Displaying items by tag: Cemex

Mexico: Mauricio Doehmer has been appointed as the president of the National Chamber of Cement. He is Cemex’s corporate affairs and business risk management executive vice-president, according to the El Financiero newspaper. He succeeds Billy Alvarez, an executive with Cementos Cruz Azul.

The publication of LafargeHolcim’s annual financial results for 2016 this week starts to give us a review of the year as a whole for the multinational cement producers. Of the larger producers, CNBM, Anhui Conch and Votorantim are expected to make their releases in April 2016, so we’ll focus here on the available data from LafargeHolcim, HeidelbergCement, Cemex and BuzziUnicem, with UltraTech Cement included for some regional variety.

Graph 1: Sales revenue from multinational cement producers in 2015 and 2016 (Euro millions). Source: Company financial reports.

As can be seen in Graph 1 currency exchange effects have caused problems for producers’ sales revenues, with LafargeHolcim, HeidelbergCement and Cemex all reporting falling sales on a direct comparison. Subsequently like-for-like adjustments have cropped up repeatedly on balance sheets to try and present a more investor-friendly picture, although even this has still seen LafargeHolcim and HeidelbergCement report small declines. In this sense it’s a little unfair to include India’s UtraTech Cement, given that the bulk of its business is in just one country. Operating in just one country though has its own risks, one of which we’ll discuss below.

Unsurprisingly, given the poor sales, the focus for the multinationals has generally been on earnings measures such as operating earnings before interest, taxation, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA). Here, LafargeHolcim and Cemex have done far better as they have streamlined their businesses. For example, LafargeHolcim’s operating EBITDA rose by 12.9% year-on-year to Euro4.895bn in 2016.

Graph 2: Cement sales volumes from multinational cement producers in 2015 and 2016 (Mt). Source: Company financial reports.

Graph 2 looks at cement sales volumes. Most of the producers have made small gains or losses in 2016 with the stark exception of LafargeHolcim. Its cement sales fell by 12.9% to 233Mt in 2016. More alarmingly, for the fourth quarter of 2016 LafargeHolcim blamed an increased rate of declining cement sales volumes on demonetisation in India, tough trading conditions in Indonesia and a unusually good year (in 2015) to compare itself against in the US.

On that point about India, UltraTech may not have released any sales volumes figures but other larger Indian producers have experienced problems with the government’s decision to remove certain banknotes from circulation in November 2016. A report by HDFC Securities this week suggests that cement volumes fell by 13% year-on-year in January 2017 following a 9% decline in December 2016. The country may be facing its first decline in cement sales volumes since 2001. This is squarely down to government policy.

On a regional basis probably the most worrying theme has been an apparent slowdown in the US towards the end of the year. As mentioned above LafargeHolcim has blamed it on a good previous year and Cemex concurred. Buzzi Unicem also reported the same trend but didn’t attribute it to anything in paticular. President Donald Trump’s push for US$1tr investment on infrastructure in the US should help to reverse this along with anything that happens with his Mexican border wall plans.

The other area to pay attention to is Indonesia. Both LafargeHolcim and HeidelbergCement reported tough trading here prompted by production overcapacity. Locally, Semen Indonesia said this week that its sales revenue fell by 3% to US$1.95bn in 2016 and it still has new cement plants to be commissioned in 2017.

The overall picture for 2016 from these cement producers appears to be one of companies treading water and making savings as their sales were battered. As mentioned previously (The global cement industry in 2016, Global Cement Magazine, December 2016) the geographic spread of assets the multinationals own doesn’t seem to be protecting them from world events as well as they once did. On the plus side northern Europe seemed to pick up or at least hold steady in 2016 but various political shocks such as the UK departure from the European Union and elections in France and Germany may scupper this. In a similar vein India remains one of the key markets but government policy has potentially dented its growth this year. In the US cement volumes may be slowing but Donald Trump is riding to the rescue! With this continued high level of potentially disruptive events cement producers are probably hoping for a quiet year in 2017.

