the world at US$34m. It brings limestone in principally from the UAE, Japan, India, Malaysia, and Vietnam. Notably it also has one of the world’s longest single conveyors, with a length of 12.8km, connecting a quarry to Ssangyong Cement’s Donghae plant.

Graph 1: Cement production and consumption in South Korea, 2010 – 2015. Source: Korean Cement Association.

Unlike the European cement-producing nations that this column has covered in recent weeks, fundamental market structural changes do not appear to be driving the merger and acquisition activity in South Korea. As Graph 1 shows, production and consumption fell from 2010 onwards but has started to pick up since 2013. Instead, a general slowing of the economy from 2010 and a relaxation of the rules triggered merger and acquisition activity. Unsurprisingly then, perhaps, given the potential opportunities for market manipulation, that the Fair Trade Commission fined six of the seven major producers a total of US$168m in early 2016 for alleged price fixing. With the private equity firms widely expected to exit the market after a relative short time, the cement industry looks set to remain volatile for the next few years. Doubtless the market regulators will be watching very carefully indeed to see how it all plays out.

The 'revelation' this week that South Korean cement producers have been paid US$127m to use/dispose of Japanese coal that is thought to be radioactive certainly sounds scary. If it is true that cement made with contaminated coal has led to the construction of radioactive buildings and roads, this may have prised open a 'can of worms' for coal producers, exporters and cement players alike. According to local media, four South Korean firms - Ssangyong Cement, Tongyang Cement, Lafarge Halla Cement and Hanil Cement - received the money to use the coal between March 2011, when the Fukashima nuclear power plant started to leak radiation, until 2013. A total of 3.7Mt of cement is 'under suspicion.'

Caesium-137 is formed by fission reactions that start with uranium-235 in nuclear reactors. The Fukushima reactor that started leaking in 2011 used this type of fuel. Once it leaked, caesium-137 was deposited into the sea and onto the land, presumably also making its way into nearby coal deposits.

As it is a metal with a melting point of just 28.5°C and a boiling point of 671°C, the caesium-137 would vaporise if it were to enter a cement production line operating at 1450°C as a metal. However, caesium will not enter the cement-making process as a metal due to its rapid and explosive reaction with water. An interesting slow-motion of this reaction can be seen here.

Instead, caesium will enter the cement-making process either as its oxide or a simple salt (e.g.: caesium chloride) in the coal. The salt will be ionized in the heat of the flame, sending caesium ions into the kiln and thus direct contact with the clinker as it is being formed. Here it will become part of the matrix of the clinker and hence the final cement product. All the time the caesium-137 is radioactive.

And it stays radioactive once it is in the finished product, for example in a building or road surface. Its half-life, the time that it takes for half of the caesium-137 to decay to meta-stable barium-137 (emitting radiation as it decays), is unfortunately very well matched to the life-span of concrete buildings at 30.7 years. This means that after about 100 years of building life the building would still be around 10% as radioactive as it was when it was built.

This would certainly be a problem if the coal was highly contaminated. However, a few questions come to mind. Firstly, if the coal contains 20-73 becquerels per kilogramme (Bq/kg) of caesium-137, as has been claimed by Lee In-young, an opposition spokesman for the New Politics Alliance for Democracy party and member of the National Assembly's Environment Labour Committee, why is this a problem when the Japanese legal limit for eating caesium-137 in contaminated vegetables is all the way up at 500Bq/kg? When the most dangerous mechanisms of caesium-137 poisoning relate to accumulation in soft tissue, how can driving along a caesium-137-containing highway constitute a health risk?

Also, the coal may well start the cement making process with 25-73Bq/kg of caesium-137 but the clinker will have a lower level. This is because for every 1t of clinker the plant will typically consume just 100-200kg of coal. The caseium-137 and hence the radiation will therefore be spread out over a larger mass. A level of 50Bq/kg in the coal would translate to a clinker level of 5-10Bq/kg. This is around 100 times lower than the Japanese vegetable limit. After this, the clinker is extended with additives to make cement. This is then added to aggregates and / or sand when concrete or mortars are made, further diluting the caesium-137, perhaps to as low as 1-5Bq/kg. It is arguable that South Korea has received a higher caesium-137 dose from Japan via air and sea than via coal imports.

In light of all this, it appears that those calling for investigations on scientific grounds, like Lee, may be misguided. However, there may be political gain. The histories of Japan and South Korea are long, violent and distrustful. Indeed, according to a BBC World Service poll conducted earlier in 2014, South Korea and China jointly have the most negative perceptions of Japan of all world nations. In this environment stories about radioactive coal become much easier to believe in.

In reality the Japanese vegetable limit is well above the likely levels that might be found in any cement products resulting from the use of this coal. It is consistent with EU limits set more than 20 years earlier (600Bq/kg). A search on the US Environmental Protection Agency's website fails to bring up any formal limit. Instead it states that everyone is exposed to caesium-137 from atmospheric fallout to a low level and that the most dangerous cases are where waste metal processors unwittingly come across sources.

So on the surface then, the South Korean reaction seems like a storm in a teacup. One question remains though. If the caesium-137 levels in the coal are so much lower than the Japanese vegetable limit, why are Korean firms being paid to take it out of Japan?