Analysis

Camargo Corrêa's ongoing bid for Cimpor must be creating nightmares for Brazil's anti-cartel authorities.

If the takeover goes through, Camargo Corrêa's Brazilian market share will rise from 24% to 37% according to data from the Global Cement Directory 2012. Together with industrial conglomerate Grupo Votorantim, who already own 21% of Cimpor, this share would amount to 72% of the country's total cement capacity.

As covered in this week's Global Cement Weekly #44 Jose Barros Franco, chief executive of Intercement a subsidiary of Camargo Corrêa, has explicitly denied that Camargo had a pre-agreement with Votorantim to split up Cimpor assets. However, he did not rule out a deal in the future to jointly manage the company. This implies that companies representing nearly three-quarters of the Brazilian cement market might be working together to at least some degree!

In October 2011 Camargo Corrêa denied that it was in talks to buyout Cimpor. According to one source at that time, Camargo Corrêa planned to take over Cimpor's operations in Brazil while Votorantim was considering taking assets outside of Brazil. Currently analysts expect the same thing to happen now if the takeover goes through, especially given any possible anti-competitive attention in Brazil.

With operations in four continents Portugal's Cimpor holds 77% of its global capacity outside of Brazil. If the takeover does actually happen, then the key question is this: how much of Cimpor's international operation does Votorantim want in return for helping its competitor Camargo Corrêa to grow back at home in Brazil?

Friday saw the news that many have long suspected: China is producing too much cement. Liu Ming, an official with the department of industry within the National Development and Reform Commission, announced that China faces national overcapacity in the next five years.

For anyone used to reading the permanently good news from China's cement industry this is a massive jolt. The natural reaction to dealing with industrial news from a command-style economy is to assume that everything is 'airbrushed'. This then demands the question: how much trouble is the Chinese cement industry really in?

Despite persistent rumours querying how long China's unparallelled growth could last, official responses have only appeared in the last two months. First the environment ministry announced stricter rules regarding nitrogen oxide emissions from cement plants in February 2012. Commentators suggested that the move could wipe out a third of the industry's profits. Shortly afterwards FLSmidth, entered the Chinese environmental control technology market.

In early March 2012 Premier Wen Jiabao lowered China's growth target for 2012, signalling public political acceptance of an inevitable economic 'soft landing'. Then in late March 2012 analysts' reports emerged predicting that each of China's main producers would suffer weakened profits in 2012. Only CNBM, China's biggest producer, appears to have bucked this trend. It announced that it expected its net profit to jump more than 100% compared to 2011. However the general uncertainty regarding statistics from China throws doubt on how realistic this forecast may be.

Yet before we give up hope it's worth remembering that opportunity abounds in a market as gargantuan as China. The rest of 2012 will be an interesting period for the Chinese cement industry.

It's official: the big boys are heading to India this week.

First Lafarge head Bruno Lafont announced broad expansion plans in the subcontinent. Then a Holcim presentation emerged from earlier in 2012 projecting that the company expects India's overall construction market to take the global third position after China and the US by 2020.

With the Indian construction share set to rise from US$360bn in 2010 to US$840bn in 2020 that's one massive market share up for grabs. Throw in some interpretation from India's 2011 census and the signs are that its population could overtake China's by 2030. Sounds like an absolutely perfect opportunity for your average embattled European cement corporation!

Except that there's no such thing as a sure bet. As we covered previously, Indian cement consumption fell for the first time in 20 years in August 2011. The cause was put down to political problems holding up infrastructure in key states. In March 2012 we've had two stories that have impacted upon the local industry. First the Railway Board of India hiked the freight rates by 24%. Then the Union Budget for 2012-13 increased the excise and service tax. Clearly everybody wants a piece of the 'inevitable' bonanza. If anything impedes India's growth in the next decade there may be bargains going for cement on the export market.

Elsewhere this week we have stories on the potential cost of a proposed air pollution ruling upon two plants in the US state of Montana, more information on a revival in the Gulf Cooperation Council region and more capacity growth in Indonesia.

Reporting the annual results for Turkish cement producer Adana Çimento opened up an issue familiar from many of the international big players' annual reports last year: currency fluctuations.

The conversion rate between the US dollar and the Turkish lira rose from US$1 to Turkish lire 1.55 at the end of 2010 to US$1 to Turkish lira 1.89 at the end of 2011. This created the alarming situation where the company's annual sales rose by 3% from 2010 to 2011 if you measured it in Turkish lira, but fell by 15% if you measured it in US dollars!

Great news for currency speculators playing with so-called 'hot money' but not so great for manufacturers seeking stable trading conditions. As for the company's shareholders, if they are paid their dividend in Turkish lira then it's the value of the lira that is important. If the shareholders have to change Turkish lira into their own 'foreign' currency in order to spend it (or keep it in the bank), into dollars for example, then that's when they could lose out.

This is particularly bad news for a country like Turkey with its strong export market. Although looking at the nation's top export destinations in 2010 reveals a roll call of instability, including Iraq, Syria, Libya and Egypt. Regardless of the price, these countries are going to need cement when the dust settles from ongoing political turmoil, something we also cover in another story this week with reports of striking at Egyptian plants. Cement isn't likely to be coming from Saudi Arabia though, which we see is enjoying demand driven by government-funded construction projects.

Elsewhere this week we have stories on the impact of the Indian Budget on the cement industry, yet more Dangote projects in Cameroon and Liberia and promising signs from Taiheiyo in Japan.

Last week Lafarge received a US$20m slap-in-the-face for cartel-like activity in South Africa. The case, which has been running since 2008, has investigated dealings at Lafarge, Pretoria Portland Cement, AfriSam and Natal Portland Cement-Cimpor. Yet the question remains: are cartels ever a good thing for the industry?

Back in December 2011 we covered the Common Price Agreement (CPA) in an article on cement price trends in the UK in Global Cement Magazine. This legally-approved cartel, operated by the UK Cement Makers' Federation, ran from 1934 until 1987. It was dissolved to allow UK producers to compete with cheaper foreign imports. Its supporters argued that it kept prices down in remote areas and stabilised the industry, a situation that cement buyers faced with escalating prices in Tanzania and Saudi Arabia might sympathise with this week. Despite this, prices in the UK fell after the CPA ended in 1987.

An uncited 'fact' on Wikipedia – itself a virtual monopoly on online knowledge – suggests that the median price increase achieved by cartels over the last 200 years could be 25%. Lafarge's fine represented 6% of its 2010 annual turnover in the region. Depending on how Lafarge's sales relate to its turnover this raises the possibility that even with its hefty fine Lafarge may still be in profit over the venture.

Cartels dog the cement industry given the prevalence of small groups of sellers in many markets. Throw in the current economic pressures in regions with over-capacity and the temptation must be irresistible. When one makes a link from this week's story from Pakistan about over-capacity to January's headline of 'inexplicably high' prices, the feeling occurs that Lafarge's chastening in South Africa is just the tip of the iceberg.

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