With president-elect Trump due to take office this week we wonder what this means for the cement industry in Mexico. In 2016 this column looked a couple of times at the implications of Trump upon the US cement industry. First, we looked at who might benefit if he builds his wall along the Mexican border and then we wondered what his policies might mean for the US industry. To answer the latter first, the main issues for the US industry are infrastructure, changes to the Environment Protection Agency (EPA) and the repercussions if Trumps serious about a trade war with China. So long as a trade war doesn’t happen then Trump is probably good news for the US cement industry. As for Mexico, the joke has been that Trump will be good for the construction business ever since market analysts Bernstein’s passed a note around in the summer of 2016 about that wall.

Graph 1: Breakdown of Mexican cement industry by production capacity. Source: Global Cement Directory 2017.

The makeup of the domestic Mexican cement industry hasn’t changed too much in the last decade, even with the merger between Lafarge and Holcim, preserving the same market share in production capacity between the companies. Most of the producers have reported growth in 2016. Cemex reported that its cement sales volumes rose by 3% for the first nine months of 2016 and by 10% in the third quarter of that year. Overall though, its net sales fell slightly to US$2.16bn in the first nine months, alongside a fall in ready-mix concrete sales volumes. Cemex, crucially, also seems to have taken charge of its debts in 2016, saying that it was on track to meet its targets and that it had announced nearly US$2bn worth of divestments in that year. Currently the company is trying to buy out Trinidad Cement in the Caribbean, which may be a sign that it has turned a corner.

Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua’s (GCC) cement sales volumes rose in the first three quarters of 2016, in its case by 4%. Its overall net sales in Mexico rose by 4.2% in Mexican Pesos for the same period but fell when calculated in US Dollars due to currency variations. GCC attributed its sales growth to better pricing environment and increased cement volumes, mainly for projects in the commercial and industrial sectors that compensated for a decline in the public sector, following the culmination of two major urban paving and highway construction projects in 2015. At the smaller end of the market, Elementia reported that its cement sales skyrocketed by 30% to US$104m in the first nine months of the year aided by higher prices and volumes.

The major Mexican cement producers all have a presence in the US with the exception of Cruz Azul. Cemex has held assets north of the border for years, Cemento Portland Moctezuma has links to Buzzi Unicem, GCC bought US assets from Cemex in 2016 and Elementia completed its purchase of Giant Cement also in 2016. These companies have clinker in their kilns in plants on US soil manned by US citizens. This represents investment in local industry and it is exactly the kind of thing that appeals to the rhetoric of Trump’s approach so far. If the new president builds his wall then Mexican producers will probably be producing much of the cement that builds it. Even the Mexican Peso’s slow decline since 2014 could help the local cement industry, as it will cut the cost of moving exports and materials north of the border. Indeed, Enrique Escalante, the chief executive officer of GCC said in late 2016 that his company was ‘ready to build’ Trump’s wall.

However, the sheer uncertainty factor of an incoming president with as little experience of public office as Donald Trump must be giving chief executives pause for thought. After all, Trump's tweets before he has assumed office have forced car manufacturers to change policy. If he manages to disrupt the North American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in order to protect US jobs then the repercussions for the Mexican economy will be profound. It sends nearly three quarters of its exports to the US. Local cement producers would surely suffer in the resulting economic disruption.

So, currency devaluations aside, Mexican producers are making money from their cement operations at home and they are increasingly hedging their bets by operating or buying units in the US. Some, like GCC, are even being ebullient about the benefits that might come their way. It may be a bumpy ride but the Mexican industry is ready. However, it may wish to avoid appearing in any of Donald Trump’s tweets anytime soon.

Construction firm DMCI Holdings announced plans this week to enter the Philippine cement market. The company intends to build one cement plant on Semirara and three cement grinding plants elsewhere – at Batangas, Iloilo and Zamboanga – to give it a national presence. DMCI’s managing director Victor Limlingan admitted to local press that his company was taking a gamble on spending US$368m in this way.

It has staked its money on the Duterte Infrastructure Plan, a scheme from the new administration that was elected in June 2016 to target US$165bn (!) towards infrastructure spending until the early 2020s. Even if a portion of this money makes it from political hyperbole to the diggers then it is likely to mean a sustained construction boom for an economy that is already growing at around 6%/yr. DCMI’s excitement was almost palpable in mid-November 2016 when it put out a press release calling for potential partners to help it benefit from the rush when it comes. Although the company did add that all the discussions were at the exploratory stage at this time because it was still awaiting bidding documents.

