Analysis

What’s in a name? Well maybe quite a lot when the company in question originally formed as a ‘merger of equals.’ So the news this week that the shareholders of LafargeHolcim have agreed to change its group name to Holcim suggests quite a lot. The name will only apply to the group company name and all market brands will remain as they are. Yet something fundamental appears to have changed.

As readers may remember, the original merger arrangements between Lafarge and Holcim ran into difficulties in early 2015 when Holcim’s shareholders expressed discontent at the perceived difference in value between the two companies in 2014. The deal was saved with a move away from a proposed 1-1 share exchange ratio towards one more in the favour of the Holcim shareholders and the removal of Lafarge’s chief executive Bruno Lafont as the designated chief executive of the new entity. However, from this point onwards the nagging suspicious was that the merger was really a glacial takeover of Lafarge by Holcim. Lafont and LafargeHolcim’s first chief executive officer (CEO) Eric Olsen became embroiled in legal proceedings surrounding Lafarge’s historic conduct in Syria. Then in mid-2018 LafargeHolcim decided to close its Paris headquarters, Lafarge’s old hub. During an extraordinary general meeting in May 2015 held by Holcim it was agreed to rename Holcim Ltd as LafargeHolcim Ltd as part of the merger process. The latest decision by shareholders in 2021 has reversed this.

For consumers of building products the bit about market brands staying as they are, as LafargeHolcim changes its name, is probably more important than the corporate wrangling over whatever the faraway parent company may or may not be called. So, Holcim Argentina’s plans this week to open 1000 new branches of its Disensa retail chain by 2024 may be far more important for existing and potential customers in that country. This is an enormous number of hardware stores for just one country by most reckonings and its gives one an idea of LafargeHolcim’s ambitions in the sector. It also carries echoes of the trend of business chains taking over the previously independent convenience store sector in the food sector in other parts of the world in recent decades. The Disensa franchise already operates over 2500 stories in eight countries - Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua and El Salvador – and it holds claim to being the largest building materials network in Latin America. And they aren’t stopping with just selling building materials. One innovation announced in April 2021 was the introduction of financial services to small businesses wanting to buy building products at its stores.

LafargeHolcim isn’t saying how much its retail chains contribute to the bottom line but no doubt it’s helping in a variety of ways. During an earnings call for its fourth quarter results in 2020, for example, its chief financial officer Geraldine Picaud noted that growth in Latin America in the second half of 2020 was driven by branded product in all distribution channels, including the Disensa chain. She also added that the region had the highest margin in the group at the time. Another thing to consider is, if the rumours about LafargeHolcim preparing to sell its operations in Brazil are true, what will it do with the local Disensa chain? Divesting carbon-intensive heavy industries, such as cement production, but migrating outwards and upwards in the building materials supply chain would certainly suggest that the company is preparing for its place in a low-carbon future.

Yet with all this talk of what LafargeHolcim or Holcim wants to call itself it is interesting to note that it was under Holcim in 2005 that Disensa was turned into a franchise network in its original home of Ecuador. A similar version of this model called Binastore was expanded and launched by LafargeHolcim in 2018 for Africa and the Middle East. ‘Joe Public’ or rather ‘José Public’ may not care what LafargeHolcim is called when they are buying cement from their local Disensa store. Other hardware stories are of course available.

For those not following the news in Nigeria, a nationwide row has broken out about the cost of cement in the country. Two of the three main local producers have been forced to publicly defend their pricing. Alongside this, the Senate of Nigeria has implored the federal government to encourage further local investment in cement production with the goal of keeping the end price down.

The current debacle started to take form in the autumn of 2020 when the price of cement leapt up by 35%. Builders and those immediately affected started complaining then but the argument really heated up in April 2021 when the local press started comparing the price of cement in Nigeria unfavourably against neighbouring countries. Dangote Cement, one of Africa’s largest cement producing companies and a Nigerian-based one at that, immediately defended itself by pointing out that its ex-factory price was the same or lower than in other African countries. It added that it could not control the price of cement between its factory and the end-consumer with dealers and middlemen benefiting from the gap. A week later the Senate of Nigeria intervened with its members discussing the issue in relation to a bill intended to liberalise the sector. This week, BUA Cement said publicly that it had no plans to raise the ex-factory price of its cement at the present time or in the future, “…barring any material, unforeseen circumstances.”

The roots of the current crisis go back to the mid-2010s when Nigeria declared itself ‘self-sufficient’ in cement after building up its domestic production capacity. At the same time it discouraged imports and embraced exports. Today, the country’s cement production capacity is around 49Mt/yr and annual demand is around 21Mt. This self-sufficiency path reached one milestone for Dangote Cement in 2020 with clinker exports starting from its Apapa terminal and the commissioning of its Onne Export Terminal in Port Harcourt. Under the old narrative for the sector this was a moment for congratulation. Suddenly though, instead of being seen as the saviour of the industry, members of the legislature were asking whether it was a good thing for Dangote Cement to hold a 60% share of the local market with most of the rest shared between Lafarge Africa and BUA Cement.

