Global Cement News

Sandbag, a climate policy think tank, published its report on the European cement sector entitled ‘Cement - The Final Carbon Fatcat’ last week on 16 March 2016. Amongst its findings the report accused the European Union (EU) Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) of pushing up emissions created by the cement industry. Unsurprisingly, Cembureau, the European Cement Association, took exception to some of the content of the report and issued a rebuttal. Notably, it said that ‘allegations that the ETS has incentivised overproduction are based on thin air.’

Here we present a section of the executive summary of Sandbag’s report that describes the current situation with the EU ETS and how Sandbag argue this has distorted the European cement industry.

The depressed carbon price under the EU ETS has done little to effect a reduction in emissions from the European cement sector. A surplus of more than 2bn EU allowances (EUAs) has built up in the European carbon market since 2008 with no expectations for the situation to change significantly over the medium term. Industry sources cite that the costs of upgrades to best available technology are tantamount to greenfield investments. The current low carbon price alone is not enough to render such investments economic, especially in the context of a depressed cement market. This applies even more so in the case of capturing and storing/using direct emissions (CCUS) which at this stage seems to be an expensive technology merely in the development stages across Europe.

Figure 1: Expected development of allowance surpluses for major industrial sectors until the end of Phase 3. Source: EUTL (Sandbag calculations).

The rules governing free allocation of allowances have failed to incentivise abatement in the cement sector. In particular, the sector’s inclusion on the list of sectors exposed to the risk of carbon leakage, as well as insensitivity to production changes, will cause its over-allocation to balloon. As we reveal in Figure 1, if activity levels continue at 2014 levels, by 2020 this surplus will be larger than 2.5 years’ worth of emissions. This is more than would be the case for almost any of the other major industrial sectors, practically all of whom expect to lose all or most of their earlier surpluses by the end of this decade.

The chronic oversupply of EUAs to the cement sector is partly due to the fact that cement firms are able to optimise their production of different products across different facilities to maximise their free allocation. Free allocation to cement installations is based on benchmarks relating only to the manufacture of clinker, an intermediate product. Many firms have been able to retain maximum free allocation, corresponding to peak production, by keeping a range of their facilities operating at just above 50% of their historic activity levels – the level required to retain 100% free allocation.

Figure 2: EU net clinker trade. Source: UN COMTRADE (Sandbag calculations).

This free allocation loophole has resulted in both windfall profits and a de facto production subsidy for highly carbon-intensive clinker. This clinker is then either blended in higher than necessary shares into cement or, as we show in Figure 2, actually exported, as EU cement subsidised by free allowances has a competitive advantage compared to manufacturers outside the ETS. This creates a net import of emissions to the EU – the complete reverse of the carbon leakage threat that many industry groups have emphasised. As we show in Figure 3, this stimulation of clinker exports to countries outside the EU has been the single most damaging factor to the decarbonisation of this sector, pushing 2013 emissions nearly 15Mt higher than they could have been.

Figure 3: Different factors’ contribution to cutting the cement sector’s emissions EU-wide during 2005 - 2013. Source: Cement Sustainability Initiative ‘Getting the Numbers Right’ database (Sandbag calculations).

As well as causing a surge in emissions, the insufficiently responsive free allocation rules leave cement companies strongly over-allocated. Table 2 shows the surpluses we estimate that the five cement majors have accumulated (or monetised) since the beginning of Phase 2.

Table 2: Largest cement companies’ surpluses and emissions (millions of EUAs, euros and tonnes). Source: EUTL (Sandbag calculations).

These five companies from the cement sector have collectively received nearly Euro1bn worth of spare EU allowances (EUAs) for free between 2008 and 2014. As the number of free allowances available to all industry is fixed, over-allocation to cement companies reduces the allowances available to other sectors that might really need protection.

The ETS therefore provides few incentives for these firms to invest in decarbonisation technologies. Given widespread expectations for an over-supplied carbon market well in to the 2020s and, consequently, a low carbon price, the opportunity cost of holding onto allowances is negligible when compared to the high cost of investment in abatement technologies.

Thanks to Alex Luta and Wilf Lytton at Sandbag for letting Global Cement publish this extract of their report. The full version of ‘Cement - The Final Carbon Fatcat: How Europe’s cement sector benefits and the climate suffers from emissions trading flaws’ is available to download from Sanbag’s website.