DMCI’s project joins six plants in various stages of planning and construction from San Miguel, Northern Cement, Eagle Cement and LafargeHolcim. In addition four existing plants are carrying out upgrades to increase their production capacity. Clearly, things are looking up for the local cement industry. DMCI follows San Miguel which announced that it was going to spend US$1bn on building five cement plants around the country in mid-2015.

In line with this kind of investment the Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippines (CEMAP) said that cement sales had risen by 10.1% year-on-year to 20.1Mt in the first three quarters of 2016. This follows annual sales growth of 8.7% to 21.3Mt in 2014 and of 14.3% to 24Mt in 2015. CEMAP’s data for 2015 also shows that local demand overtook the country’s kiln capacity in 2014. Subsequently imports peaked to 314,000t in 2014, the highest level since 2002.

The country’s second largest producer Republic Cement, a joint venture between CRH and Aboitiz, reported sales growth similar to CEMAP’s one for the first three months of the year. LafargeHolcim, the largest producer, didn’t reveal any figures in its third quarter report but it marked the Philippines as one of its key contributors in the quarter. By contrast, Cemex noted lower growth in its third quarter report at 4% for the nine months to September 2016. It also said that the government transition following the election had slowed cement consumption, especially from infrastructure projects.

The Philippine cement industry is in the enviable position of being in a boom. The kind of problems it has to cope with includes provincial cement shortages, lobbying to increase usage of blended cements, scrutiny of prices by the government and a rise in technical smuggling. Once the new plants and upgrades start becoming operational the true nature of the market should become more apparent. At present it looks likely that DCMI gamble may turn out to be a wise one. The next question will be how many more companies want a piece of the piece too?

Jamaica: Peter Donkersloot Ponce has been appointed as the general manager of Caribbean Cement Company with effect from 7 November 2016. He replaces Alejandro Varés Leal who was originally appointed in May 2015 subject to an agreement between Caribbean Cement’s owner Trinidad Cement and Cemex. However, Varés Leal has taken up a promotion with Cemex. In accordance with the Agreement, Ponce was proposed by Cemex to replace Varés Leal.

The European Commission’s decision to investigate Duna-Dráva Cement’s (DDC) purchase of Cemex Croatia sticks out in a busy news week. There have been a few noteworthy news stories this week from the Indonesian government making preparations to fight overcapacity, LafargeHolcim retreating from Chile, Cemex restructuring its management in Colombia after investigations into a land deal and the announcement of merger plans between two of the larger refractory manufacturers. Yet the commission’s probe is a response to what may be in effect a ‘land grab’ by DDC. How on earth did HeidelbergCement and Schwenk, the joint-owners of DDC, think they were going to pass this one past the relevant competition bodies?!

As the commissions describes it, the “proposed transaction would combine Cemex Croatia, the largest producer in the area, and DDC, the largest importer.” So far, so bad. Then add the observation that Cemex Croatia and LafargeHolcim control all the cement terminals in ports along the Croatian coast. Cemex has three cement plants in the south of the country with no nearby competition. Giving the owners of DDC those assets ties up the market southern Croatia nicely. Understandably, the European Commission has concerns.

Croatia has five cement plants. LafargeHolcim runs a 0.45Mt/yr plant at Koromačno and Nasicecement run a 0.6Mt/yr plant at Nasice. Cemex’s three plants are all in the south near Split within about 10km of each other. When Global Cement visited in late 2014 Cemex Croatia told us that the plants were so close together that the company considered them as one plant. The sites also share one quarry for their raw materials. Only one of three plants, Sv Juraj the largest, has a bagging unit and Sv 10 Kolovoz was mothballed due to poor market demand. Together the plants have a cement production capacity of 1.92Mt/yr. This gives Cemex 65% of the market by production capacity.

Describing the three plants as one certainly makes sense for a company that might have been considering selling them. However, it is a fair comment given the close proximity of the plants to each other and the joint-capacity below that of some of the larger single site multi-kiln plants around the world. In this sense, the real questions for the European Commission will be how much of a dent to competition will it make to hand over the area’s main importer to the area’s main producer?