The price row has seen Dangote Cement promptly suspend exports from those new terminals. It also said it had reactivated its 4.5Mt/yr Gboko plant in Benue State, which was reportedly mothballed in 2018. It is worth noting here that the Gboko plant was part of that national capacity total above despite being mothballed until fairly recently. Aside from the middleman argument, the producer said that its production costs had risen over the past 15 months due to negative currency effects but that it hadn’t increased its ex-factory prices since December 2019.

A survey by the News Agency of Nigeria in the north-east of the country revealed all sorts of speculation about why the price was so high but few facts. Some of the opinions expressed included: the coronavirus outbreak; low production rates at the plants; market middlemen; and transport costs. What is clearer is that the country’s cement production capacity is more than double that of its demand. On paper at least the nation should be able to satisfy its own needs and then export the same again with plenty spare. Yet somehow this isn’t happening. If the government really believes in self-sufficiency it may be time to take another look at the cement sector, the challenges it faces and the needs of the end consumers.

LafargeHolcim retained its ability to surprise this week with the news that it may be making preparations to leave Brazil. Local press in Minas Gerais revealed on 20 April 2021 that the company was about to try and sell its operations in the country. The building materials producer has not made a public statement yet on the matter, it may not until a deal is done and/or this could all be a great big misunderstanding. So treat the following with caution.

Firstly, LafargeHolcim deciding to sell in Brazil fits with the selective approach increasingly shown by the non-Chinese cement multinationals in recent years. It famously decided to sell up in South-East Asia from 2018 and it got as far as divesting assets in Indonesia and Malaysia. It also tried to sell in the Philippines but the local competition commission didn’t give permission for the proposed deal in the end. As Global Cement Weekly mentioned at the time this was a bold move and doing the same in Brazil seems similarly decisive now. It’s a big market to leave! CRH and HeidelbergCement have both talked openly as well about taking a value-first approach to their divestment strategies rather than trying to retain blanket coverage. However, just because a sale in Brazil by LafargeHolcim sounds right doesn’t mean it is right.

Secondly, data from the National Cement Industry Association (SNIC) shows that the Brazilian cement industry had a good year in 2020. Despite the relentlessly bad news from the coronavirus pandemic, the Brazilian government decided to keep the economy mostly open, allowing the cement industry to continue its recovery since 2018. The sector reported an 11% rise year-on-year in cement sales to 60Mt in 2020. So far in 2021 it has noted a 19% rise year-on-year to 15.3Mt in the first quarter of 2021. Yet, the association forecast slower growth in 2021 as a whole and has warned that the first quarter figures in 2021 don’t show a true picture due to a decline in sales per working day so far in 2021 despite an apparent growth in absolute figures. On the surface it’s a good time to sell cement assets in the country since the sector has been riding a recovery but the general outlook for the country is looking gloomy especially considering the ongoing scale of its coronavirus outbreak and the uncertain damage this may do to the economy as a whole.

Whether or not LafargeHolcim is actually selling up in Brazil or not it, follows the conclusion of the CRH Brazil acquisition by Buzzi Unicem’s Companhia Nacional de Cimento (CNC) joint-venture that was also announced this week after approval by the completion authority. The assets that CRH Brasil has now sold include three integrated cement plants and two grinding plants in the south-east of the country. The subsidiary sold approximately 2.8Mt of cement in 2020. If nothing else this suggests that there should be companies out there pursuing a different strategy to LafargeHolcim, CRH, HeidelbergCement and the rest who will be only too happy to build their portfolio if LafargeHolcim’s Brazilian business does go on sale.

CRH originally bought its plants in Brazil as part of a package deal when Lafarge and Holcim merged in 2015 and any potential sales by LafargeHolcim also link back to this. LafargeHolcim has spent much of the last six years working out what kind of company it wants to be. Certainly, since the current chief executive officer Jan Jenisch took charge it has had the air of a company with a mission. The Firestone Building Products acquisition earlier in 2021 is an example of this, propelling the group away from the triad of cement, concrete and aggregates as the carbon risks of heavy building materials heat up. There is something fitting perhaps that at the company’s next annual general meeting its shareholders will be asked whether they want to change the company’s name to Holcim at the group level. It’s a small thing, all market brands will remain as they are, but it may bookend the post-merger era as much as asset divestments in Indonesia and... potentially Brazil.

A great question was asked at yesterday’s Virtual Global CemTrans Seminar: what impact did the recent blockage of the Suez Canal cause to the cement industry? Luckily, Rahul Sharan from Drewry was on hand discussing freight costs following the start of the coronavirus pandemic.

As most readers will know, the Suez Canal was blocked in late March 2021 when the 200,000dwt Ever Given ran aground, at around six nautical miles from the southern entry of the canal. The ultra large container vessel was subsequently refloated and towed away just under a week later. While this was happening the fate of the ship became a global news story with business analysts totting up the cost of the obstruction. 40 bulk carriers were reported as waiting to transit the waterway the day after the blockage started and some of these were carrying cement. Reporting by the BBC noted that 369 ships were stuck waiting on either side of the blockage on the day before the ship was finally freed. The Suez Canal Authority (SCA) estimated their loss of revenue from the incident at US$14 – 15m/day. Analysts like Allianz placed the cost to the global economy at US$6 - 10bn/day.