Ireland: CRH appointed William J Teuber, Jr as a non-executive Director with effect from 3 March 2016.

Teuber, aged 64 years and a US citizen, is the Vice Chairman at EMC Corporation, a global leader in enabling businesses and service providers to transform their operations and deliver IT as a service. In previous roles he was responsible for EMC’s global sales and distribution organisation (2006 – 2012) and served as Chief Financial Officer leading the company’s worldwide finance operation (1996 - 2006). Prior to joining EMC he was a partner in the audit and financial advisory services practice of Coopers & Lybrand.

Teuber is a member of the Board of Directors of Popular, a diversified financial services company, and Inovalon Holdings, a healthcare technology company. He holds an MBA degree from Babson College, a Master of Science in Taxation from Bentley College, and a Bachelors Degree from Holy Cross.

Cemex has taken action towards its debts over the course of the last week. First, it announced that it had amended its credit agreements in order to delay the looming effects of consolidated financial leverage and coverage ratio limits by one year to March 2017 with other similar deadlines also delayed. Then it announced the pricing of US$1bn of Senior Secured Notes due in 2026, a form of secured borrowing. This was followed by confirmation of asset sales in Bangladesh and Thailand. Finally, it announced that it was seeking regulatory permission to sell a minority stake in its subsidiary in the Philippines.

This column has discussed the on-going financial travails at Cemex a few times, notably recently when the group released its fourth quarter results for 2015 and in the wake of HeidelbergCement’s announcement to buy Italcementi. Basically, it all comes down to debt, as the following graph shows.

Figure 1 - Cemex assets, debt and equity, 2006 - 2015

Cemex took on large amounts of debt following its acquisition of Rinker in 2007. Since then the value of its assets have been falling faster than it has been able to reduce its debts. However, its equity (assets minus debts) is looking like it might dip below its debts in 2016. Hence, action needs to be taken. Cemex appears to have attempted to do this over the last week. Will it be enough?

The credit amendment was probably the most pressing issue for the Cemex management given that the terms have been reliant on maintaining a leverage ratio (debt divided by assets) below a set limit. Cemex has extended the terms of the borrowing in its favour so it can keep the leverage ratio higher for longer without penalty from its creditors. Note that the leverage ratio here means the ratio between debt and operating earnings before interest, taxation, depreciation and amortisation (EBIDTA).

Selling assets and shares in Asia is the next step in cutting debt in the window the group has negotiated for itself. It holds minor cement production assets in Thailand and Bangladesh that it is selling to Siam City Cement for US$53m. These include a 0.8Mt/yr integrated cement plant in Saraburi, Thailand and a 0.52Mt/yr cement grinding plant in Madangonj, Bangladesh. Unfortunately for Cemex it purchased the Saraburi plant for US$77m in 2001 from Saraburi Cement making it a loss of at least US$24m.

A minority sale of shares in its Philippines assets is more promising. The group runs two integrated cement plants in the country, the Solid Cement Plant in Rizal and the APO Cement Plant in Cebu with a combined cement production capacity of 6.23Mt/yr and a new 1.5Mt/yr production line on the way at Solid Cement also. Local media estimate that the sale could earn Cemex as much as US$850m from the booming market. The Cement Manufacturer's Association of the Philippines reported that cement sales volumes grew by 14.3% to 24.4Mt in 2015 with more growth predicted for 2016.

The credit amendment and asset sales of US$0.9bn may give Cemex the breathing room it requires to keep the creditors at bay for a while longer. It originally refinanced its debts in 2009 at the height of the financial crisis to keep the business running until the markets picked up again. They haven’t. A question that might be legitimately asked at Cemex’s analyst day later this week, on 17 March 2016, is this: when is Cemex going to seriously tackle its debts? As the situation continues the group may end up devoting more time to managing its debts than it will to actually making cement and other building products.

India: Burnpur Cement has signed an agreement with Saurabh Ganguly as a brand ambassador for the company for three years from 11 March 2016. Ganguly was the former captain of the Indian cricket team. As the brand ambassador for the company he will endorse the product and brand of the cement producer to help increase of sales.

Germany: Johan Cnossen has resigned as the Chief Executive Officer and a member of the Management Board of KHD with immediate effect from 11 March 2016. He cited personal reasons. Other Management Board members will take over his responsibilities for an interim period.