Graph 1: Cement consumption in Croatia, 2011 - 2015 (Mt). Source: Croatian Bureau of Statistics.

Looking at the national cement market since 2011 in Graph 1 using data from the Croatian Bureau of Statistics, sales volumes fell to a low in 2013 and have picked up since then, although not to the same levels. Prior to this cement sales halved from 2008 to 2013. Under these kinds of conditions Nexe Grupa, the owner of Nasicecement, filed with pre-bankruptcy settlements in 2013. HeidelbergCement expressed interest in the cement assets around this time, although nothing eventually happened. Imports of cement grew by 11% year-on-year to 312,000t in 2015 from 280,000t in 2014. This compares to a 1% increase to 2.36Mt in domestic cement sales in 2015.

As the commission suggests, combining the region’s biggest producer and its biggest importer seems like a recipe for reduced competition and inflated prices. This could be mitigated, in theory, if DDC decided to flood the region with imports from HeidelbergCement’s new assets from Italcementi once it completes its purchase of that company. Although a dominant player in a region undercutting its own prices seems far fetched. Theoreticals aside, it seems very unlikely that the European Commission will let the purchase go ahead without taking some sort of action.

LafargeHolcim was the last major European cement producer to release its second quarter financial results last week. The collective picture is confused. Cement sales volumes have risen but sales revenue have fallen.

Most of the producers have blamed negative currency effects for their falls in revenue during the first half of 2016. Holding a mixed geographical portfolio of building materials production assets has kept these companies afloat over the last decade but this has come with a price. The recent appreciation of the Euro versus currencies in various key markets, such as in Egypt, has hit balance sheets, since the majority of these firms are based in Europe and mostly use the Euro for their accounting. Meanwhile, sales volumes of cement have mostly risen for the companies we have examined making currency effects a major contributor.

Graph 1 - Changes in cement sales volumes for major non-Chinese cement producers in the first half of 2016 compared to the first half of 2015 (%). Data labels are the volumes reported in 2016. Source: Company reports.

As can be seen in Graph 1, sales volumes have risen for most of the producers, with the exception of LafargeHolcim. Despite blaming shortages of gas in Nigeria for hitting its operating income, LafargeHolcim actually saw its biggest drop in sales volumes in Latin America by 13.2% year-on-year to 11.8Mt. The other surprise here was that its North American region reported a 2.7% fall to 8.8Mt with Canada the likely cause. Vicat deserves mention here for its giant boost in sales volumes due to recovery in France and good performance in Egypt and the US, amongst other territories.

Graph 2 - Changes in sales revenue for major non-Chinese cement producers in the first half of 2016 compared to the first half of 2015 (%). Data labels are the sales reported in 2016. Source: Company reports.

Overall sales revenue for these companies presents a gloomier scenario with the majority of them losing revenue in the first half of the year, with most of them blaming negative currency effects for this. Titan is included in this graph to show that it’s not all bad news. Its growth in revenue was supported by good performance in the US and Egypt. Likewise, good performance in Eastern Europe and the US helped Buzzi Unicem turn in a positive increase in its sales revenue. They remain, however, the exception.

Looking at sales revenue generated from cement offers one way to disentangle currency effects from performance. Unfortunately, only about half of the companies looked at here actually published this for the reporting period. Of these, LafargeHolcim reported a massive rise that was probably due to the accounting coping with the merger process that finalised in 2015. Of the rest - HeidelbergCement, Italcementi and Vicat – the sales revenue from each company’s cement businesses fell at a faster rate than overall sales. Like-for-like figures here would help clarify this situation.

Meanwhile, a mixed global patchwork of cement demand is focusing multinational attention on key countries with growing economies like Egypt and Nigeria. Both of these countries have undergone currency devaluation versus the Euro and are facing energy shortages for various reasons. The exposure of the multinational cement producers to such places may become clearer in the second half of the year.

Back in the May 2016 issue of Global Cement Magazine we asked key people at the Portland Cement Association how they thought the US presidential election might affect the local cement industry. Wisely, for an advocacy organisation with offices in Washington DC, no one would be drawn, citing a lack of information. At that point it was still unclear who was going to be on the final ticket. However, we all missed a trick because one candidate, Donald Trump, had been talking about building ‘a border fence like you have never seen before’ since at least mid-2014. And that fence could potentially require a lot of cement.