In Sharan’s view the blockage of the Suez Canal happened at a potentially risky moment for cement and clinker shipping because there was already congestion in shipping lanes built up on the east coast of South America and around Australia. However, a delay of a week around the canal, followed by the resulting congestion dispersing quickly over the following days, does not seem to have had any major impact so far.

Sharan’s presentation at Global CemTrans also included a summary of cement shipping. The key takeaways were that clinker shipping overtook cement shipping in 2019 with a connected increase in fleets investing in handymax-sized vessels. He also pointed out the key cement and clinker importing countries in 2019, before the coronavirus pandemic started causing market disruption. For cement: the US, the Philippines and Singapore. For clinker: China, Bangladesh and the Philippines. Turkey and Vietnam were the biggest exporters for both in that year.

The Ever Given incident has highlighted the continued importance of the Suez Canal for global trade for commodities. Goods still need to be physically moved around, however much stuff we digitise. It also contrasts with the issues that the Egyptian cement sector has faced in recent years such as production overcapacity. While domestic cement plants have struggled to maintain their profits, plenty of cement carriers have been transiting through the Isthmus of Suez. Local producers may well have gazed at them and wondered where they were going.

One of them, Al-Arish Cement Company, took action in this direction this week with its first export shipment of clinker. The Clipper Isadora ship disembarked East Port Said port for Ivory Coast. Future shipments are planned for West Africa, Canada, the US and Europe. Ship tracking reveals that the Clipper Isadora has not taken the Suez Canal on this occasion.

The proceedings pack for the Virtual CemTrans Seminar 2 2021 is available to buy now

Global Cement Weekly celebrates its 500th edition this week. This corresponds to nearly a decade’s worth of news and comment upon the cement industry, since the first edition went out in early June 2011. Time is brief, so the quick version of all of this is as follows: China; production growth; production overcapacity; grinding; corporate mergers; regionalisation; CO₂; digitisation; and coronavirus.

Those looking for the longer version should read Peter Edwards’ review of the 2010s in the December 2019 issue of Global Cement Magazine. Although be warned, few were expecting a global pandemic to rock markets and possibly hasten future trends when that article was written. Those looking for the even longer version should read the last 10 years of the magazine and the website… and then let us know what we missed.

Looking back at the first few editions of Global Cement Weekly brings to mind the LP Hartley quote, “the past is a foreign country; they do things differently there.” It’s all very familiar until one comes across the little things that makes one realise how much has actually changed.

For example, countries were imposing import tariffs on cement, companies were buying each other, national cement associations were lobbying hard for their members and cement plants were investing in alternative fuels equipment. All that stuff has been happening continually over the last decade and right into this week, with Russian media announcing who has won the auction to buy Eurocement and LafargeHolcim closing its deal to buy Firestone Building Products. Yet, Lafarge and Holcim were still separate companies and Italcementi was independent in 2011. On the sustainability side, Norcem and its parent company HeidelbergCement Group, with the European Cement Research Academy (ECRA), had just started a partnership agreement with Aker Clean Carbon (ACC) to study post-combustion CO₂ capture technology at Norcem’s plant in Brevik, Norway. Jump forward nine years and Norcem signed a deal with Aker Solutions in mid-2020 to order a full scale CO₂ capture, liquification and intermediate storage plant at Brevik.

The big numbers from the United States Geological Survey (USGS) show that global cement production grew by 24% to 4.1Bnt in 2020 from 3.3Bnt in 2010. However, the big growth had stopped by around 2013 and production has hovered between 4.0Bnt/yr and 4.2Bnt/yr ever since. Alongside this, Getting the Number Right (GNR) data indicates that net CO₂ emissions for cementitous products fell by 4% to 610kg/t in 2018 from 636kg/t in 2010. The former may show a levelling off of production as the Chinese market stabilised in the 2010s but the latter shows the progress that has been made in reducing cement-related CO₂ emissions and the scale of the challenge that remains ahead.

Graph 1: Embodied energy versus embodied CO₂ of building materials. Source: Hammond & Jones, University of Bath, UK.

Cement industry readers should not lose heart about the future of the industry though, while environmental pressure continues to mount. Graph 1 above shows the embodied CO₂ and energy of common building materials. Cement has been rightly identified as a major emitter of CO₂ but any society that desires to build strong structures cheaply and at scale requires concrete to do so whilst the data above remains unchallenged. The ratios may change, such as the perennial energy-cost influenced tug-of-war between asphalt and concrete roads, but concrete remains the only game in town. For now. At which point cement production becomes all about reducing the CO₂ emissions or capturing them, and determining who exactly pays for this. This then brings us to the present with the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme carbon price of over Euro40/t and other schemes popping up all around the planet. One echo from one of the early editions of Global Cement Weekly was the furore over Australia’s attempt at a carbon tax in the early 2010s. It was repealed in 2014.

One prediction about how the 2020s might be summarised for the cement industry is this: how to get away with pumping out all that CO₂? Let’s see what the next decade will bring.