Researchers at market analysts Bernstein’s sent a note to clients last week ahead of the Republican National Convention looking at the implications of if Donald Trump became president of the US and actually set out to build his 40ft high concrete wall between the US and Mexico. The result would be a 2.4Mt boost in demand for cement from cement producers near to the border. In terms of market demand Bernstein concluded that this would add over 1% to cement demand in both 2018 and 2019, a healthy ‘shot in the arm’ to the already pepped-up US cement industry, which is currently growing at around 5%/yr.

Map 1: Map of cement and ready-mix concrete plants near to the US - Mexico border. Source: Bernstein Materials Blast. Note – Bernstein does not show the Capitol Cement plant in San Antonio.

Needless to say, Bernstein’s calculations pile-drive assumptions into assumptions, atop of Trump’s political rhetoric. It bases its calculations on a border wall similar to the Israeli West Bank barrier built out of precast concrete panels. It also tries to model how much concrete and cement would be required depending on the differing height’s Trump has trumpeted at his rallies.

The kicker to this tongue-in-cheek analysis is that the construction company that stands to benefit the most from this infrastructure project is Mexican!

Cemex has significantly more cement plants and ready-mix concrete plants than any other company within a 200-mile zone either side of the border. Looking at integrated cement plants alone, it has six plants in the regions near to the proposed wall from the east and west coasts. Its nearest competitors, CalPortland with four plants and Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua with three plants, are more regionally based in the western US and Chihuahua state in Mexico. Clearly Cemex didn’t rate the chances of Donald Trump’s wall actually happening when it agreed to sell its Odessa cement plant to Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua in May 2016.

All of this goes to show that, wherever you stand on the Donald Trump presidency bid, if you manufacture cement near the US-Mexican border you might be working overtime if he (a) actually becomes president, (b) actually manages to start building his wall and (c) actually decides to make it using cement. Yet before anybody starts popping champagne corks consider this: there might also be unintended consequences for the cement sector. Restricting current legal and illegal migration trends from Mexico to the US might have a greater negative effect on the US cement industry, and the overall economy, than ordering one large infrastructure project. Working that one out is harder than a guesstimate of how much cement a border wall might consume. Probably best not to ask at this stage who might actually pay for the Great Wall of Donald Trump.

Cemex took a major step towards cutting its debts last week when it announced the sale of selected assets in the US for US$400m. Two cement plants in Odessa, Texas and Lyons, Colorado were included in the deal along with three cement terminals and businesses in El Paso, Texas and Las Cruces, New Mexico. Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua (GCC) was announced as the buyer.

Together the two plants being sold hold a cement production capacity of 1.5Mt/yr giving a rough cost of US$267/t for the assets. This compares to the cost of US$170/t that the European Cement Association (CEMBUREAU) estimates is required to build new capacity. Back in August 2015 when Taiheiyo Cement’s Californian subsidiary CalPortland purchased Martin Marietta Materials’ two cement plants in the state it paid US$181/t. Summit Materials paid far more at US$375/t in July 2015 when it purchased Lafarge’s cement plant in Davenport, Iowa, although that deal included seven cement terminals and a swap of a terminal. Other sales in 2014 to Martin Marietta Materials and Cementos Argos also hit values of around US$450/t involving lots of other assets including cement grinding plants and ready mix concrete plants.

Back on Cemex, the current sale to GCC maintains its position as the third largest cement producer in the US after the HeidelbergCement acquisition of Italcementi completes in July 2016 subject to Federal Trade Commission approval. However, it holds it with a reduced presence. Its cement production capacity will fall to 13Mt/yr from 14.5Mt/yr. It loses cement production presence in Colorado although it may retain distribution if it holds on to its terminal in Florence. In Texas it retains the Balcones cement plant near San Antonio and up to nine cement terminals depending on which ones it sells to GCC.

Selling assets in the US must be a tough decision for Cemex given that a quarter of its net sales came from the country in 2015. This was its single biggest territory for sales. This share has increased in the first quarter of 2016 as the US market for construction materials has continued to pick up.

Withdrawing from western Texas with its reliance on the oil industry makes sense. The plant it has retained in that state, the Balcones plant, is within the so-called Texas Triangle and so can hopefully continue to benefit from Texas’ demographic trends for continued housing starts and suchlike. Colorado is one of the middling US states in terms of population and likely to be a lower priority than other locations. The sales will see Cemex retrench its cement production base in southern and eastern parts of the country with the exception of the Victorville plant in California.

We’ve been watching Cemex keenly as other multinational cement producers have merged and laid out plans to merge in recent years. Saddled by debts, Cemex has appeared unable to either buy more assets itself and has remained distant from any talk of merger activity itself. The sales announcements in the US reinforce the image of a company taking action to relieve itself of its debts in 2016 following sales in Thailand, Bangladesh and the Philippines, and amended credit agreements and more borrowing. However, sales of cement plants in west Texas and Colorado outside of the strong markets in the US don’t quite suggest a company that has really committed yet to reducing its debt burden. Cemex continues to walk a tightrope between keeping the creditors at bay and riding the recovery in the US construction market.

This article was updated on 14 June 2016 with amended production capacity data for the Odessa cement plant

In April 2016 the shareholders of BP voted against a pay package of US$20m for the company's chief executive officer (CEO) Bob Dudley. The vote was non-binding to BP but it clearly sent a message to the management. Subsequently, the chairman Carl-Henric Svanberg acknowledged the mood amongst the company's investors and stated in his speech at the annual general meeting that, "We hear you. We will sit down with our largest shareholders to make sure we understand their concerns and return to seek your support for a renewed policy."

The link to the cement industry here is that many of the world's major cement producers are public companies. Similar to BP they internally set CEO and leading executive pay and remuneration packages. Just like BP, cement companies too could run into similar complaints from their shareholders, for example, should the construction and cement markets have similar jolts that the oil industry has faced since mid-2014.

To be clear: this article is not attempting to pass judgement on how much these CEOs are being compensated. It is merely seeing how compensation compares amongst a selection of leading cement companies. LafargeHolcim's revenue in 2015 was greater than the gross domestic product of over 90 countries. Running companies of this size is a demanding job. What is interesting here is how it compares and what happens when it is perceived to have grown too high, as in the case of BP.

It should also be noted that this is an extremely rough comparison of the way CEO pay and wage bills for large companies are presented. For example, the CEO total salary includes incentives, shares and pension payments. The staff wage bills includes pension payments, social charges and suchlike.

Graph 1: Comparison of CEO total remuneration from selected cement companies in 2015. Source: Company annual reports. 

There isn't a great deal to comment here except that compared to the average wage these are high from a rank-and-file worker perspective! The total salary for Eric Olsen, the CEO of LafargeHolcim, is lower than HeidelbergCement and Italcementi, which seems odd given that LafargeHolcim is the bigger company. However, Olsen has only been in-post since mid-2015. By contrast, Bernd Scheifele became the chairman of the managing board of HeidelbergCement in 2005. Carlo Pesenti, CEO of Italcementi and part of the controlling family, took over in 2004. Albert Manifold, CEO of CRH, also sticks out with a relatively (!) low salary given the high revenue of the company.

Graph 2: Comparison of CEO remuneration to average staff cost and total company revenue in 2015. Source: Company annual reports. 

This starts to become more interesting. HeidelbergCement's higher CEO/staff and CEO/revenue ratios might be explained by Scheifele's longer tenure. Yet Italcementi definitely sticks out with a much higher CEO wage compared to both the average staff wage and the company's revenue. Again, CRH stands out with a much lower CEO/staff ratio. Dangote's CEO/staff ratio is low but its CEO/revenue ratio is in line with the other companies' figures.

Consider the figures for China Resources and this suggests that CEO/revenue ratio may be more important than the CEO/staff ratio. The implication being that the market will only tolerate a ratio of up to about 0.05%. Any higher and the CEO's family has to own the company. Which, of course, is the case with Carlo Pesenti and Italcementi. Until HeidelbergCement takes over later in 2016 that is.

That’s as far as this rough little study of CEO remuneration at cement companies will go. So, next time anybody reading this article from a cement company asks for a pay rise, consider how much your CEO is receiving.